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Despite massive investments in transportation infrastructure, traffic congestion remains a major societal and public policy problem. Intelligent transportation systems (ITS) have been proposed as a potential solution to this challenge, but their effectiveness has remained unclear in both research and practice. To understand whether and how ITS affect traffic congestion, we consolidate a unique longitudinal data set on road traffic and the deployment of a large federally supported ITS program in the United States-511 systems-in 99 urban areas between 1994 and 2014. The difference-in-differences estimates show that the adoption of 511 systems is associated with a significant decrease in traffic congestion, saving over $4.7 billion dollars and 175 million hours in travel time annually in U.S. cities. 511 systems also reduce about 53 million gallons of fossil fuel consumption and over 10 billion pounds of CO2 emissions. We offer two theoretical explanations for this effect: (i) ITS help individual commuters to make better travel decisions, and (ii) ITS help local governments to develop an urban traffic management capability. Empirical evidence supports the underlying theoretical mechanisms and shows that ITS help commuters to schedule travel more efficiently, choose better navigation routes, and optimize their worktrip transportation mode. Second, the effect of ITS is contingent on road supply and public transit services. We also find that the traffic-reducing effect of ITS is larger when commuters use more online services for traffic information and when state governments incorporate more functionalities into their 511 systems. This study contributes to the literature on IT capabilities, public-sector IT value, and the societal impact of IT, while also extending the transportation economics to IT-enabled traffic interventions. Finally, we inform policymakers of ITS as a cost-effective means to mitigating traffic congestion.

The literature on corporate political activity (CPA) generally views nonmarket actions aimed at influencing political actors (e.g., lobbying or campaign contributions) as related but separate activities from market actions. This study demonstrates how firms' core market actions (e.g., market entry or geographic expansion) can function as CPA. We theorize two mechanisms through which firms leverage market actions as CPA: "pork" (i.e., ones that primarily benefit a politician's constituents) and "perk" (i.e., ones that directly benefit the politician). We document these mechanisms through an empirical analysis of data from the U.S. airline industry in 1990–2019. Specifically, we find that airlines increase the supply of flights from the airports in the home district of the chair of the Transportation Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives (pork). We also find that the airlines increase the supply of nonstop flights to Washington, DC. from the Chair's district (perk). We use counterfactual estimation methods and exogenous turnovers in committee leadership to provide causal evidence. Moreover, the observed increase in flight supplies is negatively associated with formal policy changes in Congress, and with text mining techniques, we find that this effect is stronger for bills related to aviation safety and security. We contribute to the literature on CPA by demonstrating a blurred boundary between market and nonmarket actions, which helps explain firms' competitive actions that cannot be explained by market considerations alone. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.17026 .