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AbstractThis article is an attempt to identify who's who and the whereabouts of Japanese political studies in South Korea. Previous studies suggest that South Korea made a delayed start in Japanese studies because of submerged anti-Japanese feeling among the general public, and that linguistic and humanistic studies were prevalent while social scientific studies lagged behind. The second generation scholars, who actively published their academic works on Japan between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, contributed to the development of objective, social scientific understanding of Japan. Their research interests included scrutinizing modern Japan, studying Korea-Japan relations, and analyzing Japanese foreign policy. The third generation scholars, which this article focuses on, have a few common characteristics: they began Japanese studies when Japan was rising; most of them were trained in Japan or the United States; most of them are fluent in Japanese; and they are publishing actively in major academic journals. The research interests of the third generation are categorized into four: (1) widening the research horizon; (2) inheriting the tradition of the previous generation; (3) synchronizing research agendas with the foreign scholarly community; and (4) opening up a new research horizon. After making a comprehensive content analysis of the works undertaken by third generation scholars, three major challenges are suggested for the upcoming generation of Japanese studies in South Korea: (1) globalizing the scholarly works with more theoretical analysis; (2) developing a uniquely Korean perspective about Japan; and (3) undertaking a systematic collaborative study with foreign scholars.

This article is an attempt to identify who's who and the whereabouts of Japanese political studies in South Korea. Previous studies suggest that South Korea made a delayed start in Japanese studies because of submerged anti-Japanese feeling among the general public, and that linguistic and humanistic studies were prevalent while social scientific studies lagged behind. The second generation scholars, who actively published their academic works on Japan between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, contributed to the development of objective, social scientific understanding of Japan. Their research interests included scrutinizing modern Japan, studying Korea-Japan relations, and analyzing Japanese foreign policy. The third generation scholars, which this article focuses on, have a few common characteristics: they began Japanese studies when Japan was rising; most of them were trained in Japan or the United States; most of them are fluent in Japanese; and they are publishing actively in major academic journals. The research interests of the third generation are categorized into four: (1) widening the research horizon; (2) inheriting the tradition of the previous generation; (3) synchronizing research agendas with the foreign scholarly community; and (4) opening up a new research horizon. After making a comprehensive content analysis of the works undertaken by third generation scholars, three major challenges are suggested for the upcoming generation of Japanese studies in South Korea: (1) globalizing the scholarly works with more theoretical analysis; (2) developing a uniquely Korean perspective about Japan; and (3) undertaking a systematic collaborative study with foreign scholars. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractOver the past few decades, cooperation between Korea and Japan has increased and deepened, but frictions continue to persist. Which direction is the relationship between Korea and Japan heading? This is the question that this article attempts to address.From an analytical standpoint, this article applies contemporary international relations theories – realism, liberalism, and constructivism – to the pattern of cooperation and conflict in Korea–Japan relations. After reviewing both optimistic and pessimistic positions drawn from diverse perspectives, the author makes a synthesis, where he suggests the case for cautious optimism.What we find in reality is long-term progress in an upward movement, interrupted by recurring frictions in the short term. Empirical evidence supports the case that Korea–Japan relations are making steady progress towards deeper, heightened, and multilayered cooperation. However, such issues as historical controversy and territorial disputes are the hurdles that both nations need to overcome. Whether Korea and Japan can maximize the effects of optimism, while they effectively minimize the impacts of pessimism will determine the nature of the ties between the two countries.Cooperation between the two countries is not necessarily guaranteed, but we find irreversible trends of improved cooperation over time. However, lingering suspicions, submerged nationalist sentiments, and sporadic surges of extremism remain. They should be carefully managed by the leaders of the two countries.

A review essay on books by (1) Jang Jip Choi, Hang-guk Minjujuui Mueosi Munjeinga ([What is the Problem in the Korean Democracy?] Seoul: Saengkak eui Namu, 2008); (2) Jang Jip Choi, Chan Pyo Park and Sang Hoon Park, Otteon Minjujuui Inga ([What Kind of Democracy? [Seoul: Humanitas, 2007); (3) Jin Mon Chung, Han-gukui Jenngdang Jeongchiwa Daetongnyeongje Minjujuui ([Party Politics in Korea and Presidential Democracy] Seoul: Ingansarang, 2008); (4) Young Tae Jung, Han-guk Sahoe-ui Byeonhwa wa Jindo Jeongdang ([Changes in Korean Society and The Progressive Political Party] Incheon: Inha University Press, 2006) & (5) Won Taek Kang, Daetongnyeongje, Naegakjewa Iwon Jipjeongbuje ([Presidential System, Parliamentary System and Dual Executive System] Seoul: Ingansarang, 2006).

Clientele networks are differently structured across nations, depending on the political institutional setup and the configuration of political and social forces. The political institutional setup, which is cross-nationally different, determines where clientele networks are formed, how extensive they are and how long they can persist. The configuration of political and social forces, which varies over time, defines who takes the lead in clientele networks and how effective they are for producing policy effects. A comparison of Korean and Japanese clientelism suggests that the Korean case represents a form of national-level, defensive, non-cumulative and high political-risk clientelism, while the Japanese case illustrates a form of local-level, cumulative and low political-risk clientelism. Korean clientelism is not a copy of the Japanese variant. Based on this analysis, the author suggests that not every social organisation is functional for democratic governance. He also points out that the gradual process of disintegrating clientele networks is on the move. Adapted from the source document.