Kritický racionalismus a jeho vyústění
In: Rozpravy Československé Akademie Věd
In: Řada společenských věd 99,3
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In: Rozpravy Československé Akademie Věd
In: Řada společenských věd 99,3
In: Teorie vědy: TV = Theory of science, Volume 41, Issue 2, p. 179-200
ISSN: 1804-6347
At various occasions Popper states that in order for a theory to show its strength "certain amount" of dogmatism must precede the critical testing phase. He even argues that dogmatism is a necessary precondition of criticism. These are alarming statements, undermining Popper's methodological imperative of falsification. Critical rationalism is based on a strict opposition to dogmatism for logical reasons (justification is impossible), for evolutionary reasons (justification blocks the growth of knowledge), and for ideological reasons (dogmatism encourages totalitarianism). Popper cannot provide any objective criterion defining the proper dosage of dogmatism and thus opens doors to its uncontrolled expansion. Criticism thus ceases to be the non-negotiable normative principle and the inviolable standard of rationality.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 46, Issue 3, p. 304-317
ISSN: 1552-7441
Popper proposed his theory of objective knowledge to eliminate subjectivist epistemologies. Popper's objectivism culminated in the theory of the autonomous World 3 characterized by its independence from the subjective factors belonging to World 2. I argue that Popper did not succeed in unifying his idea of the autonomy of knowledge with the requirement of the creative role of the critical subject in cognition. Moreover, his effort to desubjectivize knowledge undermined the vital importance of the critical (subjective) activity that ensures the dynamism of the growth of knowledge. In this respect, Popper suppressed the most interesting feature of his philosophical contribution.
In: Teorie vědy: TV = Theory of science, Volume 33, Issue 2, p. 205-231
ISSN: 1804-6347
Hume built his philosophical system with the ambition to become a Newton of human nature. His science of man is the fulfillment of this project. Hume was inspired by the Newtonian experimental empirical method excluding hypotheses, and he applied this method to moral sciences; he took those to be the basis of all other knowledge. The observation of human cognitive faculties, however, brought him to sceptical conclusions concerning the rational justification of empirical sciences. His original ambitions are thus undermined and his scepticism leads to the loss of legitimacy of natural science. The core of Hume's science of man is twofold - it consists in the analysis of mind and of human social behaviour. Hume contributed to the development of psychology and helped to form social sciences as a specific research area. Following his empirical method based on observation, his science of man has rather a documentary role than any normative features.
Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Contributors -- Karl Popper: His Philosophy and Science -- 1 Knowledge and Criticism -- 1.1 The Dangers of Dogmatism -- 1.2 Criticism Needs a Boost -- 2 From Demarcation to a New Concept of Reason -- 2.1 Basic Statements -- 2.2 Corroboration -- 3 The Popperian Challenge -- 3.1 Anti-Justificationist Extremism -- 3.2 Scientific Practice -- 3.3 New Concept of Reason -- References -- Physics and Cosmology -- Popper and the Quantum Controversy -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Popper and Quantum Mechanics -- 2.1 Popper's Early Concerns with Quantum Theory (1934) -- 2.2 The Turning Point: From Philosophy to Physics (Ca. 1967-1968) -- 2.3 The Mature View: Popper's Experiment (The 1980s) -- 3 Epilogue: Popper's Legacy in Quantum Physics -- 3.1 Kim and Shih, and the Real Popper Experiment -- 3.2 Popper's Ideas in Contemporary Physics: The Revival of Indeterminism -- References -- Popper's Experiment -- References -- Karl Popper and Modern Cosmology: His Thoughts and Their Impact -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Popper on Cosmology -- 2.1 Einstein's Influence on Popper -- 2.2 Does the Universe Expand? -- 2.3 Finite-Age Cosmological Models -- 2.4 Against the Big Bang -- 3 Cosmologists on Popper -- 3.1 The Steady-State Controversy: Bondi and Popper -- 3.2 Falsifiability in Modern Cosmology -- 3.3 The Multiverse: Physics or Metaphysics? -- 3.4 According to Popper -- 4 Conclusion -- References -- MOND and Methodology -- 1 . -- 2 . -- 3 . -- 4 . -- 5 . -- 6 . -- 7 . -- 8 . -- References -- The Application of Popperian Methodology to Contemporary Cosmology -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Metaphysical Research Programmes -- 2.1 Popper's Use of the Term "Metaphysical" -- 3 Metaphysical Ideas in Contemporary Cosmology -- 3.1 The Cosmological Principle as a Constituent of a MRP -- 3.2 The Standard Model of Cosmology (ΛCDM) as a Metaphysical Research Programme.
In: Boston studies in the philosophy of science 272