Suchergebnisse

In 1993 the World Bank created the revolutionary World Bank Inspection Panel and, with it, a precedent under international law that allowed people to seek recourse for harm resulting from the projects the Bank financed in developing countries. This was the first time that a universal international organization recognized and responded to its impact on individuals. Within a decade of the Inspection Panel, other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) created similar accountability mechanisms. These mechanisms embody a norm of 'accountability as justice' that provides recourse for environmentally and socially damaging behavior through a formal sanctioning process. In 'The Good Hegemon,' Susan Park analyzes the 'accountability as justice' norm: its creation, how it functions, and whether it holds the MDBs to account.

"Taking a thematic and theoretical approach, this textbook examines international organisations (IOs) and their effectiveness in solving global issues. Through the lens of international relations theory, it focuses on eight key issue areas central to international relations: conflict; weapons; human rights; global health; financial governance; international trade; political and economic unions; development, and the environment. Capturing the best and most up-to-date scholarly research and empirical examples from around the world, the book enables students to develop the theoretical tools to evaluate IOs and answer the key question, 'are IOs a help or a hindrance?'. Text features include suggestions for further reading, questions, highlighted key terms and supplementary online resources, as well as text boxes providing demonstrations of how additional theories and concepts apply to specific IOs in the issue areas discussed. This textbook is an essential resource for undergraduate and graduate courses on global governance, international organisations, and international relations"--

AbstractCreated to facilitate the transition of economies of Central and Eastern Europe towards democracy and the free market, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is a regional institution in the development finance regime complex. This article examines how the EBRD's independent accountability mechanism (IAM) emerged and changed to demonstrate how policy norms filter through regime complexes. This is important because new ideas can change behavioural expectations and institutional practices across a complex. Tracing where the idea originated from and how it took hold is therefore central to understanding member state interests, the EBRD's response considering its organisational preferences, and how the policy norm solidified through inter‐institutional learning. This deepens our understanding of the development finance regime complex in two ways: first, it, shows how ideas can filter through to seemingly independent institutions via member states, bureaucrats, and stakeholders. This supports the argument that the development finance regime complex is coherent with increasingly consistent rules and obligations. Second, it reminds us not to reify states; while they demanded institutional change nonstate actors influence what constitutes appropriate behaviour for development financiers.

Governance arrangements have become increasingly complex over time, such that today everything from the Internet to medicine and warfare is subject to some form of governance at the global level. Notably, these changes in global governance can come slowly or quickly, depending on circumstances. For example, evolutionary change is evident in the establishment of new treaties and protocols on regulating the various aspects of war and its aftermath—an area where the list of agreements is long and growing. But change can also happen very quickly as new mechanisms—for example, for coordinating states' responses during pandemics—are established during crises.

AbstractIntergovernmental Organizations (IOs) such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) were created by and for states. The ADB was established to further economic growth and cooperation in the Asia Pacific. At the behest of its powerful member states the ADB created an accountability mechanism (AM) in 1995. This mechanism was created to provide recourse to people that might be or are 'directly materially and adversely affected' by a development project financed by the ADB. As with the other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), the creation of such an 'external accountability mechanism' recognized a legally relevant relationship between an IO and private persons. This article investigates the operations of the ADB's AM. Arguably, the ADB's AM has brought some improvement to affected people through its mediation, compliance investigations and monitoring. Yet analysis of the mechanism also demonstrates that progress is hampered by a lack of access, transparency, Developing Member Country (DMC) resistance, staff obstruction and a lack of independence in the mechanism itself.

In the 1990s Multilateral Development Banks created accountability mechanisms (AMs) that allowed people affected by development projects redress. Currently undertheorized, this paper examines how and why the Asian Development Bank (ADB) created an AM, and whether the AM serves its purpose to hold the ADB to account and to provide 'fair hearing of the views of the affected group'. This article argues that the ADB created a new AM because of institutional isomorphism, borrowing the idea of the AM from the World Bank as a result of coercive and mimetic isomorphic processes. Further, that the ADB introduced a mechanism ill-suited to the pre-existing (old) organizational culture of the ADB, which is based on consensus and hierarchical rule-following in the context of ADB operations to further economic growth while upholding state sovereignty. Despite its restructure and recent review, the mechanism's weakness was revealed through a stand-off between China and the AM over an investigation begun in 2009 (creating something 'blue'). The paper concludes that the AM's ability to serve its purpose will remain hampered as long as ADB maintains consensus around economic growth and state sovereignty over providing recourse to affected people. (Pac Rev/GIGA)