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AbstractThe purpose of this research is to uncover the dynamic structure of an interorganizational emergency management network after a disaster. This research tests two hypothesized network structures: interdependent risk and independent risk. While the former illustrates the importance of trust and information redundancy in coordinating and aligning emergency preparedness and response, the latter captures the tendency for local actors to seek dominant partners to bridge crucial information across the region. A stochastic actor‐based model with a forward selection strategy is used to analyze the structural effects of endogenous networks and the effects of exogenous community attributes on interorganizational ties. Based on the data sets collected before and after the 2012 typhoons in South Korea, the results support the interdependent risk hypothesis, suggesting that an interorganizational network structure tends to evolve into the notion of shared collaboration risk.

AbstractThis research examines the extent to which political similarities—that is, homophily between political actors at the local level—affect patterns of interorganizational collaboration in an emergency response situation. While the field of emergency management has focused on implementation‐oriented arrangements among key stakeholders, few studies have systemically investigated the creation and development of interorganizational collaborations led by political actors, especially following catastrophic events. The analysis reveals that a dyadic tie with political homophily boosts local responders' ties with other agencies during emergencies. Findings indicate that political solidarity, formulated by chief elected officials of municipalities and council members, can broaden the scope of interorganizational collaboration by mitigating institutional collective action problems at the local level. This research presents a critical recommendation for emergency managers that interlocal collaboration for timely response to a disaster is attributable to political similarities that facilitate frequent interlocal interactions through formal and/or informal agreements.

Networks play an important role in collaboration, but previous work has not examined the different roles of elected and appointed officials in these networks. This article investigates local economic development policy networks to address (1) the extent to which the structure of relationships reflects the efforts of actors to efficiently collect and process information or to enhance credible commitment; (2) the extent to which differences in incentives and risk aversion lead to differences in politicians' and administrators' networks; and (3) how similarities and differences between local governments affect their network relationships. Exponential random graph analysis of local governments in the Orlando, Florida, metropolitan area demonstrate that local government actors forge tightly clustered networks, consistent with the desire to address commitment problems. Although administrators have more expansive networks, there is little evidence of differences in network patterns for administrators and elected officials. Similarity of economic problems and differences in population also promotes collaboration. These findings are linked to the competitive nature of economic development.

There is high interest in economic development efforts involving cooperation or collaboration among metropolitan jurisdictions. To determine why some local governments engage in cooperative agreements while others do not, this paper investigates transaction obstacles, including bargaining, information, agency, enforcement, and division problems. The authors then advance an institutional collective action explanation for intergovernmental cooperation, focusing on the conditions under which these transactions costs are low. This work anticipates that the costs associated with interlocal cooperation are influenced by the demographic characteristics of communities, local political institutions, and the nature of regional government networks. Empirical analysis based on a national survey of local development officials provides support for several predictions from this model and identifies policy variables that, in turn, increase the prospects for cooperation, specifically through the development of informal policy networks.

This article explores the consequences that local government institutions and turnover among local government officials have for local borrowing. We outline how turnover affects choices in policy arenas involving public and private sector actors, long-term obligations, or future commitments. Turnover creates political uncertainty that alters the time horizons of local leaders as well as the transaction costs involved in the floating of bond issues. Empirical analysis of city borrowing patterns in the late 1980s provides evidence that turnover of council members and managers in council—manager cities increases municipal debt burdens. However, turnover of chief administrative officers in mayor—council cities is associated with less city borrowing.