Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Petulant and Contrary: Approaches by the Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council to the Concept of 'threat to the peace' under Article 39 of the UN Charter -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Introductory Overview -- Part 1: Theory and Methodology -- 1 Law and Politics in the Time of the Prohibition on the Use of Force -- 2 Critical Discourse Analysis and Case Study Selection -- Part 2: Case Studies -- 3 Spain 1946 (Resolutions 4 (1946), 7 (1946) and 10 (1946)) -- 4 Palestine 1948 (Resolution 54 (1948)) -- 5 Portuguese African Territories 1963 (Resolution 180 (1963)) -- 6 Apartheid in South Africa 1963-77 (Resolutions 181, 182 (1963), 190, 191 (1964), 282 (1973), 311 (1972), 417 and 418 (1977)) -- 7 Vietnamese Intervention into Cambodia 1978-79 -- 8 US-Iran Hostage Crisis 1979 (Resolutions 457 and 461 (1979)) -- 9 Namibian Occupation by South Africa 1981-83 (Resolutions 532 and 539 (1983)) -- 10 Repression of a Civilian Population-Iraq 1991 (Resolution 688 (1991)) -- 11 Civil War in Yugoslavia 1991 (Resolution 713 (1991)) -- 12 The Coup in Haiti 1991-93 (Resolution 841) -- 13 Extradition of Pan Am Flight 103 Bombing Suspects and Access to Information Related to UTA flight 772 Bombing, 1992 (Resolutions 731 and 748 (1992)) -- 14 Rwandan Civil War and Genocide 1993-94 (Resolutions 812 (1993), 846 (1993), 872 (1993), 893 (1994), 909 (1994), 912 (1994), and 918 (1994)) -- 15 Afghanistan 1999 (Resolution 1267) -- 16 East Timor Intervention 1999 (Resolution 1264) -- 17 Small Arms Trade (Resolution 2117 (2013) and the Arms Trade Treaty) -- 18 AIDS Epidemic in Africa and Peacekeeping Operations 2000-05 -- 19 Non-Proliferation of WMDS: Resolutions 1441 (2002), 1540 (2004), 1696 (2006), 1718 (2006) -- 20 UK and US Use of Force against Iraq 2003.

Front Matter -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Introductory Overview -- Theory and Methodology -- Law and Politics in the Time of the Prohibition on the Use of Force -- Critical Discourse Analysis and Case Study Selection -- Case Studies -- Spain 1946 (Resolutions 4 (1946), 7 (1946) and 10 (1946)) -- Palestine 1948 (Resolution 54 (1948)) -- Portuguese African Territories 1963 (Resolution 180 (1963)) -- Apartheid in South Africa 1963–77 (Resolutions 181, 182 (1963), 190, 191 (1964), 282 (1973), 311 (1972), 417 and 418 (1977)) -- Vietnamese Intervention into Cambodia 1978–79 -- US–Iran Hostage Crisis 1979 (Resolutions 457 and 461 (1979)) -- Namibian Occupation by South Africa 1981–83 (Resolutions 532 and 539 (1983)) -- Repression of a Civilian Population—Iraq 1991 (Resolution 688 (1991)) -- Civil War in Yugoslavia 1991 (Resolution 713 (1991)) -- The Coup in Haiti 1991–93 (Resolution 841) -- Extradition of Pan Am Flight 103 Bombing Suspects and Access to Information Related to uta flight 772 Bombing, 1992 (Resolutions 731 and 748 (1992)) -- Rwandan Civil War and Genocide 1993–94 (Resolutions 812 (1993), 846 (1993), 872 (1993), 893 (1994), 909 (1994), 912 (1994), and 918 (1994)) -- Afghanistan 1999 (Resolution 1267) -- East Timor Intervention 1999 (Resolution 1264) -- Small Arms Trade (Resolution 2117 (2013) and the Arms Trade Treaty) -- aids Epidemic in Africa and Peacekeeping Operations 2000–05 -- Non-Proliferation of wmds: Resolutions 1441 (2002), 1540 (2004), 1696 (2006), 1718 (2006) -- UK and US Use of Force against Iraq 2003 -- Sexual Violence as a Tactic of War: 'Women and Peace and Security', and 'Children and Armed Conflict' (Resolutions 1820 (2008), 1882 (2009), 1888 (2009), and 1960 (2010)) -- Piracy: Somalia and Gulf of Guinea -- Civil War in Syria -- Chemical Weapons (2013): Resolution 2118 -- Meta-synthesis -- Meta-Synthesis Overview -- General Meta-Synthesis Observations -- Team America: World Police? -- London Calling -- Vive la France -- From Russia with Love -- Enter the Dragon -- Conclusion -- Annex -- Potential Case Studies -- Coding Results Tables -- Back Matter -- Bibliography -- Index.

