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The literature on church-state relations in post-Soviet Russia has been slowly but steadily expanding over the past two decades. The period since 2008, however, remains underdeveloped, as existing analysis has focused on specific issues rather than attempting an overview of the larger trends since the above-mentioned changes in the leadership of both institutions. Seeking to address this gap, this article explores the implications of the nearly coincidental changeovers in leadership in the Moscow Patriarchate and the secular state for church-state relations in Russia, both near and long-term. The first part of the article sets up the context for understanding the new church-state dynamic, by discussing in some detail the state of the relationship under Patriarch Aleksii II. The conclusions are that, under Aleksii tenure, the church could be considered a relatively weak institution, as it was unable for the most part to strengthen its position in Russia through legislative means. The second part focuses on the process whereby the new patriarch came to be elected in 2009, intending thereby to shed some light on Kirill I's leadership style and political agenda. The third part discusses concrete changes in the church-state relationship that have occurred on the federal level since 2008. The final section proposes some conclusions regarding the importance of the Russian Orthodox Church as a political actor in the contemporary Russian Federation, suggesting that despite the recent gains in the church's political fortunes, the ROC's position in society and particularly vis-à-vis the government remains vulnerable in key respects.

Assesses the level of influence that the Russian Orthodox Church, ROC, has upon the Russian voters, politicians, and political elite with the question as to how well informed these voting groups themselves are of the ROC's official stance on any given subject, as well as to gain an understanding if outward homage to Orthodoxy has made a true change within the political arena. This train of thought is then applied to 12 different Russian political parties to test levels of influence of the ROC upon them. It is noted that most of the politicians and their respective parties utilize the jargon of the ROC and so examines the differing levels to which each party language attempts to embody the ROC's moral standards. Finds that the four major political parties often give more credence to the influence of the church than actually exists. Lastly looks at the Rodina bloc political parties and how they've assessed the need to incorporate ROC ideals into their jargon and voting, with the surprising twist that, while addressing themselves to the voting populace in terms of ROC standards, over a third of those that voted for them consider themselves to be atheists. Finds that very few of the parties truly utilize or identify with the ROC in practice, but rather couple ROC ideals with basic patriotism due to the church's historical place in Russian society. References. S. Fullmer