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The occurrence of some revolutionary episodes seems initially puzzling. For example, before the 'Arab Spring', macroeconomic conditions were improving, the political leaders had been in power for a long time, and the autocrats had shown an apparent interest in the welfare of their population by investing in human capital. We argue that such a paradox can be solved by considering that high education levels are incompatible with the features characterising strong neopatrimonial states. We develop this intuition in a simple theoretical model and we test our prediction in a sequential empirical study of regime changes and regime breakdowns in a large panel of countries. We indeed find that a regime change is more likely in countries combining high neopatrimonialism and high education levels. Moreover, when a regime change happens under these circumstances, a revolution is the most likely type of regime breakdown. These results help to understand the 'Arab Spring' but are not specific to the Arab world.

The occurrence of some revolutionary episodes seems initially puzzling. For example, before the 'Arab Spring', macroeconomic conditions were improving, the political leaders had been in power for a long time, and the autocrats had shown an apparent interest in the welfare of their population by investing in human capital. We argue that such a paradox can be solved by considering that high education levels are incompatible with the features characterising strong neopatrimonial states. We develop this intuition in a simple theoretical model and we test our prediction in a sequential empirical study of regime changes and regime breakdowns in a large panel of countries. We indeed find that a regime change is more likely in countries combining high neopatrimonialism and high education levels. Moreover, when a regime change happens under these circumstances, a revolution is the most likely type of regime breakdown. These results help to understand the 'Arab Spring' but are not specific to the Arab world.

We revisit the question of why fertility behaviors and educational decisions appear to vary systematically across ethnic groups. We assess the possibility that fertility differentials across groups remain even though their socio-economic characteristics are similar. More specifically, we consider that parents' fertility decisions are affected by the uncertainty concerning the future economic status of their off-spring. We assume that this uncertainty varies across groups and is linked to the size of the group one belongs to. The transition path gives support to the minority status hypothesis according to which minority members usually have a higher fertility facing low potential for social mobility but may in some instances strategically decrease their fertility.

This article analyzes the impact of income inequality on environmental policy in the presence of green consumers. We first develop a model with two main ingredients: citizens, with dierent income capacities have access to two commodities whose consumption differs in terms of price and environmental impact, and they vote on the environmental policy. In this setting, there exists a unique political equilibrium in which the population is split into two groups, that differ in the type of good, conventional vs. green, they consume. The analysis shows that a change in the level of inequality induces variations in both the size and composition of these two groups of citizens. This in turn determines whether or not more inequality stimulates the public policy. We then conduct an empirical investigation on a panel of European countries over the period 1996-2019. We find the existence of an inverted J-shape relationship between inequality and public environmental spending. This outcome can be explained by the combination of a composition effect, affecting the green group, and a substitution effect between private green consumption and public environmental spending.

This article analyzes the impact of income inequality on environmental policy in the presence of green consumers. We first develop a model with two main ingredients: citizens, with dierent income capacities have access to two commodities whose consumption differs in terms of price and environmental impact, and they vote on the environmental policy. In this setting, there exists a unique political equilibrium in which the population is split into two groups, that differ in the type of good, conventional vs. green, they consume. The analysis shows that a change in the level of inequality induces variations in both the size and composition of these two groups of citizens. This in turn determines whether or not more inequality stimulates the public policy. We then conduct an empirical investigation on a panel of European countries over the period 1996-2019. We find the existence of an inverted J-shape relationship between inequality and public environmental spending. This outcome can be explained by the combination of a composition effect, affecting the green group, and a substitution effect between private green consumption and public environmental spending.

This article analyzes the impact of income inequality on environmental policy in the presence of green consumers. We first develop a model with two main ingredients: citizens, with dierent income capacities have access to two commodities whose consumption differs in terms of price and environmental impact, and they vote on the environmental policy. In this setting, there exists a unique political equilibrium in which the population is split into two groups, that differ in the type of good, conventional vs. green, they consume. The analysis shows that a change in the level of inequality induces variations in both the size and composition of these two groups of citizens. This in turn determines whether or not more inequality stimulates the public policy. We then conduct an empirical investigation on a panel of European countries over the period 1996-2019. We find the existence of an inverted J-shape relationship between inequality and public environmental spending. This outcome can be explained by the combination of a composition effect, affecting the green group, and a substitution effect between private green consumption and public environmental spending.

