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AbstractManuscript TypeReviewResearch Question/IssueWe survey the literature on corporate governance in banks in the US and international settings. We discuss how the specialness of banks, deposit insurance, high bank leverage, and bank regulation interact with bank governance. We evaluate bank governance from three perspectives: (1) maximizing bank equity value, (2) maximizing total enterprise value, and (3) maximizing social objectives. Our survey includes evidence on how bank governance differs from that of manufacturing firms. We also survey studies on managerial incentives in banks and their implications for bank performance and risk taking before and during the 2007–2008 financial crisis.Research Findings/InsightsThe high leverage (usually above 90 percent) of banking institutions gives rise to a trade‐off between strengthening equity governance and maximizing enterprise value. Aligning managers very closely with shareholders can give rise to strong incentives for risk shifting to the detriment of firm value. The bank risk choices might also go against the societal objectives of a stable financial system.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWe provide a framework for the optimal design of bank governance and bank regulation, considering the objectives of both depositors and society‐at‐large in addition to those of bank shareholders. This framework could be especially important in determining risk choices by banks and the effects of such on the stability of the financial system.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur analysis of the literature surveyed has policy implications for bank regulation, top‐management compensation in banks, and directives for design of governance in banks. We discuss implications for direct regulation of banks and regulation of bank governance. The findings surveyed provide guidance for board independence, board size, board composition, and incentive features in top‐management compensation.