Suchergebnisse

For a long time, economists have assumed that we were cold, self-centred, rational decision makers - so-called Homo economicus; the last few decades have shattered this view. The world we live in and the situations we face are of course rich and complex, revealing puzzling aspects of our behaviour. Optimally Irrational argues that our improved understanding of human behaviour shows that apparent 'biases' are good solutions to practical problems - that many of the 'flaws' identified by behavioural economics are actually adaptive solutions. Page delivers an ambitious overview of the literature in behavioural economics and, through the exposition of these flaws and their meaning, presents a sort of unified theory of behaviouralism, cognitive psychology and evolutionary biology. He gathers theoretical and empirical evidence about the causes of behavioural 'biases' and proposes a big picture of what the discipline means for economics.

AbstractModern consumers typically face complex goods and services. In the interest of customer protection, these companies are asked to disclose information about the products and consumers are typically required to indicate their understanding of the information provided. In truth, consumers seldom consult, even less understand the information provided. I present here the state of evidence about how commercial disclosure actually works (or rather does not work) with consumers characterized with human limitations in information processing. I discuss ways to improve disclosure regulation to improve customer protection.

De l'intérêt de l'économie expérimentale pour améliorer notre compréhension des mécanismes de la motivation scolaire L'économie expérimentale fournie un nouvel ensemble d'outils pour l'économiste de l'éducation. Cet article expose les raisons pour lesquelles la méthode expérimentale peut être utile pour l'étude du comportement des élèves dans le cadre scolaire et comment leurs préférences et croyances peuvent influencer leur succès à l'école.

AbstractWe study how agents adapt their behaviour to variations of incentives in dynamic contests. We investigate a real dynamic contest with large stakes: professional tennis matches. Situations in which balls bounce very close to the court's lines are used as the setting of a quasi-experiment providing random variations in winning probability. We find evidence of a momentum effect for men whereby winning a point has a positive causal impact on the probability to win the next one. This behaviour is compatible with a reaction to the asymmetry of incentives between leaders and followers. We do not find momentum for women.

In most collective actions, individuals' incentives are not perfectly aligned with the goals of the group/team they are part of. We investigate how individual specific incentives affect both individuals and team leaders' strategies in a natural setting. We use a discontinuity in individual rewards in batsmen scoring in cricket to identify the causal effect of such incentives on behavior. We find that batsmen react to the presence of individual-specific incentives by adopting strategies that may be suboptimal at the team level. More surprisingly, we also find that team captains react to these individual incentives by adopting suboptimal strategies at the team level, which may bring large benefits to the individual players. These results suggest a complex interplay of individual and team incentives which we conjecture may arise in repeated team interactions.