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"Many books on performance management or evaluation are about the public sector in general or specifically about some programs or organizations. Only a few of them target the public institutions. This book addresses what types of challenges that performance evaluation of public institutions actually face and how to overcome them through the analysis of Korea's three-decade long experiences. This book provides detailed descriptions on how performance evaluation of public institution has been implemented in Korea. At the same time, it provides comprehensive analyses on theoretical issues such as validity analysis performance measure, the dynamic change of efficiency of public institution, impact of price regulation on profits, and qualitative approaches for evaluating governance"--

Scholars have argued that utilization of quantitative performance indicators by public organizations could generate unintended consequences that might outweigh the benefits of performance measurement. We examined the relationships between goal ambiguity and external control, and distortive practices in performance measurement in public organizations. The data from 47 agencies of the central and local governments in Korea were analyzed using fixed-effect ordered logistic regression methods. The results showed that goal ambiguity was positively and significantly associated with distortive practices in performance measurement. Goal ambiguity may incentivize public employees to misuse performance information to obtain rewards for higher performance ratings. Contrary to our expectation, reinforced external control was negatively and significantly related to distortive behaviors in performance measurement. Higher work autonomy was not significantly associated with manipulation of performance information. Employees with higher intrinsic motivation were less likely to distort performance measures, whereas the ones with higher extrinsic motivation were more likely to misuse performance information to achieve higher performance ratings. Points for practitioners To avoid the potential distortions in performance measurement, public managers should adopt a refined measurement model of performance customized to the unique characteristics of public services. Multiple sets of measures need to be developed and managed properly to respond to complex political environments which involve different key values and the stakeholders in the policy processes, and the nature of public service products and outcomes. Reinforced behavioral control in the process of measuring performance will also be necessary.

This study explores the demographic and environmental factors affecting the spread and mortality rate of COVID-19 in countries around the world. We performed a hierarchical regression by adding interaction terms to such factors as the proportion of people aged 65 or older, the ratio of foreign migrants, the number of hospital beds available, population density, the Gini index, smoking rate among the population, mean population exposure to PM2.5 and NOx emissions in each country. We found that countries with a higher proportion of people over 65 had a higher rate of confirmed positive cases, a higher mortality rate, and a higher case fatality rate. We also found that there was a positive and significant statistical correlation between the number of foreign migrants in a country and the rate of confirmed positive COVID19 cases and the number of deaths but an inverse relationship between this variable and the case fatality rate. We found a negative relationship between the number of hospital beds and mortality and case fatality rate while but a positive relationship between the level of nitrogen oxides in the environment and the rate of confirmed positive cases, the mortality rate, and the case fatality rate, although there was no such relationship for ultrafine dust. Overall, the variables affecting the spread and mortality of COVID-19 in June, during which it was expected there would be a lull after the virus had reached its peak in May, were similar to those affecting its spread and mortality in May, but the model's explanatory power and significance were higher in May.

This study examines the circumstances under which public organizations establish easy performance goals, analyzing nationwide data collected from cabinet departments in central and local government agencies in South Korea. Several factors have been identified as contributing to the tendency of public organizations to set easily achievable goals. Firstly, local governments tend to establish less challenging performance standards compared to central government agencies. Secondly, public organizations with higher financial resources per employee ratios are inclined to set easy performance goals. Lastly, the presence of a strong innovation-oriented culture or transparency requirements decreases the likelihood of setting easy performance goals.

Understanding who behaves more ethically and how to boost one's ethical decision making are important but relatively neglected human resource management (HRM) questions. To fill this gap, we extend recent experimental research on the role of public service motivation (PSM) in enhancing ethical behavior by leveraging a unique setting of anti-corruption reform in South Korea. Building on the difference-in-differences design in a quasi-experimental setting with more than 10,000 civil servants, gathered as part of a representative survey, we find that not only do civil servants' higher levels of PSM lead to more ethical behavior but that their colleagues with higher levels of PSM are also perceived to be more ethical after policy implementation. As the first quasi-experimental research attempting to estimate PSM's causal effect on ethical behavioral change, with the largest survey samples to date, our analysis has important implications regarding the greater efficacy of anti-corruption policies and the role of PSM in this context.

