Suchergebnisse

The United States and its allies within the European Union have been unable to forge a common response to deal with the rise of China. Even though China's growing global presence might undermine the international position of the United States, Washington's European allies have sometimes refused to close ranks with their American ally. And more importantly, European engagement with China during the last decade has lacked internal consistency and cohesion, to the point that the European Union has rarely been the relevant actor when it comes to shaping Europe-China relations. This is the conclusion reached by this paper after analyzing the EU's behavior on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Belt and Road Initiative, the adoption of Huawei's 5G technology and the consideration of China as a threat within NATO's framework. The European Commission has been unwilling or unable to unite the member states around a common position on these four cases. However, the findings of this article also support the idea that an embryonic model of strategic autonomy was already underway during the last decade, and that the growing awareness within the EU about the importance and implications of China's rise brings new geopolitical opportunities for the union.
Received: 28 July 2021Accepted: 05 November 2021

Since the implementation of the reform and opening-up policies by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China has undergone a series of rapid changes that have turned it into a great power with prospects for global leadership. Its rise has not only opened up the possibility that, for the first time in the last two centuries, a non-Western country could once again rise to the top of the international order. The changes in China over the past four decades have also refuted a considerable number of assumptions and arguments held from different angles of the social and political sciences. This paper will analyze how the rise of China has debunked some of the main paradigms and theories in the field of International Relations, social movements, democratization, and globalization. The present study concludes that the multidimensional implications of China's rise were not, to a large extent, anticipated by some of the mainstream theories of these disciplines. ; Since the implementation of the reform and opening-up policies by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China has undergone a series of rapid changes that have turned it into a great power with prospects for global leadership. Its rise has not only opened up the possibility that, for the first time in the last two centuries, a non-Western country could once again rise to the top of the international order. The changes in China over the past four decades have also refuted a considerable number of assumptions and arguments held from different angles of the social and political sciences. This paper will analyze how the rise of China has debunked some of the main paradigms and theories in the field of International Relations, democratization, and globalization. The present study concludes that the multidimensional implications of China's rise were not, to a large extent, anticipated by some of the mainstream theories of these disciplines.

Desde la implementación de la política de reforma y apertura por Deng Xiaoping en 1978, China ha experimentado una serie de rápidos cambios que la han convertido en una gran potencia con perspectivas de liderazgo global. Su ascenso no sólo ha abierto la posibilidad de que, por primera vez en los dos últimos siglos, un país no occidental pueda situarse de nuevo en la cima del orden internacional. Estos cambios en China durante las últimas cuatro décadas han refutado, además, un considerable número de premisas y argumentos sostenidos desde distintos ángulos de las ciencias políticas y sociales. En este sentido, este artículo analizará cómo el ascenso de China ha desafiado algunos de los principales paradigmas y teorías en los campos de las relaciones internacionales, la democratización y la globalización. El presente estudio concluye que las implicaciones multidimensionales del ascenso de China no fueron, en gran medida, anticipadas por algunas de las principales teorías de estas disciplinas.

