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What explains the post-Cold War surge in peacekeeping contributions from the developing world? I argue that, amid a wave of democratization and expanded peacekeeping activity, such countries use peacekeeping deployments to reduce the threat of the military to nascent democratic institutions. Peacekeeping participation serves to placate the military in the short term with resources and continued activity, while socializing and professionalizing it to pro-democracy behaviors in the long term. Assessing troop contributions from 1990 to 2011, I find evidence that new democracies make larger contributions than other states, where the effect diminishes as democracy becomes consolidated. Moreover, the effect is amplified in countries with a greater military legacy. I supplement this with a study of Argentina to further support the proposed mechanism. These findings help explain the shift in state peacekeeping contributions in recent years, the role of democracy in peacekeeping efforts, and the impact of international actors in supporting democratization.

What explains the post–Cold War surge in peacekeeping contributions from the developing world? I argue that, amid a wave of democratization and expanded peacekeeping activity, such countries use peacekeeping deployments to reduce the threat of the military to nascent democratic institutions. Peacekeeping participation serves to placate the military in the short term with resources and continued activity, while socializing and professionalizing it to pro-democracy behaviors in the long term. Assessing troop contributions from 1990 to 2011, I find evidence that new democracies make larger contributions than other states, where the effect diminishes as democracy becomes consolidated. Moreover, the effect is amplified in countries with a greater military legacy. I supplement this with a study of Argentina to further support the proposed mechanism. These findings help explain the shift in state peacekeeping contributions in recent years, the role of democracy in peacekeeping efforts, and the impact of international actors in supporting democratization.

While studies have investigated why states contribute personnel to peacekeeping operations, little consideration has been given to how domestic political factors influence state contributions. We argue that changes in executive power that involve a shift in the domestic source of leadership support cause fluctuations in troop deployments, leading to inconsistent contribution behavior. However, we argue that this effect is attenuated in more democratic states since greater overlaps in the preferences of domestic groups are present and political institutions exist to constrain major policy shifts. Analysis of state troop commitments to UN peacekeeping from 1991 to 2018 supports this argument. This research highlights the often overlooked role of domestic policy processes in peacekeeping contributions while moving beyond considering why some states contribute relatively more personnel to address variation within countries. The findings indicate that while democracies typically contribute fewer peacekeepers, they tend to be more consistent contributors in the face of leadership turnover.

Abstract
While studies have investigated why states contribute personnel to peacekeeping operations, little consideration has been given to how domestic political factors influence state contributions. We argue that changes in executive power that involve a shift in the domestic source of leadership support cause fluctuations in troop deployments, leading to inconsistent contribution behavior. However, we argue that this effect is attenuated in more democratic states since greater overlaps in the preferences of domestic groups are present and political institutions exist to constrain major policy shifts. Analysis of state troop commitments to UN peacekeeping from 1991 to 2018 supports this argument. This research highlights the often overlooked role of domestic policy processes in peacekeeping contributions while moving beyond considering why some states contribute relatively more personnel to address variation within countries. The findings indicate that while democracies typically contribute fewer peacekeepers, they tend to be more consistent contributors in the face of leadership turnover.

Abstract
Successful peacekeeping depends heavily on the conflict parties providing unrestricted consent to the intervention. Consent is, however, often withheld or limited by one or more parties who calculate a higher cost to peace than to continued fighting. We highlight the role of international economic incentives in the form of foreign development aid in overcoming hurdles to obtaining consent. We argue that past aid sends a credible signal of future, post-conflict material benefits if the belligerents work toward peace. This conditionality of future benefits thereby incentivizes the belligerents to work toward peace and stability, including providing unrestricted consent to peacekeeping missions. Analyses of 119 post-Cold War civil wars and a brief narrative of East Timor demonstrate that foreign aid significantly and substantially increases the likelihood of unrestricted consent. The findings have implications for the literature on international influences on domestic political contestation and for research on the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

Successful peacekeeping depends heavily on the conflict parties providing unrestricted consent to the intervention. Consent is, however, often withheld or limited by one or more parties who calculate a higher cost to peace than to continued fighting. We highlight the role of international economic incentives in the form of foreign development aid in overcoming hurdles to obtaining consent. We argue that past aid sends a credible signal of future, post-conflict material benefits if the belligerents work toward peace. This conditionality of future benefits thereby incentivizes the belligerents to work toward peace and stability, including providing unrestricted consent to peacekeeping missions. Analyses of 119 post-Cold War civil wars and a brief narrative of East Timor demonstrate that foreign aid significantly and substantially increases the likelihood of unrestricted consent. The findings have implications for the literature on international influences on domestic political contestation and for research on the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

Despite evidence that United Nations peacekeeping is a cost-effective tool for addressing civil and interstate conflict, it has consistently experienced financial shortfalls as member states neglect to pay their dues. To enable investigation into the dynamics of peacekeeping support, we present newly collected data on all member-state financial contributions to all UN peacekeeping operations from 1990 to 2010. The data also include dues assessed by the UN to gauge the extent to which states fall short of what they owe. We show that financial shortfalls are widespread and vary across both missions and contributors. The data offer opportunities to understand patterns of financial support for peacekeeping across states, missions, and time, and can ultimately provide insight into the factors that lead states to support international institutions and public goods. We illustrate how scholars can use the data with an analysis of the factors that drive states to meet their financial commitments. We find that wealthier states, those more engaged in global trade, democracies, and those that also contribute personnel to peacekeeping operations are the most likely to pay their dues. Conversely, the United States and countries in the Americas, Africa, and Asia are more likely to shirk part or all of their financial obligations in a given year.

Is the acquisition of personnel for UN peacekeeping missions susceptible to free-riding by UN member states? If so, what drives this behavior and what impact does this have on obtaining required personnel for the mission? Using data from 21 missions in 13 African countries between 1990 and 2010, this article addresses whether UN peacekeeping missions experience a shortfall in personnel due to incentives to free-ride by contributing states. It argues that as the number of states contributing to a mission increases, contributors have a greater incentive to free-ride and make suboptimal personnel contributions, leading to greater overall shortfall in the mission's personnel. However, this free-riding behavior can be mitigated by the economic incentives of contributor states. The findings support two central tenets of collective action theory: that free-riding by member states contributing to the mission is more prevalent when the number of contributors is larger, and when selective incentives such as economic gains are lower. These findings have implications for the strategic composition and efficacy of peacekeeping forces. More broadly, the results underscore the struggle of international organizations to obtain compliance from member states in achieving their international objectives.

From its capacity for deploying joint operations in conflict zones to its status as a standard-bearing forum for international behaviour, the United Nations has asserted its relevance in a diverse array of issues and conflicts around the world. Equally as diverse has been the scholarship surrounding the United Nations over the past several decades. This collection of essays provides a snapshot of these diverse lines of scholarship, highlighting existing scholarship on a range of topics, as well as identifying areas of opportunity for future scholarly work on these topics. Taken as a whole, this forum more broadly provides insight into core pillars of the United Nations' mission--including the maintenance of peace and security; fostering friendly relations between nations; promoting human rights and humanitarian goals; and encouraging cooperation and harmonization of interests between nations. Moving forward, it is our hope that this collection will serve as a sprigboard for inspiring future work to both build and expand upon the insights from the past several decades of scholarship on the United Nations.