Suchergebnisse

Multilateral negotiations form the basis of much international cooperation, but the hurdle of reaching agreement often proves insurmountable. One prominent example of such negotiations is the Doha round of trade liberalization talks in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The round has already lasted more than fourteen years but, so far, has fallen short of its original ambition. This article identifies one possible reason why multilateral negotiations such as those of the Doha round face difficulties, namely the dysfunctional communication among states. I contend that a state's ability to effectively articulate its interests is inhibited when its interests are dispersed across a number of issues under negotiation rather than focused on one or two primary areas. For straight- forward domestic political reasons, a state that pursues multiple interests in negotiations will have difficulty in credibly communicating its position to other participants. This decreases the efficiency of negotiations, creates delays, and may lead to negotiation deadlock. I test this proposition with the use of a newly collected dataset of coded public statements by representatives of WTO member states at the eight ministerial conferences between 1996 and 2011.

In international organizations, states seek representation not only indecision-making and political fora but also in the administrative bodies, orsecretariats. This article maps the representation of Central and EasternEuropean (CEE) countries in the secretariats of 36 bodies of the UnitedNations (UN) system in the years 1996-2015. The CEE region is interestingdue to the deep political divide between Russia and the Western-orientednew EU member states. Using new empirical evidence regarding theparticipation of CEE countries' citizens on the professional staff of the UNbodies, we show that Russia has dramatically lost much of itsrepresentation in the UN administration over the last twenty years. Incontrast, a number of other CEE countries have considerably improved theirposition in it. In spite of that, the countries of the entire CEE region belongto those with an overall weak representation in the administrative bodies ofthe UN.

AbstractThis survey article provides the first comprehensive assessment of the functioning of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), the central monitoring platform of the World Trade Organization (WTO), over the first 20 years of the WTO's existence (1995–2014). Building on two large new datasets, we assess the performance of the Mechanism along three dimensions: (1) members' participation rates in trade policy reviews (TPRs); (2) the coverage of trade flows through participation of states in relevant TPRs; and (3) the content of their input into the reviews. Descriptively, we identify a very prominent increase in members' participation rates, but also a very high share of dyadic trade flows covered by the TPRs. In the most recent period, members accounting for up to 95 per cent of the imports into the reviewed state take part in the TPRs, on average. We also argue that the Mechanism provides space for substantial critical reviewing of members' policies, especially in some areas such as agriculture. However, we also identify specific pitfalls of the Mechanism, especially in its excessive formalism and lack of interactive discussion.

This paper offers the first comprehensive quantitative explanatory study of the World Trade Organization (WTO) member states' activity in the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), the WTO's central monitoring instrument. We analyze both the written questions submitted and the oral declarations delivered by the WTO members in all 95 trade policy reviews in the six-year period of 2009–2014. Descriptively, we find that the European Union and the United States are the most active members, but that the so-called 'rising' powers – namely China, Brazil, and India – very closely follow. In addition, almost the entire membership is involved in reviewing activity, at least to some extent. The explanatory results reveal that activity in the TPRM is strongly associated with a country's market size. However, the member states' overall aggregate membership in international organizations plays an almost equally important role.

How successful have emerging powers been at increasing their representation within the secretariats of international organizations (IOs)? We examine the representation of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN) System, including the UN Secretariat, over the last two decades. The analysis reveals four major findings. First, some redistribution of staff positions from established to emerging powers has taken place, but it has been relatively minor. Second, nationals from emerging powers are still strongly under-represented in international secretariats in comparison with those from established powers. Third, emerging powers' representation at the IMF and WTO increased more than in the UN, where it actually declined. Fourth, there is strong variation between emerging powers: India appears to be the most successful emerging power in sending its nationals to the secretariats of IOs, Brazil's and China's records are mixed, and Russia has fared poorly. We interpret our findings in light of international relations theories and theories of institutional path dependence. The results suggest that staffing patterns are only loosely related to shifts in economic size and are subject to strong independent institutional dynamics.