El conflicto del Mar de la China Meridional ha supuesto, durante casi medio siglo, un desafío a las relaciones diplomáticas de China con los países de la región. La disputa por las más de 200 islas, arrecifes y rocas agrupadas mayoritariamente en torno a los archipiélagos de las Islas Spratly y Paracelso ha desencadenado de manera recurrente encontronazos de carácter militar entre los distintos estados involucrados, así como manifestaciones populares en apoyo a sus respectivos países.
En tanto la República Popular de China es un régimen socialista de partido único, cabría esperar que su respuesta al conflicto fuera unitaria y homogénea, cumpliendo el concepto realista del estado como actor unitario. Según este concepto, los estados actuarían a nivel internacional como entes unitarios y racionales, cuyo comportamiento viene determinado por la estructura del sistema internacional y no por su composición interna. Por tanto, el presente artículo tiene el objetivo de analizar hasta qué punto dicho concepto es aplicable al comportamiento de China en la disputa del Mar de la China Meridional.
La elección del enfoque del artículo se fundamenta en dos razones. En primer lugar, porque China parecería, a priori, un caso de estudio favorable para la viabilidad del concepto del estado como actor unitario, dada la naturaleza de su régimen político. En segundo lugar, porque la disputa del Mar de la China Meridional es un tema de actualidad sobre el que no se espera una solución a corto o medio plazo, y por tanto dicho enfoque se antoja imprescindible para poder comprender mejor futuras acciones de China en el conflicto.
Para ello, se analizará la participación en el conflicto de los órganos de liderazgo del Partido Comunista de China, el Estado, el Ejército Popular de Liberación, los gobiernos provinciales y locales, las empresas comerciales y la opinión pública. Estos actores son conscientes de que China no renunciará a sus reivindicaciones territoriales en la zona, y por tanto intentan ejercer influencia en función de sus propios intereses y puntos de vista. El artículo concluye que los actores analizados no sólo son capaces de influir en las consideraciones y decisiones de los principales líderes chinos, sino que además con sus acciones -en ocasiones contradictorias- hacen que ya no resulte posible hablar de un país cuyo comportamiento encaje con el concepto de estado como actor unitario desarrollado por autores realistas como Hans Morgenthau o John Mearsheimer.
El artículo se estructura de la siguiente forma. El primer epígrafe desarrollará el marco teórico del artículo, explicando el concepto realista del estado como actor unitario. Además, pondrá en contexto la evolución de la formulación de la política exterior china durante las últimas décadas, proceso que ha ido adquiriendo una creciente complejidad, y presentará el estado de la cuestión del estudio sobre el conflicto del Mar de la China Meridional. El segundo epígrafe analizará el impacto en el conflicto de los distintos actores políticos chinos anteriormente mencionados. Finalmente, la conclusión presentará de manera sucinta los principales resultados obtenidos por el artículo, sugiriendo nuevos enfoques para futuros estudios.