Abstract

Black Sails is an historical drama written as a prequel to Treasure Island. It did this by weaving the history surrounding the Pirate Republic of New Providence Island around fiction to create a compelling narrative exploring the force and evils of law and empire, and the lengths that some will go to in order to resist and be free. This paper will examine Black Sails as a social discourse text in order to critique the impact and tyranny, yet inevitability, of the law, and how soft power is feminised but requires queerness to be effective.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has once again brought the question of the limits of the veto by the P5 in the UN Security Council into the spotlight. This short piece examines the possibility of the veto power of the P5 being restricted and the possibility of reform of the UN Charter to restrict or abolish the veto. After concluding that the drafting of the Charter makes these approaches unworkable it then considers the possibility of the UN being reformed under a new Charter that has a more equitable Security Council – concluding that such an approach is functionally impossible.

Abstract
Within the ideological confines of Western liberal democracies, two 'truths' are held to be self-evident: that Russia and China are opportunistic in their behaviour, and that this behaviour is strategic rather than sincere. This article is a short, empirical analysis of the justifications of Russia and China when determining a 'threat to the peace' in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations. Examining how Russia and China have justified their decisions where this concept was significantly under debate, I find that their behaviour is not as opportunistic as believed. Rather, it is consistent with ideals of pragmatism and state-centric interpretations of international law. I further suggest that the consistency of their approaches means it is of little consequence if their arguments are strategic in nature.

The UN Security Council's response to the Rwanda genocide was a significant moment in history. It changed the face of international law, cementing individual criminal responsibility for atrocities in the canon of international law. It also saw the Security Council respond to mass atrocities without the consent of the state in question in a manner that ran counter to historical practice. But all of these outcomes are haunted by the fact that decisions made by the Security Council in the build up to the genocide served to create the conditions on the ground that allowed genocide to flourish. This intervention conducts a critical discourse analysis of the statements made by the Permanent Five members of the Security Council justifying these decisions in the context of whether Rwanda constituted a 'threat to the peace' under article 39 of the UN Charter, concluding that Security Council through its decisions was complicit in the genocide.

AbstractCyberspace is now acknowledged not only as the newest domain of warfare, but also as a space vital to economic, educational and cultural development for all States. This thin consensus ignores the fundamental fact that the backbone of cyber infrastructure—submarine telecommunication cables—is not (for the large part) located within sovereign territorial jurisdiction. The radically increased reliance of States upon submarine data cables emphasises their vulnerability to damage by malicious acts, accidents, or natural phenomena. Faced with these problems, legal analysis has tended to identify gaps or deficiencies in the law, and propose the creation of new legal instruments. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it expands the frame of analysis to include deliberate damage to cables not only in peacetime but under the law of armed conflict. Second, rather than treating the legal framework as inherently deficient, it considers the extent to which existing rules and principles can be progressively developed, interpreted, or creatively applied to close perceived gaps. This article surveys the existing law specific to the protection of submarine cables and assesses how general principles of the law of the sea, State responsibility, the law on the use of force, and the law of armed conflict apply to this problem. It thus considers in turn the applicable 'law of peace', the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.

Abstract
Submarine data cables are of fundamental strategic consequence. However, two intensely context-sensitive and contemporary sets of questions about how these cables are to be dealt with by the law of armed conflict remain—questions which state practice during the two World Wars either did not resolve or did not need to address. Through an examination of the relevant legal history and current law, this article seeks to explore potential answers to these question sets. The first question set relates to the general approach to be adopted when dealing with submarine data cables within LOAC: a sui generis regime; discrete analogy; or general principles? The second question set addresses three lingering queries regarding legal characterization of submarine data cables for LOAC purposes, namely: (i) Are they ordinary military objectives? (ii) Can they be considered neutral objects? (iii) How do we assess proportionality in relation to attack on submarine data cables? The analysis concludes that a modified application of the ordinary rule of proportionality in LOAC targeting, noting some of the difficulties surrounding the concepts of incidental damage in this context, offers the most useful way forward.

Understanding the descriptors attached to cyber operations and cyber actors is crucial to communicating the nature of these entities and the influence they wield in cyberspace. Given the ever-increasing threat that corporations, governments, and the everyday consumer face from these entities, it is paramount that respondents evaluate and apply the most appropriate descriptors when communicating about such incidents. In this paper, we discuss whether a 'privateer' analogy has relevance in this space given the current state of cyber-actor behaviour and the increase in the number of governments relying on external experts to design, construct, and execute cyber-disruption operations. In determining the appropriateness of the 'privateer' analogy, we explore the following questions: What types of labels are available for this private actor-perpetrated, but state-purposed cyber-operational conduct? Based on a brief history of privateering, how and why might privateering be an appropriate analogy? Given the strict legal paradigmatic constraints surrounding the availability of the concept and the availability of modern Law of Armed Combat (LoAC) concepts to cover the practice, how and why is privateering not an appropriate analogy? Ultimately, we conclude that the applicability of the 'privateering' analogy in the context of cyber operations is dubious. It appears that international law has developed beyond the need (and desire) for privateers and privateering operations. In this discussion, we consider legal and regulatory alternatives for responding to cyber behaviour that may still resemble privateering under effective (and much more current) international law.