Suchergebnisse

In 1993, the system of proportional representation in Italy was replaced by a modified first-past-the-post system. This innovation was meant to eliminate the fragmented party system, to bring about the development of a bipolar party system, as well as a certain degree of government stability & to guarantee alternation between government & opposition. After three elections the result seems to be positive: a change of government took place, the stability of governments increased & the real actors of competition are no longer the parties, but the electoral coalitions. Nevertheless, the Italian bipolarism has not consolidated yet, as the reform of the electoral system has produced a bipolar party system consisting of two actors: the coalitions & the parties. The coalitions have not yet removed the parties, while the parties cannot do without the coalitions. The bipolarisation of the electoral coalitions & the fragmentation of parties will continue facing each other. 7 Tables, 47 References. Adapted from the source document.

Asserts that the initiation & resolution of ethnic conflicts are often due to outside influences: powerful nations ally themselves with a specific ethnic group or ethnic groups in a troubled country & work to exert their influence over them. Other important factors include the diversity of the social structure as well as the mindset & abilities of the country's ruling class. The European Union plays a major role in its interaction with ethnic groups in that many consider it a civilizing influence over the so-called "uncivilized" ethnic groups. Pallaver thoroughly analyzes the ethnic conflicts in South Tyrol, Northern Ireland, & the Basque Country in the context of the aforementioned factors. This comparative analysis sheds light on the true roots of ethnic conflicts in Europe & identifies specific steps that need to be taken to stem further conflict. 48 References. A. Simms-Clark

AbstractDue to the absence of a strong constitutional veto player, comparative research uses to classify Austria as country with weak federal structures, occasionally even as a "federation without federalism". From an institutional perspective, the assessment is definitely correct, in particular with regard to the nearly insignificant status of the second chamber Bundesrat. Apart from constitutional provisions, however, there are informal forces at work in decision‐making processes. Our thesis is that any approach ignoring the fact that the nominal constitution is paralleled by a real one falls short. Instead, we focus on the Conference of State Governors which, though not established by law, is a strong player in Austria's multi‐layered system qualifying the picture of "weak" federalism. The paper gives on overview of origin and function of the conference and its ambivalent role in making up for the shortcomings of the federal structures. Taking recent attempts of reorganizing fiscal equalization between states and federation as an example, the need of reforming the allocation of rights and duties between the different levels and, at the same time, the obstacles blocking the reform is outlined and analyzed.