Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Chapter 1: In Defense of the No-Miracles Argument -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The NMA -- 1.3 Laudan's Objection -- 1.4 The Rejection of the Demand -- 1.5 IBE -- 1.6 Evolutionary Theory -- 1.7 The End of History Illusion -- 1.8 Ad Hoc -- 1.9 Empiricism -- 1.10 Surrealism -- 1.11 Predictive Similarity -- 1.12 Summary -- References -- Chapter 2: Critiques of the Pessimistic Induction -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Pessimistic Induction -- 2.3 Problematic Positions -- 2.3.1 The Classic PI and IBE -- 2.3.2 The Classic PI and Evolutionary Theory -- 2.4 The Grand PI -- 2.4.1 Four Intrinsic Problems -- 2.4.2 The PUA -- 2.4.3 The Relative PI -- 2.4.4 The PI over Realists -- 2.4.5 The Epistemic PI -- 2.4.6 The Problem of Misleading Evidence -- 2.4.7 Proportional Pessimism -- 2.5 Summary -- References -- Chapter 3: Critiques of Scientific Antirealism -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The PI Over Antirealist Explanations -- 3.3 The PI Over Pessimists -- 3.4 The PI Over Antirealists -- 3.5 Explanation -- 3.6 Prediction -- 3.7 Two Epistemic Disadvantages -- 3.8 Epistemic Reciprocalism -- 3.9 Empiricism and the Problem of Unobserved Anomalies -- 3.10 Constructive Empiricism -- 3.11 Gap Antirealists -- 3.12 Summary -- References -- Chapter 4: Six New Arguments for Scientific Realism -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The Optimistic Induction Over Realists -- 4.3 The Argument from Undiscovered Evidence -- 4.4 The Argument from Neighboring Theories -- 4.5 The Counter-Induction for Realism -- 4.6 The English Notion of Rationality -- 4.7 The Grand Optimistic Induction -- 4.8 Tu Quoque -- 4.9 Summary -- References -- Chapter 5: Critiques of Five Variants of Putative Realism -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Entity Realism -- 5.3 Minimal Realism -- 5.4 Axiological Realism -- 5.5 Van Fraassen's Definition -- 5.6 Selective Realism -- 5.6.1 An Analysis.

Van Fraassenas savąją pragmatinę mokslinio aiškinimo teoriją paremia Bayeso sąlyginės tikimybės matu ir kartu, priešingai nei teigia Prasetya, jos patvirtinimui panaudoja geriausio paaiškinimo išvedimą (GPI). Priešingai nei mano van Fraassenas, Bayeso sąlyginės tikimybės skaičiavimas negali būti atliktas pirmiausia nepritaikius GPI. Argumentas, apeliuojantis į blogų aibę, kurį naudoja van Fraassenas kritikuodamas GPI, grįžta bumerangu į pragmatinę teoriją ir Bayeso sąlyginę tikimybę, taigi tampa argumentu prieš van Fraasseną ir Prasetyą.

Moral subjectivism is not self-defeating, contrary to what moral objectivists claim. Ockham's Razor favours moral subjectivism over moral objectivism. It is circular for moral objectivists to say that since we construct sound and cogent arguments out of moral statements, moral statements are true. Moral subjectivism acknowledges the role that arguments play in our moral lives, contrary to what moral objectivists contend. The way in which moral objectivists attempt to establish moral objectivism ironically supports moral subjectivism.

Abstract: I defend cultural relativism against the following objections: (i) The analogy between motion and morality is flawed. (ii) Cultural relativism has greater potential to be harmful to our daily lives than is cultural absolutism. (iii) We made moral progress when we
moved from slavery to equality. (iv) There are some moral principles that are accepted by all cultures around the world. (v) Moral argumentation is impossible within the framework of cultural relativism. (vi) We construct arguments for and against cultures.

[full article, abstract in English; abstract in Lithuanian] The absolute pessimistic induction states that earlier theories, although successful, were abandoned, so current theories, although successful, will also be abandoned. By contrast, the relative pessimistic induction states that earlier theories, although superior to their predecessors, were discarded, so current theories, although superior to earlier theories, will also be discarded. Some pessimists would have us believe that the relative pessimistic induction avoids empirical progressivism. I argue, however, that it has the same problem as the absolute pessimistic induction, viz., either its premise is implausible or its conclusion does not probably follow from its premise.

[full article, abstract in English; only abstract in Lithuanian]

Nickles advocates scientific antirealism by appealing to the illusion hypothesis, the pessimistic induction over scientific theories, Darwin's evolutionary theory, and the problem of underdetermination. I object that both the illusion hypothesis and evolutionary theory clash with the pessimistic induction and with the problem of underdetermination. I also argue that Nickles's positive philosophical theories are subject to Park's pessimistic induction over antirealists. Finally, I apply the Golden Rule to antirealists, viz., if antirealists do not want scientists to run the pessimistic induction over antirealists, antirealists ought not to run the pessimistic induction over scientific theories.

Scientific antirealism, the view that successful theories are empirically adequate, is untenable in light of the problem of unobserved anomalies that since past scientists could not observe the anomalies that caused the replacement of past theories with present theories, present scientists cannot observe the anomalies either that will cause the replacement of present theories with future theories. There are several moves that antirealists would be tempted to make to get around the problem of unobserved anomalies. All of them, however, are problematic.

Pasak Juhos Saatsi pasiūlyto minimaliojo realizmo, vyksta teorinė mokslo pažanga. Ši koncepcija sukurta pesimistinei indukcijai įveikti, vidurio pozicijai tarp mokslinio realizmo ir instrumentalizmo užimti bei mokslo teorijų sėkmei paaiškinti. Šiame straipsnyje pateikiami du prieštaravimai minimaliajam realizmui. Pirma, nėra aišku, ar minimalusis realizmas išties yra tarp realizmo ir instrumentalizmo, nes instrumentalizmas neplaukia iš minimaliojo realizmo. Antra, nėra aišku ar minimalusis realizmas gali paaiškinti mokslo teorijų sėkmę, nes abejotina, ar teorinė pažanga daro sėkmę tikėtiną. Be šių dviejų prieštaravimų, straipsnyje formuluojama ir kritikuojama nauja pozicija, kuri iš tikrųjų atsiduria tarp realizmo ir instrumnetalizmo.

Abstract
It is supererogatory to refrain from eating meat, just as it is supererogatory to refrain from driving cars, living in apartments, and wearing makeup, for the welfare of animals. If all animals are equal, and if nonhuman omnivores, such as bears and baboons, are justified in killing the members of other species, such as gazelles and buffaloes, for food, humans are also justified in killing the members of other species, such as cows, pigs, and chickens, for food. In addition, it is fair for humans to eat animals because humans are also eaten by animals.

Individual realism asserts that our best scientific theories are (approximately) true. In contrast, selective realism asserts that only the stable posits of our best scientific theories are true. Hence, individual realism recommends that we accept more of what our best scientific theories say about the world than selective realism does. The more scientists believe what their theories say about the world, the more they are motivated to exercise their imaginations and think up new theories and experiments. Therefore, individual realism better fosters scientific creativity than selective realism.