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The 2021 military coup in Myanmar has left the country significantly isolated on the world stage. Politically, foreign governments have avoided recognizing the junta rulers, although quasi-official engagement is still underway. Economically, foreign investments into Myanmar have dropped by 42% from 2021 to 2022, off levels that had already massively decreased since the 2017 Rohingya expulsion. However, despite the international outcry over the new regime's open warfare against civilians and the escalating violence in Myanmar's multi-front civil war, both China and Japan have remained engaged in development cooperation, pursuing ambitious projects for economic corridors and special economic zones (SEZs) that were contracted under the deposed civilian government; in the case of China, even some new projects have been launched.
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Pascal Abb



Dr. Pascal Abb ist Koordinator der Forschungsgruppe "Regimewettbewerb" und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am PRIF mit Schwerpunkt China. Er betreibt aktuell ein Forschungsprojekt zu den Auswirkungen der Belt-and-Road-Initiative auf Konfliktstaaten. // Dr Pascal Abb is Coordinator of the Research Group "Regime Competition" and Senior Researcher at PRIF with a focus on China. He is currently conducting a research project on the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative on conflict states.

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Der Beitrag Do regime differences shape developmental engagement? How China and Japan compete in post-coup Myanmar erschien zuerst auf PRIF BLOG.

After a lengthy process of internal deliberation, the German government released its China strategy on July 13. The document signals a policy shift away from the business-focused approach taken by previous governments, and towards a "de-risking" of ties with China. It also reframes the relationship by stressing elements of competition and even rivalry, based on the perception that Chinese authoritarianism is becoming a threat to Germany and its role in the world. Instead of seeking to transform autocracies through engagement, the new approach is much more about shoring up Germany's own system.
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Pascal Abb



Dr. Pascal Abb ist Koordinator der Forschungsgruppe "Regimewettbewerb" und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der HSFK mit Schwerpunkt China. Er betreibt aktuell ein Forschungsprojekt zu den Auswirkungen der Belt-and-Road-Initiative auf Konfliktstaaten. // Dr Pascal Abb is Coordinator of the Research Group "Regime Competition" and Senior Researcher at PRIF with a focus on China. He is currently conducting a research project on the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative on conflict states.

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Der Beitrag Germany's New China Strategy: A Defensive Shift erschien zuerst auf PRIF BLOG.

Mit dem Beginn des russischen Angriffskriegs auf die Ukraine wurde das Narrativ eines globalen Wettstreits zwischen Demokratien und Autokratien wiederbelebt, das bereits im Zuge des Aufstiegs Chinas an Bedeutung gewonnen hatte. Im März 2022 hatte auch Außenministerin Annalena Baerbock noch von einem "Bündnis von liberalen Demokratien weltweit" gesprochen, das es gegen die Diktaturen dieser Welt zu schließen gelte. Etwas mehr als ein Jahr später hat die Bundesregierung nun ihre Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie veröffentlicht, in der vom Zwei-Lager-Denken nichts mehr zu finden ist. Diese positive Entwicklung wird jedoch konterkariert von einem weitgehenden Schweigen zu Fragen von Stabilität und Sicherheit, die sich im Umgang mit unterschiedlichen Regimetypen stellen – was auch keine Lösung ist, wie wir im Folgenden argumentieren.
Author information





Pascal Abb



Dr. Pascal Abb ist Koordinator der Forschungsgruppe "Regimewettbewerb" und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der HSFK mit Schwerpunkt China. Er betreibt aktuell ein Forschungsprojekt zu den Auswirkungen der Belt-and-Road-Initiative auf Konfliktstaaten. // Dr Pascal Abb is Coordinator of the Research Group "Regime Competition" and Senior Researcher at PRIF with a focus on China. He is currently conducting a research project on the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative on conflict states.

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Der Beitrag Nicht darüber reden ist auch keine Lösung: Die Rolle von Autokratie und Demokratie in der Nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie erschien zuerst auf PRIF BLOG.

The March 2023 state visit of Chinese president Xi Jinping to Russia has attracted significant attention, and has been described as symbolic of growing cooperation between authoritarian states opposed to the current world order. However, as we argue in a recently-published article based on a review of Russian and Chinese expert statements, this partnership should best be understood as a limited, strategically motivated cooperation against shared threat perceptions. Meanwhile, there is much less agreement on normative questions, let alone a shared vision of an alternative world order.
Author information





Pascal Abb



Dr. Pascal Abb ist Koordinator der Forschungsgruppe "Regimewettbewerb" und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der HSFK mit Schwerpunkt China. Er betreibt aktuell ein Forschungsprojekt zu den Auswirkungen der Belt-and-Road-Initiative auf Konfliktstaaten. // Dr Pascal Abb is Coordinator of the Research Group "Regime Competition" and Senior Researcher at PRIF with a focus on China. He is currently conducting a research project on the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative on conflict states.

