Suchergebnisse

This evaluation sought to understand CCAFS' influence in motivating actors to tackle climate change. In CCAFS' theory of change, a cross-cutting aim is to work with strategic partners to "foster policy and institutional change" that will enable large-scale CSA adoption. A conceptual framework was developed, and an innovative approach based on the Digital Methods epistemology was employed to explore the dynamics of knowledge dissemination and changes in attitude towards CSA among stakeholders at various levels. It considered online networks and narratives as evidence of "offline" program influence. Results show that CCAFS has inspired positive change in government policy; built a global community for climate adaption; and sparked public interest in "Climate Smart Agriculture".

2021's Conference of Parties, the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of Parties (COP26), is crucially important as governments—for the first time since the Paris Agreement—are expected to agree on concrete commitments and greater ambitions to limit global warming to 1·5°C. COP26 President-Designate Alok Sharma stated that delivery of US$100 billion in climate finance is going to be the key to whether the goals of COP26 succeed or fail. At the same time, people worldwide have started acknowledging the impacts of the climate crisis on peace and security—otherwise called the climate security nexus.1, 2 The concern then becomes where and how objectives and investments in adaptation and peacebuilding can be aligned, and how trade-offs between climate finance, peace, and security can be minimised or avoided.

The increasingly interconnected nature of our world means that failing to achieve coherence between climate- and peace and security-related policy domains forms a significant climate-related security risk. Poorly designed climate policies that are insensitive to pre-existing insecurities and conflict dynamics may undermine political stability, amplify social inequalities and grievances, and accelerate a loss of biodiversity and climate change-related impacts. Peace and security policies that do not account for climate risks may conversely promote ineffective and unresponsive interventions and risk locking communities into vicious cycles of insecurity and climate vulnerability. This work contributes to the climate securityproofing of policy outputs by developing a methodological framework that assesses the degree to which policy outputs and strategy documents display awareness of climate-related security risks and climatepeace opportunities. This framework is used to assess policies and strategies from across eight African countries. We find that despite some limited recognition of often place-specific climate-related security risks, a clear and shared conceptual understanding of the climate, peace and security nexus is generally lacking; climate and environment-related policies are generally more aware of climate security and have greater cross-sectoral engagement than peace and security-related policies; and that opportunities exist for the integration of climate security-related considerations into existing strategic priorities, instruments and programmatic activities.

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Approaches to operationalising the linkages between climate, peace and security are increasingly demanded by international organisations. Yet, there is a limited understanding of what effective programming practices that address climate-related security risks entail. Critical voices argue that programme designs often rely on analyses that ignore structural and cultural realities on the ground, leading to technocratic understandings of risks, and prescriptions for action that do not relate to people's experiences, perceptions and values. Advised by social learning theory, this study developed and evaluated a participatory appraisal method to guide the design of environmental peacebuilding programming strategies meant to address climate-related security risks. The method was evaluated across nine rural locations in Kenya, Senegal and Guatemala, involving 221 participants. Based on a critical evaluation of the method, opportunities and challenges for the use of social learning approaches to advise environmental peacebuilding programming are discussed. Results indicate that appraisal processes of collective reflection can support jointly articulated and context-relevant understandings of climate-related security risks. This shared knowledge can then support local communities in the design of climate adaptation strategies that potentially contribute to sustainable peacebuilding. Settings characterised by low political legitimacy and the unwillingness of conflictive actors to engage in dialogue are identified as barriers for the development of feasible programming strategies.

Is climate variability regressive? One argument could be as follows: People living in areas with high risk of climate hazards usually correspond to the most disadvantaged populations. Due to existing structural inequalities, they have limited opportunities to cope with climate hazards and often fall into a spiral of further poverty and social exclusion. In this paper, we investigate whether climate variability indeed has a regressive effect in Vietnam and Indonesia where both climate variability and inequality have been increasing. We directly analyse the effect of annual and seasonal temperature on income and income inequality across years. We do so by looking at the Vietnamese and Indonesian populations as a whole and also investigating more in-depth how these impacts change for the most vulnerable and marginalised groups. Our results suggest that climate variability increases inequality and that its biggest burden is bore by existing vulnerable groups. In Indonesia, these groups are rural, farming, low educated, female headed households, whose income is significantly reduced because of changes in climate conditions. Similarly, in Vietnam, ethnic minorities, rural, farming, and agricultural households bear the biggest impact of climate variability. Interestingly, some households in Vietnam are able to completely offset short-term impact of climate variability, using remittances and transfer as an insurance, but our findings also show that their coping strategy does not withstand longer term impacts of persistent climate variability. Despite the remarkable efforts of the national governments in supporting most vulnerable and marginalised groups in the Vietnamese and Indonesian societies in the past decades, specific interventions are needed to address the needs of those who are still bearing the biggest burden of climate impacts to finally allow even the "last mile" groups to escape poverty and exclusion.

