Poverty dynamics among mature women: evidence from the National Longitudinal Surveys 1967-1989
In: National longitudinal surveys
In: Discussion paper 95,25
46 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: National longitudinal surveys
In: Discussion paper 95,25
In: National longitudinal surveys
In: Discussion paper 95,24
In: AEI studies 300
In: Studies in Economic Policy, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
In: Journal of Risk and Insurance, Band 86, Heft 2, S. 351-380
SSRN
Efforts to insure long-tenured displacement workers against earnings losses from unemployment spells and lower wages on subsequent jobs have led to an array of government and employer programs. A policy typology is proposed to impose order on these programmatic efforts. The basic typology involves the familiar distinction between (i) separation benefit type – fixed sum severance or unemployment-linked – and (ii) financing type – insurance or savings. In this four-way categorization, severance savings accounts are the least familiar, perhaps because they are often mislabeled as unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISA). A third policy dimension – the job separation events that trigger plan payouts – is also fundamental to understanding program performance and consequences. Indeed insurance plan performance converges on that of savings plans as the range of insured events and their likelihoods expand. Severance "savings" plans require payouts other than for involuntary separation, most commonly for retirement, which highlights the link with pensions. Conversely the severance properties of pension plans vary with ownership rights (vesting) and "rollover" rules. Forced savings plans that also permit fund access for house purchases and/or human capital investments (provident funds) are an obvious extension of strict severance savings plans.
BASE
Severance pay, a fixed-sum payment to workers at job separation, has been the focus of intense policy concern for the last several decades, but much of this concern is unearned. The design of the ideal separation package is outlined and severance pay emerges as a natural component of job displacement insurance packages, serving both as scheduled reemployment wage insurance and, if search moral hazard is a problem, as scheduled UI. Like any firm-financed separation expenditure, severance pay can induce excessive job retention, but such distortions do not appear to be of practical significance at benefit levels typically mandated in the industrialized world. Moreover there is no evidence that firms attempt to avoid these firing cost distortions by substituting severance savings plans, which have zero firing costs. Indeed severance insurance plans similar to those mandated are often offered voluntarily in the U.S. The appropriate role of government in the market for severance pay is briefly considered.
BASE
Job displacement insurance typically includes both unemployment benefits and lump-sum severance pay, and each has provoked policy concerns. Unemployment insurance concerns have centered on distorted job search/offer acceptance decisions by the worker, severance-induced firing cost concerns on excessive labor hoarding by firms. A single period private contracting model is used to investigate the interaction of these two seemingly distinct issues. Viewed singly, familiar results emerge. The absence of separation benefits of any kind leads to excessive labor hoarding as a primitive form of earnings insurance. In a limited information environment, the distribution of job displacement insurance between the two benefit types becomes important. Unemployment insurance benefits must be limited (relative to first-best levels) and severance pay made more generous. Firing cost considerations are less familiar. Because the firm wants to provide benefits, they cannot be contracted around. Although formally driven by the sum of (unsubsidized) severance pay and expected unemployment benefits, the second-best firing cost program limits severance pay only. Together the two constraints create an unpromising contracting environment. The firing cost constraint is the more easily relaxed by government action - subsidies of sufficient size to one or another of the separation programs will work. Offer acceptance requires restrictions on leisure (workfare). Unfortunately, if first-best benefits are mandated, efficiency requires that both be eased.
BASE
Severance pay mandates are an appealing job displacement insurance strategy in developing countries, which have only modest government administrative capacities, but they carry the threat of adverse indirect effects. A critical review of the empirical literature reveals that severance benefit mandates, unaccompanied by other labor regulations, have little apparent impact on labor market behaviors. Indeed many severance mandates in the industrialized world do not greatly exceed those provided voluntarily in larger firms in the U.S. Benefit mandates in the developing world are sometimes more extravagant, and the absence of substantial effects may result from limited enforcement. Broader economic regulations do appear to have substantial, adverse effects on the labor market, but it is important not to equate these with simple severance insurance plans.
BASE
Economists have concerns about the firing cost implications of mandated severance plans. Analysis reveals that predicted severance plan consequences depend critically on the precise structure of the plan. Whether governments mandate (i) severance insurance plans or (ii) severance savings plans is important; savings plans have no firing cost effects on employer layoff decisions. The firing cost implications of insurance plan are sensitive to the types of job separations that qualify a worker for benefits. Plans that pay benefits across all separations are functionally severance savings plans. The variety of plan types is illustrated using U.S. and international examples.
BASE
In: The journal of economic history, Band 51, Heft 3, S. 657-674
ISSN: 1471-6372
Explanations for the recent decline in the labor force attachment of males 65 years of age and older include the introduction of Old Age and Survivors Insurance and the growth in private pension programs. Neither hypothesis can explain the sizable decline that occurred between 1930 and 1950, when aggregate social security and private pension payments were small. Estimates from pooled state aggregate data indicate that the means-tested Old Age Assistance program established by the Social Security Act of 1935 significantly increased retirement activity in this period, particularly among low-income individuals.
In: Journal of political economy, Band 99, Heft 4, S. 859-876
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: Journal of political economy, Band 99, Heft 4, S. 859
ISSN: 0022-3808
In: Journal of political economy, Band 92, Heft 3, S. 542-549
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: Population and development review, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 41
ISSN: 1728-4457
In: Economica, Band 49, Heft 193, S. 81