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Abstract not available. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

Abstract. While there is strong evidence that a libertarian‐authoritarian dimension exists in Great Britain, there is only weak evidence that it contributed to the Conservative Party's electoral victories in 1979, 1983, and 1987. The present paper addresses this empirical divergence by presenting new evidence. Using a multivariate statistical analysis of British respondents in the 1979–1987 Eurobarometers, the paper estimates the impacts of political values and class‐based demographic characteristics on individual‐level support for the Conservative and Labour parties. The multivariate model is estimated separately for each year in order to compare the explanatory variables' effects over time. The paper's findings demonstrate that authoritarian and libertarian values significantly influenced party support, with the strongest effects occurring in 1983 and 1984. In addition, they show that class‐based support was negatively correlated with value‐based support during 1979–1987.

While there is strong evidence that a libertarian-authoritarian dimension exists in Great Britain, there is only weak evidence that it contributed to the Conservative Party's electoral victories in 1979, 1983, and 1987. The present paper addresses this empirical divergence by presenting new evidence. Using a multivariate statistical analysis of British respondents in the 1979-1987 Eurobarometers, the paper estimates the impacts of political values and class-based demographic characteristics on individual-level support for the Conservative and Labour parties. The multivariate model is estimated separately for each year in order to compare the explanatory variables' effects over time. The paper's findings demonstrate that authoritarian and libertarian values significantly influenced party support, with the strongest effects occurring in 1983 and 1984. In addition, they show that class-based support was negatively correlated with value-based support during 1979-1987. (European Journal of Political Research / AuD)

Abstract. Much of the research on the European Community focuses on elites and institutions and as a result downplays the importance of the mass public in determining the direction of European integration. A common justification for this viewpoint is that members of the public provide a stable reservoir of strong support for European integration. Recent political events, however, raise doubts about this depiction of a 'passive public'. Consequently, there is a need for a fuller understanding of European attitudes. We specify a number of hypotheses dealing with the effects of international trade interests, security concerns, and demographic characteristics on cross‐national and cross‐sectional variations in public support for European integration. Using Eurobarometer surveys and OECD data on EC trade from 1973–1989, we investigate these hypotheses in a pooled cross‐sectional model. Our statistical results reveal that an individual's level of support is positively related to her nation's security and trade interests in EC membership and her personal potential to benefit from liberalized markets for goods, labour, and money.

ObjectiveThis article examines the distinction between group‐based issue opinion formation (what we term "following the crowd") and idiosyncratic or nongroup‐based formation (what we term "thinking outside of the box"). The argument put forth is that issue saliency can lead citizens to think about issues in nongroup‐based terms.MethodWe use heteroskedastic regression to measure the degree to which group‐based variables explain issue opinions. Using group variables (demographics, party identification, etc.) to estimate respondents' issue responses means that nongroup variation is soaked up by the error term.ResultsWe find that citizens who view an issue as highly salient are more likely to "think outside the box," while citizens who view an issue as less salient are more likely to "follow the crowd" by defaulting to their group memberships and identifications.ConclusionOur results indicate that response variability (less consistency within groups) on issue opinions is not always the result of uncertain citizens, nonattitudes, or measurement error. In some situations, greater response variability can reflect a deliberative and policy‐based form of opinion formation.

Students of economic voting have recently made substantial progress in their understanding of when the economy is and is not likely to impact election outcomes. Our knowledge of the lower level dynamics that drive these aggregate results remains fairly murky. In this paper we test competing theoretical claims about how individual level orientations toward political economy lead to observed aggregate trends in support for incumbent politicians. We do this with models of support for the Labour Party in the United Kingdom before and during the recent global economic turndown. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

To explore systematic differences in economic reasoning and what might account for them, we investigate how sociocultural conditions affect transitions to market economies in the West African country of Benin. We probe the importance of several factors: basic economic norms, utility maximization behavior, individual-level personal capital, and individual-level social capital. The evidence, based on experiments embedded in an opinion survey, indicates that Beninese citizens widely share commitments to the basic foundations of economic interaction, e.g., property rights. The nature of social capital varies across cultural and political contexts and accounts for cross-contextual variation in the costs associated with cooperative behavior and in utility maximization behavior.