Suchergebnisse

Abstract
An analysis of the structure of parliaments in European countries shows that a wide range of options developed across the centuries. However, many of these patterns (among which tetracameralism, tricameralism, and qualified unicameralism) did not survive, despite their sometimes-remarkable historical interest. Currently, parliaments in Europe are either unicameral or bicameral: while unicameralism is the most common option, bicameralism is generally adopted in more populous countries and/or States with strong territorial autonomies. As a matter of fact, among varieties of bicameralism, the most common is characterized by a 'territorial' second chamber. Nevertheless, other types of bicameralism deserve attention too, not only to provide a comprehensive outline of the comparative scene, but also to find features that can define emerging trends. For this purpose, a classification of bicameralism will be outlined, mainly examining the patterns displayed by second chambers and the relationships between the two chambers. Combining this classification with the outcomes of the choice between unicameralism and bicameralism, some trends can be detected, although national experiences are so diverse that reliable norms are difficult to identify.

In the aftermaths of World War II, a mechanism for constitutional review was set up, to provide the system with means of reacting against infringements of the Supreme Law. Even though a Constitutional Court was established, the Italian system of constitutional adjudication is only partially inspired by Kelsen's centralized model: actually, one its main features of the system is the cooperation between the Constitutional Court and ordinary courts. In the last decades, major changes have increased the system's rate of decentralization, in connection with European integration and, most notably, with the new role for ordinary courts in the context of constitutional review. In this regard, the Constitutional Court required ordinary courts to refrain from submitting a question of constitutionality until they had examined – and excluded – the possibility of interpreting the provision at issue so as to render it constitutional. The constitutionally oriented legislative interpretation can be linked to the fact that Constitution has deeply penetrated society and the courtrooms, to the point that currently the protection of the Constitution can be effectively achieved by ordinary means, so that Constitutional Court's guidance is needed much less frequently than in the past.