This article analyzes the impact of income inequality on environmental policy in the presence of green consumers. We first develop a model with two main ingredients: citizens, with dierent income capacities have access to two commodities whose consumption differs in terms of price and environmental impact, and they vote on the environmental policy. In this setting, there exists a unique political equilibrium in which the population is split into two groups, that differ in the type of good, conventional vs. green, they consume. The analysis shows that a change in the level of inequality induces variations in both the size and composition of these two groups of citizens. This in turn determines whether or not more inequality stimulates the public policy. We then conduct an empirical investigation on a panel of European countries over the period 1996-2019. We find the existence of an inverted J-shape relationship between inequality and public environmental spending. This outcome can be explained by the combination of a composition effect, affecting the green group, and a substitution effect between private green consumption and public environmental spending.

This article analyzes the impact of income inequality on environmental policy in the presence of green consumers. We first develop a model with two main ingredients: citizens, with dierent income capacities have access to two commodities whose consumption differs in terms of price and environmental impact, and they vote on the environmental policy. In this setting, there exists a unique political equilibrium in which the population is split into two groups, that differ in the type of good, conventional vs. green, they consume. The analysis shows that a change in the level of inequality induces variations in both the size and composition of these two groups of citizens. This in turn determines whether or not more inequality stimulates the public policy. We then conduct an empirical investigation on a panel of European countries over the period 1996-2019. We find the existence of an inverted J-shape relationship between inequality and public environmental spending. This outcome can be explained by the combination of a composition effect, affecting the green group, and a substitution effect between private green consumption and public environmental spending.

This article analyzes the impact of income inequality on environmental policy in the presence of green consumers. We develop a theory with three main ingredients: first, citizens have different income capacities; second they have access to two different commodities whose consumption differs in terms of price and environmental impact, and third, they have to vote on the environmental policy. In this setting, there exists a unique political equilibrium such that the population is split in two groups, depending on whether there is positive consumption of the green good. The analysis shows that higher income inequality is generally associated with lower public spending in environmental protection. We then test this prediction in a fixed-effect model with robust standard errors using a panel of European countries over the period 1996-2019. We indeed find that income inequality negatively affects both public expenditures in environmental protection.

This article analyzes the impact of income inequality on environmental policy in the presence of green consumers. We first develop a model with two main ingredients: citizens, with dierent income capacities have access to two commodities whose consumption differs in terms of price and environmental impact, and they vote on the environmental policy. In this setting, there exists a unique political equilibrium in which the population is split into two groups, that differ in the type of good, conventional vs. green, they consume. The analysis shows that a change in the level of inequality induces variations in both the size and composition of these two groups of citizens. This in turn determines whether or not more inequality stimulates the public policy. We then conduct an empirical investigation on a panel of European countries over the period 1996-2019. We find the existence of an inverted J-shape relationship between inequality and public environmental spending. This outcome can be explained by the combination of a composition effect, affecting the green group, and a substitution effect between private green consumption and public environmental spending.

Elite-biased democracies are those democracies in which former political incumbents and their allies coordinate to impose part of the autocratic institutional rules in the new political regime. We document that this type of democratic transition is much more prevalent than the emergence of pure (popular) democracies in which the majority decides the new political rules. We then develop a theoretical model explaining how an elitebiased democracy may arise in an initially autocratic country. To this end, we extend the benchmark political transition model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) along two essential directions. First, population is split into majority versus minority groups under the initial autocratic regime. Second, the minority is an insider as it benefits from a more favourable redistribution by the autocrat. We derive conditions under which elite-biased democracies emerge and characterise them, in particular with respect to pure democracies.

The occurrence of some revolutionary episodes seems initially puzzling. For example, before the 'Arab Spring', macroeconomic conditions were improving, the political leaders had been in power for a long time, and the autocrats had shown an apparent interest in the welfare of their population by investing in human capital. We argue that such a paradox can be solved by considering that high education levels are incompatible with the features characterising strong neopatrimonial states. We develop this intuition in a simple theoretical model and we test our prediction in a sequential empirical study of regime changes and regime breakdowns in a large panel of countries. We indeed find that a regime change is more likely in countries combining high neopatrimonialism and high education levels. Moreover, when a regime change happens under these circumstances, a revolution is the most likely type of regime breakdown. These results help to understand the 'Arab Spring' but are not specific to the Arab world.

Elite-biased democracies are those democracies in which former political incumbents and their allies coordinate to impose part of the autocratic institutional rules in the new political regime. We document that this type of democratic transition is much more prevalent than the emergence of pure (popular) democracies in which the majority decides the new political rules. We then develop a theoretical model explaining how an elitebiased democracy may arise in an initially autocratic country. To this end, we extend the benchmark political transition model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) along two essential directions. First, population is split into majority versus minority groups under the initial autocratic regime. Second, the minority is an insider as it benefits from a more favourable redistribution by the autocrat. We derive conditions under which elite-biased democracies emerge and characterise them, in particular with respect to pure democracies.