Search results

This paper examines the interdependence of cross-ownership and level of privatization in case of differentiated products mixed duopoly. It shows that it is optimal for the private firm not to own any (own the entire) portion of the privatized share of its rival firm, if the level of privatization is very low (very high). In equilibrium, the government makes sure that cross-ownership is not attracted. However, in most of the situations, the possibility of cross-ownership adversely affects the prospect of privatization. Results of this paper have strong implications to antitrust regulations and divestment policies.

The paper analyses the impact of the reach of communist parties, the degree of political activism, personal attributes of workers, and industrial characteristics on the individual decision to unionise for Indian non-agricultural regular workers using micro data from the 2004-05 Employment and Unemployment Survey, NSSO, linked to state-level factors. A notable result is that the reach of communist parties has considerable effect on unionisation probability. Moreover, it seems that mere existence of communist parties in a state also facilitates unionisation to some extent. State-level political activism and unemployment rate also influence the individual decision to be unionist. The paper concludes also that worker's gender, marital status, ethnic background, employment status, experience, occupation, sector of employment, establishment size, and type of industry remain important in the determination of union membership.

This paper examines how product differentiation as well as strategic managerial delegation affects optimal emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare, under alternative modes of competition. It shows that, under pure profit maximization, the optimal emission tax rate is not necessarily decreasing in degree of product differentiation. Moreover, the impacts of delegation on the scope for the optimal emission tax rate to be lower for higher degree of product differentiation are very different under alternative modes of competition. Under price (quantity) competition, the equilibrium emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare are lower (higher) in the case of delegation.

ABSTRACTExisting literature on managerial delegation indicates that collusive outcomes can be obtained in an oligopoly game through cooperative managerial delegation. In contrast, this paper shows that, if managers are delegated to choose R&D, in addition to choosing production levels, full‐collusive outcomes cannot be achieved through cooperative delegation. Moreover, (i) under cooperative delegation, semi‐collusion always yields lower profit, higher R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than that in the case of competition and (ii) cooperative delegation leads to a higher profit lower R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than the no delegation case, irrespective of product market conduct.

This paper analyzes the impact on individual decisions to unionize of several factors: the reach of communist parties, the degree of political activism, personal attributes of workers, and industrial characteristics. The workers examined are Indian nonagricultural regular workers, using micro‐data from the 2004–5 Employment and Unemployment Survey conducted by the National Sample Survey Organisation, linked to state‐level factors. A notable result is that the reach of communist parties has considerable effect on unionization probability. Moreover, it seems that the mere existence of communist parties in a state also facilitates unionization to some extent. State‐level political activism and unemployment rate also influence the individual decision to join a union. The paper concludes also that a worker's gender, marital status, ethnic background, employment status, experience, occupation, sector of employment, establishment size, and type of industry remain important in the determination of union membership.

AbstractWe show as emerging markets (EMs) size crosses a threshold it is in advanced economies (AEs) own interest to reduce negative spillovers to EMs. It follows the potential for international cooperation in macroeconomic and prudential policy increases. But entrenched perceptions and historical advantages are obstacles. These blocks are explored as well as possibilities in macroeconomic policies and in prudential regulation. Export of capital is a major way AEs earn a share in EM income. AE macroeconomic policy and volatile capital outflows from AEs are a source of negative spillovers for EMs, but preventive prudential regulation is not adequate in AEs. More regulation is likely to reduce short‐term returns to capital flows but not long‐term, since with fewer crises both AE and EM income streams would rise. Moreover, there is some evidence excess capital flow volatility has adverse effects on AEs themselves. It follows universal macro‐prudential polices would benefit both country groups.