Colombia 2010: analisis de las elecciones presidenciales y legislativas
In: Colombia internacional, Heft 74, S. 9-26
ISSN: 0121-5612
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In: Colombia internacional, Heft 74, S. 9-26
ISSN: 0121-5612
In: Revista latinoamericana de política comparada, Band 4, S. 75-98
ISSN: 1390-4248
In: Política y gobierno, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 3-34
ISSN: 1665-2037
In Chile & Colombia bicameral disagreements over on legislation are resolved through a parliamentary committee that has the power & responsibility to craft a consensual alternative. We show why members of these committees have a privileged position from which to influence the content of legislation. These legislators can act strategically & advance their preferences even when they confront institutionally powerful presidents. Conference Committees in Chile & Colombia play a decisive role in many important instances & in practice their proposals are rarely defeated. Adapted from the source document.
In: Electoral Studies, Band 29, Heft 4, S. 648-660
The Colombian case offers a rare opportunity to observe effects of electoral reform where districting remains constant. Only the formula changed, from extremely 'personalized' (seats allocated solely on candidate votes) to 'listized': seats are allocated to party lists, which may be either open or closed. Electoral reform has effects on both the inter-party dimension (the number of parties competing) and the intra-party dimension (the extent of competition within parties). Consistent with theoretical expectations, the inter-party dimension features an increased number of parties in the low-magnitude districts and a decrease in the high-magnitude districts. On the intra-party dimension, the impact 'mirrors' the inter-party: less competition in smaller districts, yet more in larger districts. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]
In: Electoral Studies, Band 29, Heft 4
The Colombian case offers a rare opportunity to observe effects of electoral reform where districting remains constant. Only the formula changed, from extremely 'personalized' (seats allocated solely on candidate votes) to 'listized': seats are allocated to party lists, which may be either open or closed. Electoral reform has effects on both the inter-party dimension (the number of parties competing) and the intra-party dimension (the extent of competition within parties). Consistent with theoretical expectations, the inter-party dimension features an increased number of parties in the low-magnitude districts and a decrease in the high-magnitude districts. On the intra-party dimension, the impact 'mirrors' the inter-party: less competition in smaller districts, yet more in larger districts. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]
This paper explores the characteristics of the political economy process that conditioned the scope and success of the combination of fiscal reforms before and after Colombia's 1991 constitutional reforms. Using formal analysis of reforms and interviews with actors, reforms in taxation, decentralization, the budgetary process and pensions are examined in times of political crisis, economic crisis, and economic boom. The results generally confirm the hypothesis that increased political fragmentation and limited unilateral executive power after the 1991 reforms restricted the extent of reforms, particularly in tax law. Nonetheless, the enactment of piecemeal reforms was encouraged by crisis conditions.
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In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 153-174
ISSN: 0362-9805