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As a contribution to the search for suitable and sustainable solutions to finance rising medical care expenditures, the book proposes a typology of healthcare financing and insurance schemes, based on the dimensions of basic vs. supplementary services and mandatory vs. voluntary coverage, to analyse the design and the complex interactions between various financing and insurance arrangements in several OECD countries. This study provides a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the financial and organisational structures of different countries' healthcare financing and insurance schemes. Its main contributions are the development of a novel and rigorous theoretical framework analysing the economic rationales for the optimal design of healthcare financing and insurance schemes, and an empirical and institutional analysis investigating the consequences for efficiency and affordability of the complex interactions between basic and supplementary sources of financing.

Three major policy tools govern the demand for private health insurance (PHI) in Australia: premium-related subsidies (i.e. PHI-rebate); income tax surcharges (i.e. the Medicare Levy Surcharge (MLS)); and lifetime community-rating (i.e. Lifetime Health Cover). The first two provide a system of carrots and sticks to create incentives for increasing the demand for PHI. The third creates incentives for consumers to purchase PHI earlier than they otherwise would have, and to maintain this coverage over time even when prices rise. This paper makes a number of contributions to the existing literature. We develop a diagrammatic model that incorporates income heterogeneity and use it to consider two important policy issues: the effect of policy changes on consumer price responsiveness, and the effect of policy changes on the PHI take-up rates. The model suggests that recent changes to the income tax surcharge are likely to reduce the price elasticity of demand for insurance, which could have further consequences for outcomes in the PHI market and the health system more generally. Increases in premiums will reduce take-up, but could worsen the government's budget position, even if tax revenues were to rise. Finally, we conduct numerical simulations to examine the possible effects of recent policy changes, which are aimed at further means-testing the PHI rebate and the MLS. The simulation results suggest that these recently adopted policy changes are likely to reduce the take-up of PHI as well as consumers responsiveness to future premium increases.

Three major policy tools govern the demand for private health insurance (PHI) in Australia: premium-related subsidies (i.e. PHI-rebate); income tax surcharges (i.e. the Medicare Levy Surcharge (MLS)); and lifetime community-rating (i.e. Lifetime Health Cover). The first two provide a system of carrots and sticks to create incentives for increasing the demand for PHI. The third creates incentives for consumers to purchase PHI earlier than they otherwise would have, and to maintain this coverage over time even when prices rise. This paper makes a number of contributions to the existing literature. We develop a diagrammatic model that incorporates income heterogeneity and use it to consider two important policy issues: the effect of policy changes on consumer price responsiveness, and the effect of policy changes on the PHI take-up rates. The model suggests that recent changes to the income tax surcharge are likely to reduce the price elasticity of demand for insurance, which could have further consequences for outcomes in the PHI market and the health system more generally. Increases in premiums will reduce take-up, but could worsen the government's budget position, even if tax revenues were to rise. Finally, we conduct numerical simulations to examine the possible effects of recent policy changes, which are aimed at further means-testing the PHI rebate and the MLS. The simulation results suggest that these recently adopted policy changes are likely to reduce the take-up of PHI as well as consumers responsiveness to future premium increases.

• The current escalation in costs of Australia's health care system does not appear to be sustainable. • Sustainable financing requires direct engagement of consumers - instead of the current political process driven by special interest groups, target

• The current escalation in costs of Australia's health care system does not appear to be sustainable. • Sustainable financing requires direct engagement of consumers - instead of the current political process driven by special interest groups, target

Objective(s): This paper aims at providing an overview of the COVID-19 situation, health policies, and economic impact in Greece, Iceland, New Zealand, and Singapore. The four countries were chosen due to their ability to contain the spread and mitigate the effects of COVID-19 on their societies. Method(s): We use document analysis based on the available national reports, media announcements, official coronavirus websites and governmental decrees in each of the four countries starting from the 1st of January o the 9th of August announcements. We apply a policy gradient to compare and examine the policies implemented in the four countries. Finding(s): The four countries have different demographic, epidemiological, socioeconomic profiles but managed to control the pandemic at an early stage in terms of total number of positive cases. The four countries managed to absorb the health system shock and decrease the case fatality ratio of COVID-19. Early interventions were crucial to avoid expected life lost in case of no early lockdown. The pandemic triggered several economic stimulus and relief measures in the four countries; the impact or the economic rebound is yet to be fully observed. Conclusion(s): We conclude that early, proactive and strict interventions along with leveraging previous experience on communicable diseases and the evolution of testing strategies are key lessons that can be synthesized from the interventions of the four countries and that could be useful for a potential second wave or similar pandemics.

In April 2007, Australia introduced a risk equalisation (RE) scheme (de facto a claims equalisation scheme), which replaced an extant reinsurance scheme that had operated since 1976. This scheme is one of a number of policy measures that the Australian Government has instituted to support the voluntary private health insurance (PHI) market which is subject to mandatory community rating and the attendant problem of selection. The latter has been a persistent concern in the Australian PHI market since the introduction of Australia's universal, compulsory national health insurance scheme Medicare. This paper presents a brief overview of Australia's health care financing arrangements and, in particular, focuses on the history, structure and functioning of the RE scheme. It provides an exposition of the operation of the scheme and empirical evidence of the scheme's effects in its first full year of operation, 2007-08. The paper makes three contributions: first, it provides the only detailed overview of the functioning of the Australian RE scheme published to date; second, it presents the first empirical measures of the scheme's operation at the level of the 38 individual PHI funds; and third, it describes the systematic differences in the scheme's operation with respect to large and small funds. Thus, this paper provides a number of insights into the operation and outcomes of the Australian RE scheme following its first year of operation.

In April 2007, Australia introduced a risk equalisation (RE) scheme (de facto a claims equalisation scheme), which replaced an extant reinsurance scheme that had operated since 1976. This scheme is one of a number of policy measures that the Australian Government has instituted to support the voluntary private health insurance (PHI) market which is subject to mandatory community rating and the attendant problem of selection. The latter has been a persistent concern in the Australian PHI market since the introduction of Australia's universal, compulsory national health insurance scheme Medicare. This paper presents a brief overview of Australia's health care financing arrangements and, in particular, focuses on the history, structure and functioning of the RE scheme. It provides an exposition of the operation of the scheme and empirical evidence of the scheme's effects in its first full year of operation, 2007-08. The paper makes three contributions: first, it provides the only detailed overview of the functioning of the Australian RE scheme published to date; second, it presents the first empirical measures of the scheme's operation at the level of the 38 individual PHI funds; and third, it describes the systematic differences in the scheme's operation with respect to large and small funds. Thus, this paper provides a number of insights into the operation and outcomes of the Australian RE scheme following its first year of operation.