Suchergebnisse

One of the fundamental critiques against twentieth century experiments in central economic planning, and the main reason for their failures, was the inability of humandirected planning systems to manage the data gathering, analysis, computation, and control necessary to direct the vast complexity of production, allocation, and exchange decisions that make up a modern economy. Rapid recent advances in AI, data, and related technological capabilities have re-opened that old question, and provoked vigorous speculation about the feasibility, benefits, and threats of an AI-directed economy. This paper presents a thought experiment about how this might work, based on assuming a powerful AI agent (whimsically named "Max") with no binding computational or algorithmic limits on its (his) ability to do the task. The paper's novel contribution is to make this hitherto under-specified question more concrete and specific. It reasons concretely through how such a system might work under explicit assumptions about contextual conditions; what benefits it might offer relative to present market and mixed-market arrangements; what novel requirements or constraints it would present; what threats and challenges it would pose, and how it inflects long-standing understandings of foundational questions about state, society, and human liberty.As with smaller-scale regulatory interventions, the concrete implementation of comprehensive central planning can be abstracted as intervening via controlling either quantities or prices. The paper argues that quantity-based approaches would be fundamentally impaired by problems of principal-agent relations and incentives, which hobbled historical planning systems and would persist under arbitrary computational advances. Price-based approaches, as proposed by Oskar Lange, do not necessarily suffer from the same disabilities. More promising than either, however, would be a variant in which Max manages a comprehensive system of price modifications added to emergent market outcomes, equivalent to a comprehensive economy-wide system of Pigovian taxes and subsidies. Such a system, "Pigovian Max," could in principle realize the information efficiency benefits and liberty interests of decentralized market outcomes, while also comprehensively correcting externalities and controlling inefficient concentration of market power and associated rent-seeking behavior. It could also, under certain additional assumptions, offer the prospect of taxation without deadweight loss, by taking all taxes from inframarginal rents.Having outlined the basic approach and these potential benefits, the paper discusses several challenges and potential risks presented by such a system. These include Max's need for data and the potential costs of providing it; the granularity or aggregation of Max's determinations; the problem of maintaining variety and innovation in an economy directed by Max; the implications of Max for the welfare of human workers, the meaning and extent of property rights, and associated liberty interests; the definition of social welfare that determines Max's objective function, its compatibility with democratic control, and the resultant stability of the boundary between the state and the economy; and finally, the relationship of Max to AI-enabled trends already underway, with implications for the feasibility of Max being developed and adopted, and the associated risks. In view of the depth and difficulty of these questions, the discussion of each is necessarily preliminary and speculative.

Continued failure to limit emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that are causing global climate change has brought increased attention to climate engineering (CE) technologies, which actively modify the global environment to counteract heating and climate disruptions caused by elevated greenhouse gases. Some proposed forms of CE, particularly spraying reflective particles in the upper atmosphere to reduce incoming sunlight, can cool the average temperature of the Earth rapidly and cheaply, thereby substantially reducing climate-related risks. Yet CE interventions provide only imperfect corrections for the climatic and other environmental effects of elevated greenhouse gases, and carry their own environmental risks. Moreover, they may also increase risks, by weakening political support for essential emission reductions or providing new triggers for international conflict. These technologies thus require international governance, but also pose novel and severe challenges to current international laws and institutions. Effective governance of CE will require a capacity to make decisions regarding the conditions, if any, under which specific interventions are authorized, plus real-time operational oversight of any interventions that are conducted. Decision processes must be effectively linked with scientific research and assessment, and with institutions to manage and respond to threats of CE-related conflict. We advance preliminary suggestions to address two priority areas for early investigation: how international cooperation on early CE research can help develop shared norms that can grow robust enough to support future decision needs; and how early research and development on CE can be made to complement and encourage, rather than undermining, parallel efforts to reduce climate risks by cutting emissions.

This third edition has been comprehensively updated to reflect the large changes in scientific knowledge and policy debates on climate change since the previous edition in 2009. It provides a concise but thorough overview of the science, technology, economics, policy, and politics of climate change in a single volume. It explains how scientific and policy debates work, outlines the scientific evidence for the reality and seriousness of climate change and the basic atmospheric science that supports it, and discusses policy options and the current state of the policy debate. By pulling these elements together, the book explains why the issue can be so confusing and provides guidance on practical routes forward. Anyone interested in climate change, the global environment, or how science is used in policy debates should read this book. It is the ideal textbook for undergraduate or graduate courses in environmental policy and climate change.

The second edition of Dessler and Parson's acclaimed book provides an integrated treatment of the science, technology, economics, policy, and politics of climate change. Aimed at the educated non-specialist, and at courses in environmental policy or climate change, the book clearly lays out the scientific foundations of climate change, the issues in current policy debates, and the interactions between science and politics that make the climate change debate so contentious and confusing. This new edition is brought completely up to date to reflect the rapid movement of events related to climate change. In addition, all sections have been improved, in particular a more thorough primer on the basic science of climate change is included. The book also now integrates the discussion of contrarian claims with the discussion of current scientific knowledge; extends the discussion of cost and benefit estimates; and provides an improved glossary.

Proposed geoengineering interventions, like other high-stakes and potentially disruptive technologies, present both a compelling case for expanded research to inform future decisions, and significant concerns about societal harms that may follow from this research, directly or indirectly. In response, there have been widespread calls to both expand research and govern this research with greater care and scrutiny than typical of the normal processes that govern all research areas. We propose that for geoengineering and similarly controversial issues, governance of research must fulfill three broad functions. First, processes are needed that enable reliable research, by providing the authorization, resources, and management necessary for research to proceed, together with the strategic planning and quality controls to ensure that research results are useful and relevant to inform societal choices. Second, processes are needed to assess potential harms or risks from research activities and ensure that these are appropriately managed. These potential harms may include both direct physical risks, and indirect risks mediated by social, economic, or political processes. Finally, processes are needed to support the legitimacy of the research program, by ensuring that the topics, methods, and conduct are compatible with relevant legal, political, and moral principles and are broadly acceptable to affected citizens. These requirements may interact closely with the processes that serve the first two functions, by requiring that research priorities, aims, conduct, participants, and results are transparently and promptly disclosed, that relevant citizen and stakeholder groups are consulted, and that broader implications of proposed research are acknowledged and addressed. Drawing on the concerns expressed in the current geoengineering debate, and on experience conducting and governing research in other areas, we discuss alternative concrete ways to provide these functions for geoengineering research. This paper was prepared as input to a workshop of senior state officials considering the implications of potential geoengineering research for California.