How do bureaucrats respond to legislators' demands for change in policy implementation? We distinguish between unified and divided government, where the degree of legislative oversight over bureaucratic autonomy is likely to differ, and we argue that how bureaucrats actually respond in varying executive‐legislative relations depends on their incentives shaped by greater autonomy in implementation (unified government) versus closer monitoring by legislators (divided government). Analyzing two sets of original data from list and endorsement experiments with local bureaucrats in Korea (n = 4064)—one from the period of legislative auditing and the other from the nonauditing period—we find that bureaucrats are more likely to incorporate legislators' views into their decision‐making under unified than under divided government. Furthermore, bureaucrats are more responsive to legislatures when their political ideology is congruent with that of a legislative majority than when it is incongruent, regardless of unified or divided government. Our findings have a clear implication: the importance of bureaucratic autonomy and preferences rather than monitoring as an effective tool to increase bureaucratic responsiveness.

Scholars have debated the question of what influences bureaucrats' policy implementation in provincial government, some taking the top-down and some the bottom-up approaches. However, less well understood in this debate is the impact of governors' characteristics, particularly at a time of national political crisis. Given that their roles have been proven important for the performance of provincial governments, this is a significant oversight. To fill this gap, we examine the effect of governors' political characteristics on provincial bureaucrats' responses to the center by leveraging a unique setting, that of presidential impeachment in South Korea. Using original survey data on 655 civil servants from all 17 provincial governments, gathered as part of a representative survey, we find that bureaucrats are less responsive to the central government after impeachment. Our results show that this difference between pre- and post-impeachment is driven by several political characteristics, such as governors' political ideology and tenure in office. Our findings have implications for the role of governors in intergovernmental relations and the management of provincial governments' performance.

The aim of this article is to explore the motivations of street-level bureaucrats when implementing change initiated by elected politicians. We analyse experimental data on more than 1,800 local civil servants from all 243 local governments in South Korea and find that street-level bureaucrats are more likely to implement change instigated by local elected politicians when their own policy positions are reflected in the reforms. Moreover, the degree to which street-level bureaucrats are likely to execute reforms instigated by local politicians is greater when bureaucrats perceive themselves as having more freedom to exercise discretion. These findings reveal a behavioural insight into the conditions in which bureaucrats are more likely to respond to change championed by elected politicians versus conditions where they are more likely to follow existing rules in the policy implementation process.

AbstractThe question of who controls the bureaucracy has been widely debated in the political science and public administration literatures. However, to whom bureaucrats are responsive and to what extent are relatively unknown, particularly outside the US. To understand how organizational behaviour changes according to external political environments, we leverage a unique setting, that of the 2016 presidential impeachment in South Korea. We analyse original experimental data from more than 1,000 civil servants, gathered as part of a nationally representative survey, in order to estimate the degree to which civil servants chose to incorporate the president's preferences into their policy decisions before and after her impeachment. We find that presidential impeachment has a differential impact on the responsiveness of civil servants across the formal ranks of the personnel, controlling for their political views and several other individual characteristics. While bureaucrats were similarly responsive to the President before impeachment regardless of their grades, senior civil servants were significantly more responsive to the President after impeachment than were lower‐ranking bureaucrats. Our study contributes to the literature on organizational theory and public management the evidence that civil servants' attitudes are shaped by the structure of bureaucratic organizations and change with external settings involving elected principals.

AbstractScholars have debated what constitutes effective ministerial leadership with respect to administrative competence versus political influence. The authors contribute experimental evidence to this debate through a unique survey design of endorsement experiments. Using original data from 949 national civil servants in South Korea, this article examines civil servants' assessments of ministerial leadership in three central dimensions of public management: internal management, interbranch coordination, and policy formulation/implementation. Further, existing variation in the characteristics of agencies is used to test whether such variation induces systematic differences in civil servants' responses. Findings show that that civil servants' attitudes toward ministerial leadership are asymmetric in nature. Ministers with civil service backgrounds are endorsed in all three dimensions, whereas ministers with legislative backgrounds receive increased support only for interbranch coordination skills. The levels of support for ministers with different backgrounds also vary across agency types. This analysis has implications for public management practice and agency control in presidential governments.