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This article investigates the politics of holding bank executives accountable for banking crises. The post-2008 financial crisis was characterized by a significant variation in the endorsement of retributive justice. While some countries established special prosecutorial bodies and facilitated prosecutions, others relied on the existing prosecutorial mechanisms to seek out wrongdoing. The comparative experience of Iceland and Cyprus shows that the unfolding of the crisis shapes the appetite of politicians for retributive justice. With a banking collapse, politicians will be most proactive, as voters' demand for justice is high and the risks for the banking industry are minimal. With a severe yet negotiated crisis following a bailout/bail-in, politicians are more reluctant to endorse policies that may risk the recovery of the fragile banking sector.

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the design of accountability mechanisms has taken on renewed importance in academic and policy debates. Calls for holding individuals whose actions and omissions contributed to the meltdown accountable have gained traction in a number of countries after the crisis. Yet, individual accountability norms are seemingly absent from the international economic agenda in response to crisis. In this paper we address this puzzle by exploring the evolution of two major international organisations, the IMF and the FSB, in bringing accountability following financial crises. Our analysis reveals how these institutions have increasingly incorporated in their toolkit policy recommendations related to the unethical or illegal conduct by government officials of individuals in the financial industry, but these tools were geared almost exclusively towards forward-looking policies designed to deter the reoccurrence of illegal or unethical behavior rather than punishing or scrutinizing past wrongdoing. We argue that the extent to which individual accountability norms permeate the international economic agenda is mediated by the institutional characteristics of the organizations that comprise the international financial regime.

AbstractFinancial crises are often presented as triggers for important innovations in international regulation of financial markets, but existing evidence for this claim primarily derive from the analyses of individual initiatives, assessed against noncomparable benchmarks. In order to provide systematic evidence of financial crises' impact on international financial regulatory change, this paper develops a novel text‐as‐data approach to measure regulatory novelty. We use this approach to analyze the full population of international banking and securities standards between 1975 and 2016. Contrary to theoretical expectations, our empirical findings indicate rules designed by international banking and securities regulators following financial crises are on average as likely to build on existing international regulations as those designed before a crisis. We also find that international banking rules published after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis are an important exception.

AbstractWhile organized business is a key actor in regulatory politics, its influence is often conditional on the level of unity or conflict occurring within the business community at any given time. Most contemporary regulatory policy interventions put pressure on the normal mechanisms of business unity, as they are highly targeted and sector‐specific. This raises the question of how business unity operates across a highly variegated economic terrain in which costs are asymmetric and free‐riding incentives are high. In this paper, we empirically assess patterns of business unity within regulatory policymaking across different regulated sectors. Our analysis utilizes data from hundreds of regulatory policy proposals and business community reactions to them in the telecommunications, energy, agriculture, pharmaceutical, and financial sectors over a variety of institutional contexts. We find considerable empirical support for the "finance capital unity" hypothesis – the notion that the financial sector enjoys more business unity than other regulated sectors of the economy. When the financial sector is faced with new regulations, business groups from other sectors frequently come to its aid.

AbstractThe global financial crisis that erupted in summer 2007 has made the reform of international prudential financial regulation one of the top priorities of global public policy. Past scholarship has usefully explained the creation and strengthening of international financial standards with reference to three policy arenas: interstate, domestic, and transnational. Despite the accomplishments of this specialist literature, the recent crisis has revealed a number of limitations in the ways scholars have understood interstate power relations, the influence of domestic politics, and the significance of transnational actors within international financial regulatory politics. Taken together, developments in each of these three arenas suggest that researchers may also need to be prepared to shift from explaining the strengthening of official international standards to analyzing their weakening in the postcrisis world. The latter task will require scholars to devote more analytical attention to a wider set of international regulatory outcomes, including "informal regulatory convergence," "regulatory fragmentation," and especially "cooperative regulatory decentralization."

Abstract
Non-financial corporations (NFCs) have acted as vocal and important allies with the financial industry when it comes to advocacy over regulatory policy. Why? We explore this question in the context of the lobbying activity surrounding the financial policy reforms in the USA following the global financial crisis. We propose a range of explanations for why some NFCs might become 'financial activists' in support of the financial industry, while others remain passive. We find a wide range of indicators of firm-level financialization to be unreliable predictors of NFC financial activism, in addition to indicators of potential external control by financial firms through their ownership structure or the presence of financial subsidiaries. Our finding instead show how NFC financial activism is related to how a given firm is embedded in broader structures of corporate networks, relational political action, and ideology.