Suchergebnisse

The following paper examines the envisaged framework and effectiveness of the triangulation of mechanisms currently planned at the EU level: the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), proceedings under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) against Poland and Hungary, and the mechanism to protect EU's budget in deficiencies withregards to the rule of law in Member States. This research focuses on the overall structure and powers of the EPPO with special attention on its role in investigating and prosecuting offences affecting to the EU's financial interests. This includes active and passive corruption among others with particular emphasis on the expected interaction between the EPPO and the national authorities. However, not all EU Member States have joined the EPPO framework. Here the role of the EU institutions is analyzed in light of the recent developments in Article 7 TEU proceedings. A third possible mechanism to react to the growth of executive powers in some states and the corresponding imbalances is the EU Commission's proposal for a mechanism on the protection of the EU's budget in case of generalized deficiencies as regards the rule of law. This may include corruption or other breaches to the implementation of the Union budget.

The following paper examines the envisaged framework and effectiveness of the triangulation of mechanisms currently planned at the EU level: the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), proceedings under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) against Poland and Hungary, and the mechanism to protect EU's budget in deficiencies withregards to the rule of law in Member States. This research focuses on the overall structure and powers of the EPPO with special attention on its role in investigating and prosecuting offences affecting to the EU's financial interests. This includes active and passive corruption among others with particular emphasis on the expected interaction between the EPPO and the national authorities. However, not all EU Member States have joined the EPPO framework. Here the role of the EU institutions is analyzed in light of the recent developments in Article 7 TEU proceedings. A third possible mechanism to react to the growth of executive powers in some states and the corresponding imbalances is the EU Commission's proposal for a mechanism on the protection of the EU's budget in case of generalized deficiencies as regards the rule of law. This may include corruption or other breaches to the implementation of the Union budget.

The following paper examines the envisaged framework and effectiveness of the triangulation of mechanisms currently planned at the EU level: the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), proceedings under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) against Poland and Hungary, and the mechanism to protect EU's budget in deficiencies withregards to the rule of law in Member States. This research focuses on the overall structure and powers of the EPPO with special attention on its role in investigating and prosecuting offences affecting to the EU's financial interests. This includes active and passive corruption among others with particular emphasis on the expected interaction between the EPPO and the national authorities. However, not all EU Member States have joined the EPPO framework. Here the role of the EU institutions is analyzed in light of the recent developments in Article 7 TEU proceedings. A third possible mechanism to react to the growth of executive powers in some states and the corresponding imbalances is the EU Commission's proposal for a mechanism on the protection of the EU's budget in case of generalized deficiencies as regards the rule of law. This may include corruption or other breaches to the implementation of the Union budget.

This paper examines the challenges that States face in times of emergency as regards their constitutional framework, the imposition of restrictive measures such as lockdowns and the challenging balance to uphold and fulfil human rights obligations and the rule of law. Bulgaria has responded to the COVID-19 pandemic with the promulgation of the Law of the State of Emergency in March 2020. The State powers in emergency circumstances are not unlimited. The legal framework of the Bulgarian public health emergency is analyzed through the dual lens of constitutional limitations and the Article 15 ECHR derogation regime. The work provides a comparative analysis of the procedural notification practice of various States under the ECHR and ICCPR. The derogation regime and relevant principles such as proportionality and margin of appreciation are thoroughly examined. States should strike the proportionate balance to protect public health and apply the widest possible array of human rights protections.

The following paper examines the envisaged framework and effectiveness of the triangulation of mechanisms currently planned at the EU level: the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), proceedings under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) against Poland and Hungary, and the mechanism to protect EU's budget in deficiencies with regards to the rule of law in Member States. This research focuses on the overall structure and powers of the EPPO with special attention on its role in investigating and prosecuting offences affecting to the EU's financial interests. This includes active and passive corruption among others with particular emphasis on the expected interaction between the EPPO and the national authorities. However, not all EU Member States have joined the EPPO framework. Here the role of the EU institutions is analyzed in light of the recent developments in Article 7 TEU proceedings. A third possible mechanism to react to the growth of executive powers in some states and the corresponding imbalances is the EU Commission's proposal for a mechanism on the protection of the EU's budget in case of generalized deficiencies as regards the rule of law. This may include corruption or other breaches to the implementation of the Union budget.

The following paper examines the envisaged framework and effectiveness of the triangulation of mechanisms currently planned at the EU level: the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), proceedings under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) against Poland and Hungary, and the mechanism to protect EU's budget in deficiencies with regards to the rule of law in Member States. This research focuses on the overall structure and powers of the EPPO with special attention on its role in investigating and prosecuting offences affecting to the EU's financial interests. This includes active and passive corruption among others with particular emphasis on the expected interaction between the EPPO and the national authorities. However, not all EU Member States have joined the EPPO framework. Here the role of the EU institutions is analyzed in light of the recent developments in Article 7 TEU proceedings. A third possible mechanism to react to the growth of executive powers in some states and the corresponding imbalances is the EU Commission's proposal for a mechanism on the protection of the EU's budget in case of generalized deficiencies as regards the rule of law. This may include corruption or other breaches to the implementation of the Union budget.