Suchergebnisse

We provide empirical support and a theoretical explanation for the vicious circle of political corruption and tax evasion in which countries often fall into. We address this issue in the context of a model with two distinct groups of agents: citizens and politicians. Citizens decide the fraction of their income for which they evade taxes. Politicians decide the fraction of the public budget that they peculate. We show that multiple self-fulfilling equilibria with different levels of corruption can emerge based on the existence of strategic complementarities, indicating that corruption may corrupt. Furthermore, we find that standard deterrence policies cannot eliminate multiplicity. Instead, policies that impose a strong moral cost on tax evaders and corrupt politicians can lead to a unique equilibrium. ; Preliminary Version

We provide empirical support and a theoretical explanation for the vicious circle of political corruption and tax evasion in which countries often fall into. We address this issue in the context of a model with two distinct groups of agents: citizens and politicians. Citizens decide the fraction of their income for which they evade taxes. Politicians decide the fraction of the public budget that they peculate. We show that multiple self-fulfilling equilibria with different levels of corruption can emerge based on the existence of strategic complementarities, indicating that corruption may corrupt. Furthermore, we find that standard deterrence policies cannot eliminate multiplicity. Instead, policies that impose a strong moral cost on tax evaders and corrupt politicians can lead to a unique equilibrium.

The authors construct a dynamic one‐good multicountry growth model with productive government spending and perfect capital mobility to study fiscal interdependence among countries. In the case of a source‐based tax, it is found that there is no strategic interaction and that the equilibrium spending/tax mix coincides with the optimal one. In the case of a residence‐based tax system, however, there is strategic interaction across countries and, under noncooperation, countries tend to spend and tax over and above the optimal Pigouvian level.

We examine the welfare effects of a customs union on a small monetary economy. The role of money is captured by a generalized cash‐in‐advance constraint which allows for non‐uniform monetization across sectors. This generates a demand‐side distortion which results in a discrepancy between the marginal domestic rate of substitution and the world price. We show that, depending on the economy's inflation rate and the difference between the existing and the optimal tariff rate, trade creation may reduce welfare while trade diversion may improve it.

"This book offers a comprehensive guide to the on-going Greek debt crisis. It identifies and explains Greece's idiosyncratic weaknesses, and highlights the existing rigidities in the EU architecture that make the recovery prospects of the Greek economy challenging. Chapters from expert contributors highlight aspects of the performance of the Greek economy with focus on export performance, labour market conditions, political cycles and regional income disparities. The book then goes on to outline the banking system in Greece in the post-crisis era, and includes analysis that explains how the credit rating score affected Greece's borrowing capacity prior to the start of the insolvency crisis. The final part analyses and compares alternative scenarios of fiscal consolidation, seeking to identify whether there are alternatives to fiscal austerity and the impact of each one of them. This section also clarifies various misconceptions about the significant determinants of international competitiveness. Despite the focus of the book, the lessons drawn from the chapters are not limited to Greece. This volume will be of interest to academics, practitioners and policy makers who wish to take a closer look at the Greek debt crisis and learn more about the challenges the Greek economy is currently facing."--

Intro -- Contents -- Editors and Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Part I Introduction and PoliticalEconomy Approaches -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Greek Crisis in the Context of Wider Eurozone Developments -- 1.3 Summary Indicators of the Greek Crisis -- 1.4 Looking for Culprits: What Went Wrong -- 1.5 A Chronology of the Crisis -- 1.6 Current Outlook and Prospects -- 1.7 Taking Stock -- 1.8 A Proposal -- 1.9 Summary of the Contributions to this Volume -- References -- 2 The Eurozone Crisis: A Near-Perfect Case of Mismanagement -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Before the Crisis: Fiscal Indiscipline -- 2.3 Greece: The Mother of the Eurozone Crisis -- 2.4 Contagion: Muddling-Through -- 2.5 Turnaround: The ECB Against Governments -- 2.6 The Public Debt Legacy -- 2.7 Conclusions -- References -- 3 The Elusive Promise of Structural Reform -- 3.1 Structural Reforms: The Concept -- 3.2 Partial Amnesia -- 3.3 What Triggers Takeoffs? -- 3.4 Maximum Gain for Minimum Pain -- 3.5 Pay Now, Pay Later -- 4 The Responsibility of the EU -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Technical Issues -- 4.3 Germany: Rechtstaat -- Greece: Unrechtstaat -- 4.4 Social Europe? -- 4.5 Who Was Being Rescued? -- 4.6 Conclusion: Nothing Has Been Achieved -- References -- 5 German Macroeconomic Thought and Its Effects -- 5.1 German Macroeconomic Thought -- 5.2 German Macroeconomic Thinking and European Monetary Integration -- 5.3 German Policy Thinking and the Euro Crisis -- 5.3.1 Competitiveness and Growth: Which Way to Recovery for Greece? -- 5.3.2 ECB Vs German Policy Thinking in the Euro Crisis -- 5.3.3 IMF vs German Policy Thinking in the Euro Crisis -- 5.4 Concluding Comments -- References -- 6 Seven Years of Austerity and the Greek Dra(ch)ma: Three Economists' Views and a Comment -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.1.1 The Boom -- 6.1.2 The Bust