For almost half a century, conflict in the South China Sea has constituted a challenge to China's diplomatic relations with the countries in the region. The dispute over the more than 200 islands, reefs and rocks located mainly around the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos has repeatedly unleashed military clashes between the different states involved, as well as popular demonstrations in support of their respective countries. Since the People´s Republic of China is a one-party socialist regime, it might be expected that its response to the conflict would be unitary and homogeneous, suiting the concept of the state as a unitary actor. According to this concept, states would behave at the international level as unitary and rational entities whose behavior is determined by the structure of the international system and not by their internal composition. Therefore, this paper aims to analyze the extent to which this concept applies to China's behavior in the South China Sea dispute. As a frequent source of tension in the region, the South China Sea conflict has received widespread attention during the last decades. Already in the 1970s and 1980s, the first studies began to emerge focusing on Chinese responses to the territorial disputes, although limiting their scope to the analysis of the possibility of China resorting to force to impose its claims. It is necessary to go back to the 1990s to find the only work (Wu and Bueno de Mesquita, 1994) that, focusing exclusively on the South China Sea conflict, analyzes the differentiated impact of different Chinese political actors. Unfortunately, this work has become obsolete, as in recent years there has been a growing fragmentation in the number of actors with the ability to influence China's foreign policy. Academic publications so far have focused either exclusively on the South China Sea conflict, but without addressing it from the point of view of the impact that various Chinese actors might have on the Chinese response, or in the analysis of these actors, but without focusing exclusively on the dispute this paper is dealing with. The present paper aims to fill this research gap, carrying out a study of the impact of the growing number of Chinese political actors on the behavior of their country in the conflict, and it will do so by testing the theoretical applicability of a concept so widespread in the field of International Relations: the state as a unitary actor. The approach of this paper is based on two premises. First, because China would seem, a priori, a favorable case for the study of the viability of the concept of the state as a unitary actor, given the nature of its political regime. Second, because the South China Sea dispute is a timely issue on which a solution is not expected in the short or medium term, and therefore the approach of this paper might enhance the understanding of China's future actions in the conflict. To this end, this paper will analyze the participation in the conflict of the leadership structures of the Chinese Communist Party, the State, the People´'s Liberation Army, provincial and local governments, commercial companies, and public opinion. These actors are aware that China will not abandon its territorial claims in the area, so they try to exert influence to further their own interests and points of view. The paper concludes that these actors are not only capable of influencing the considerations and decisions of the Chinese leadership, but also that, with their -on occasions contradictory- actions, they make it no longer possible to argue that China's behavior fits the concept of the state as a unitary actor supported by realist scholars such as Hans Morgenthau or John Mearsheimer. Undoubtedly, the Politburo Standing Committee and, especially, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (Xi Jinping), play the most crucial role when it comes to China's behavior in the South China Sea conflict. In fact, the General Secretary´'s more assertive views have largely determined China's actions over the past decade. However, it is still necessary to maintain a consensual decision-making process. This consensus, combined with the participation of foreign policy advisers, can lead to relatively slow decision-making. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has traditionally adopted a more prudent and conciliatory stance, having clashes with other state agencies that, with their more assertive attitude, might act to the detriment of Chinese foreign policy. For its part, the People's Liberation Army has a limited influence through official channels. However, it can reach public opinion through nationalist messages in social media, and its operational autonomy gives it a margin of maneuver to carry out military actions that, although not being decided by the Chinese leaders, could increase China´'s political tensions with its neighbors. Provincial and local governments, as well as commercial companies, are favored by the ambiguous guidelines emanating from the central political power, enhancing their divergent behaviors based on their own interests: while some governments and companies are favored by the exaltation of the defense of China's territorial claims on the islands, others maintain a more conciliatory stance, stressing the positive results provided by the cooperation with neighboring countries. Finally, public opinion vehemently defends China's territorial claims in the South China Sea, a double-edged sword for the government, which may find its room for maneuver limited under future situations of crisis. In fact, citizen pressures could be behind the more assertive attitude shown by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in recent times. The paper proceeds as follows. The first section will introduce the theoretical framework of the paper, explaining the realist conception of the state as a unitary actor. At the same time it will put into context the evolution of China's foreign policymaking over the past decades, a process that has become increasingly complex, while also presenting a brief literature review on the South China Sea conflict. The second section will analyze the impact of the Chinese political actors mentioned above on the conflict. Finally, the conclusion section will present the main results obtained by the paper and suggest new avenues for future studies. ; El conflicto del Mar de la China Meridional ha supuesto, durante casi medio siglo, un desafío a las relaciones diplomáticas de China con los países de la región. La disputa por las más de 200 islas, arrecifes y rocas agrupadas mayoritariamente en torno a los archipiélagos de las Islas Spratly y Paracelso ha desencadenado de manera recurrente encontronazos de carácter militar entre los distintos estados involucrados, así como manifestaciones populares en apoyo a sus respectivos países. En tanto la República Popular de China es un régimen socialista de partido único, cabría esperar que su respuesta al conflicto fuera unitaria y homogénea, cumpliendo el concepto realista del estado como actor unitario. Según este concepto, los estados actuarían a nivel internacional como entes unitarios y racionales, cuyo comportamiento viene determinado por la estructura del sistema internacional y no por su composición interna. Por tanto, el presente artículo tiene el objetivo de analizar hasta qué punto dicho concepto es aplicable al comportamiento de China en la disputa del Mar de la China Meridional. La elección del enfoque del artículo se fundamenta en dos razones. En primer lugar, porque China parecería, a priori, un caso de estudio favorable para la viabilidad del concepto del estado como actor unitario, dada la naturaleza de su régimen político. En segundo lugar, porque la disputa del Mar de la China Meridional es un tema de actualidad sobre el que no se espera una solución a corto o medio plazo, y por tanto dicho enfoque se antoja imprescindible para poder comprender mejor futuras acciones de China en el conflicto. Para ello, se analizará la participación en el conflicto de los órganos de liderazgo del Partido Comunista de China, el Estado, el Ejército Popular de Liberación, los gobiernos provinciales y locales, las empresas comerciales y la opinión pública. Estos actores son conscientes de que China no renunciará a sus reivindicaciones territoriales en la zona, y por tanto intentan ejercer influencia en función de sus propios intereses y puntos de vista. El artículo concluye que los actores analizados no sólo son capaces de influir en las consideraciones y decisiones de los principales líderes chinos, sino que además con sus acciones -en ocasiones contradictorias- hacen que ya no resulte posible hablar de un país cuyo comportamiento encaje con el concepto de estado como actor unitario desarrollado por autores realistas como Hans Morgenthau o John Mearsheimer. El artículo se estructura de la siguiente forma. El primer epígrafe desarrollará el marco teórico del artículo, explicando el concepto realista del estado como actor unitario. Además, pondrá en contexto la evolución de la formulación de la política exterior china durante las últimas décadas, proceso que ha ido adquiriendo una creciente complejidad, y presentará el estado de la cuestión del estudio sobre el conflicto del Mar de la China Meridional. El segundo epígrafe analizará el impacto en el conflicto de los distintos actores políticos chinos anteriormente mencionados. Finalmente, la conclusión presentará de manera sucinta los principales resultados obtenidos por el artículo, sugiriendo nuevos enfoques para futuros estudios.