Seed systems for vegetatively propagated crops (VPCs) are frequently governed by a regulatory blueprint designed for major cereal crops. This approach tends to disregard the distinct biological characteristics of VPCs, in turn limiting farmers' access to high-quality planting material and increasing the risk of pest and disease transmission. In this paper, we ask what type of regulatory framework is appropriate for improving farmers' access to quality VPC planting material, and what the costs, benefits, risks, and unintended consequences are of alternative regulations. We explore this in the context of cassava and potato in Vietnam through secondary data and document analysis, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions. Findings indicate that despite a regulatory regime that imposes strict rules on the production and trade of planting material for VPCs, the market is largely unregulated due to weak enforcement capacity. In the absence of regulatory enforcement, however, producers and traders of VPC planting material signal quality to farmers through trust, reputation, and long-term relationships. Though effective at a small and localized scale, these informal systems are unlikely to accommodate the plans for rapid expansion of the cassava and potato sectors outlined in the Government of Vietnam's strategy for growth and development. Nor are they likely to prove effective in managing increases in pest and disease pressures that result from cross-border trade, climate change, or other factors. We discuss alternative policy approaches and argue that the most appropriate policy regime requires that a careful balance be struck between a permissive regime at the local level and strict regulatory surveillance and enforcement at the national and regional level. ; IFPRI5; CRP2; CRP3.4; 1 Fostering Climate-Resilient and Sustainable Food Supply; 3 Building Inclusive and Efficient Markets, Trade Systems, and Food Industry ; DSGD; PIM ; Non-PR ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM); CGIAR Research Program on Roots, Tuber, and Bananas (RTB)

This appendix describes more in details the methods used in the WFP - CGIAR project "Assessing the relationship between climate, food security and conflict in Ethiopia and in the Central American Dry Corridor (CADC). Quantitative analysis on the impact of climate variability on conflict in Ethiopia and in the CADC countries." In this study, we investigate the climate-food security-conflict nexus in Ethiopia and the CADC (Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras). Both Ethiopia and the CADC are hotspots of high climate variabilities, high political insecurity, and conflicts and widespread food and nutrition insecurities across their populations.

Conflicts are increasingly analysed as exhibiting a stealth complexity in which triggers and consequences are intricately linked to climate, environmental degradation and the struggle to control a finite pool of natural resources. The climate crisis is a multifaceted reality and, against this background, many pressing priorities compete with each other. The disruptive effect of climate variability and change on food systems is particularly acute and constitutes a direct and tangible threat to livelihoods globally. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate and discuss the importance of food systems under a climate crisis in exacerbating conflicts in the Sahelian region and propose interventions beyond and complementary to the usual military and security solutions. We demonstrate for the Sahel that (i) climate hazards are frequent and exposure to climate variability is high, (ii) hotspots of high climate variability and conflict exist, and (iii) impact pathways by which climate exacerbates food systems that can lead to conflicts are documented in the literature. While these three findings suggest clear links between conflict and climate, we find that (iv) current peace indices do not include climate and food systems indicators and therefore provide an uncomplete picture, and (v) food systems programming for climate adaptation has so far not explicitly considered peace and security outcomes. Furthermore, we propose that food systems programming that truly tackles the climate crisis should take more explicit account of peace and security outcomes in conflict-affected areas.

AbstractConflicts are increasingly analysed as exhibiting a stealth complexity in which triggers and consequences are intricately linked to climate, environmental degradation and the struggle to control a finite pool of natural resources. The climate crisis is a multifaceted reality and, against this background, many pressing priorities compete with each other. The disruptive effect of climate variability and change on food systems is particularly acute and constitutes a direct and tangible threat to livelihoods globally. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate and discuss the importance of food systems under a climate crisis in exacerbating conflicts in the Sahelian region and propose interventions beyond and complementary to the usual military and security solutions. We demonstrate for the Sahel that (i) climate hazards are frequent and exposure to climate variability is high, (ii) hotspots of high climate variability and conflict exist, and (iii) impact pathways by which climate exacerbates food systems that can lead to conflicts are documented in the literature. While these three findings suggest clear links between conflict and climate, we find that (iv) current peace indices do not include climate and food systems indicators and therefore provide an uncomplete picture, and (v) food systems programming for climate adaptation has so far not explicitly considered peace and security outcomes. Furthermore, we propose that food systems programming that truly tackles the climate crisis should take more explicit account of peace and security outcomes in conflict-affected areas.