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Der Beitrag Xi and Putin's Strategic Tango: Unpacking the Complexities of Russia-China Relations After the 2023 Moscow Summit erschien zuerst auf PRIF BLOG.

More than thirty years after the proclaimed "end of history" and the third wave of demo­cratization, the world is once again marked by increased diversity in political regimes. The (re-)emergence of powerful autho­ritarian states like China and Russia and the trend of back­sliding in seemingly consolidated demo­cracies have created a more pluralistic and multipolar world, in which states with different political regime types increasingly view each other as competitors, seeking to prove the superiority of their own political and economic systems and to win the alle­giance of third countries.
Author information





Pascal Abb



Dr. Pascal Abb ist Koordinator der Forschungsgruppe "Regimewettbewerb" und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der HSFK mit Schwerpunkt China. Er betreibt aktuell ein Forschungsprojekt zu den Auswirkungen der Belt-and-Road-Initiative auf Konfliktstaaten. // Dr Pascal Abb is Coordinator of the Research Group "Regime Competition" and Senior Researcher at PRIF with a focus on China. He is currently conducting a research project on the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative on conflict states.

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Der Beitrag Regime Competition in a Fragmented World: Consequences for Peace and Conflict erschien zuerst auf PRIF BLOG.

Abstract Russia's attack on Ukraine has not only shaken the foundations of the European security order, but will also have long-term repercussions on the future of international relations. While Ukraine is enjoying universal backing from Western states, Russia has received at least rhetorical support from its "strategic partner" China. Influential voices have cited this constellation as proof of a new global confrontation between democratic and authoritarian camps. Amidst the current "sea change" in German foreign and defense policy, calls are mounting to make this assumed systemic confrontation its new baseline. In this brief article, we aim to sketch a more complex picture of the Sino-Russian partnership, as revealed by the war in Ukraine. Based on an analysis of Chinese and Russian official statements and expert commentaries published since shortly before the beginning of the war, we find that it is fundamentally shaped by three factors: a partial and short-term overlap of interests, an underdeveloped normative basis further challenged by Russia's belligerent behavior, and a pronounced reactivity towards US security agency. Accordingly, closer Sino- Russian alignment is not based on ideological fraternity or a symptom of renewed systemic bipolarity in global politics. Viewing it as such is also a bad guideline for practical policy, as it ignores the differences in both countries' attitudes towards the status quo of global order, and risks pushing them closer together in further challenges against it.

This paper uses the case of Sino-Southeast Asian relations to gain insights on China's ability to muster support for its global agenda. The analysis focuses on the regional-global nexus of interstate relations and explores the extent to which the quality of two states' regional relations influences the likelihood of behavioral alignment in global politics. To this end, we consider a range of potentially influential aspects of Sino-Southeast Asian relations (the quality of bilateral relations based on recent event data, alliance policy, regime similarity, development level, and economic ties) and employ a statistical model to search for correlations with observed trends of voting coincidence in the United Nations General Assembly during the period 1979-2010. We find a strong correlation between the quality of regional bilateral relations and global policy alignment, which indicates that patterns of regional cooperation and conflict also impact the trajectory of China's rise in world affairs.

This paper reviews contending realist assumptions about domestic and systemic impulses for balancing behavior, derives a set of corresponding hypotheses for state actions and submits them to a statistical large‐n analysis for testing. A total of 18 highly conflict-prone dyads of states are observed over lengthy periods of time in order to gather data for a regression analysis of the effects of different impulses on both the external and internal balancing behavior of the weaker states. In accordance with the results, it is argued that domestic (or unit-level) factors are highly important in explaining the scope of balancing and often exert a stronger influence than do power gaps between states. As moderating factors, they are especially crucial in clarifying apparent cases of over‐ and underbalancing.

This paper provides an overview of the landscape of Chinese foreign policy think tanks, classifies them according to the activities they pursue, and offers some explanations as to how they have developed their particular characteristics - both at the level of individual institutes as well as in the broader national context. To this end, the paper introduces a new typology for the classification of think tanks and takes an in-depth look at their current activities. -- think tanks ; China ; Chinese foreign policy ; institutions ; policymaking ; intellectuals