Sucht und Delinquenz; Addiction and delinquency
In: Forensische Psychiatrie, Psychologie, Kriminologie, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 233-238
ISSN: 1862-7080
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In: Forensische Psychiatrie, Psychologie, Kriminologie, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 233-238
ISSN: 1862-7080
In: Sucht: Risiken - Formen - Interventionen
Menschen mit einer Suchterkrankung können in verschiedenen Rechtsbereichen, häufig dem Strafrecht, mit dem Gesetz in Konflikt geraten. Die Forensische Psychiatrie beschäftigt sich nicht ausschließlich mit der Begutachtung, Behandlung oder Prognose jener Menschen, sondern soll auch wissenschaftliche Zusammenhänge erläutern für verschiedene Berufsgruppen, die mit dem Thema Sucht und Delinquenz konfrontiert sind. Das Buch liefert grundlegende Informationen zu Auftreten, Ursache und Verlauf von Suchterkrankungen im Zusammenhang mit Delinquenz, zu Interventions- und Präventionsmöglichkeiten sowie zu forensisch-psychiatrischer Tätigkeit auf diesem Gebiet.
Taking together all the evidence on the aetiology, development and differential processes of delinquent behaviour from childhood to adulthood, we dispose of important new evidence from the neurosciences, which, compared to traditional criminological, developmental, psychological and sociological evidence, increases our capacity to explain the age-crime curve. In particular, the right-hand side of the curve, indicating desistance from crime in young adulthood between the ages of 18 and 25, can be based on new insights from neuroscientific research on brain maturation and the development of self-control mechanisms. As a result, new questions about judicial reactions and interventions must be raised. If an individual's brain is fully matured only in the mid-twenties, general criminal law is possibly inappropriate, and a specific youth or young-adult criminal law reflecting the transitional processes and the diminished culpability of young-adult offenders should rather be applied. In many European jurisdictions, the scope of youth justice has been extended upwards to 18–20 year-old adults, in the Netherlands even up to 22years of age, a political decision affecting criminality and based on new neuroscientific evidence. ; Vertindami bendrai visus mokslu grįstus įrodymus apie delinkventinio elgesio etiologiją, vystymąsi ir diferencijuotus procesus nuo vaikystės iki pilnametystės, mes disponuojame svarbiais naujais neuromokslų įrodymais, kurie, palyginus su tradiciniais kriminologiniais, raidos psichologiniais ir sociologiniais įrodymais, suteikia papildomų mokslinių argumentų aiškinant netolygų nusikalstančių asmenų pasiskirstymą amžiaus kreivėje. Būtent dešinioji padidėjusio nusikalstamo elgesio dažnumo šioje kreivėje atkarpa, vaizduojanti nusikalstamo elgesio dinamiką nuo vėlyvosios paauglystės (maždaug nuo 18 metų) iki jaunų suaugusiųjų amžiaus (maždaug iki 25 metų), gali būti pagrįsta naujomis neurologinių mokslinių tyrimų, susijusių su smegenų brendimu ir savikontrolės mechanizmais, įžvalgomis. Todėl būtina iš naujo kelti klausimą, kokia turėtų būti baudžiamoji teisinė reakcija ir intervencijos šio amžiaus žmonių atžvilgiu. Jei smegenys visiškai subręsta tik žmogaus gyvenimo trečiojo dešimtmečio viduryje, suaugusiesiems numatytos (bendrosios) baudžiamosios atsakomybės taikymas gali būti neproporcingas ir neatitikti individualių poreikių, o vietoj to turėtų būti taikomos specialios nepilnamečiams ir jauniems suaugusiesiems numatytos normos, kuriomis atsižvelgiama į pereinamuosius asmens brendimo procesus ir mažesnę jaunų suaugusių nusikaltėlių kaltę. Daugelio Europos šalių baudžiamosios justicijos sistemose įtvirtinta galimybė nepilnamečiams numatytus ypatumus taikyti asmenims iki 18–20 metų, Nyderlanduose– net iki nesulaukusiems 23 metų– šis baudžiamasis politinis sprendimas buvo priimtas remiantis būtent naujais neuromokslų įrodymais, kurie šiame straipsnyje ir analizuojami.
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Taking together all the evidence on the aetiology, development and differential processes of delinquent behaviour from childhood to adulthood, we dispose of important new evidence from the neurosciences, which, compared to traditional criminological, developmental, psychological and sociological evidence, increases our capacity to explain the age-crime curve. In particular, the right-hand side of the curve, indicating desistance from crime in young adulthood between the ages of 18 and 25, can be based on new insights from neuroscientific research on brain maturation and the development of self-control mechanisms. As a result, new questions about judicial reactions and interventions must be raised. If an individual's brain is fully matured only in the mid-twenties, general criminal law is possibly inappropriate, and a specific youth or young-adult criminal law reflecting the transitional processes and the diminished culpability of young-adult offenders should rather be applied. In many European jurisdictions, the scope of youth justice has been extended upwards to 18–20 year-old adults, in the Netherlands even up to 22 years of age, a political decision affecting criminality and based on new neuroscientific evidence.
BASE
Taking together all the evidence on the aetiology, development and differential processes of delinquent behaviour from childhood to adulthood, we dispose of important new evidence from the neurosciences, which, compared to traditional criminological, developmental, psychological and sociological evidence, increases our capacity to explain the age-crime curve. In particular, the right-hand side of the curve, indicating desistance from crime in young adulthood between the ages of 18 and 25, can be based on new insights from neuroscientific research on brain maturation and the development of self-control mechanisms. As a result, new questions about judicial reactions and interventions must be raised. If an individual's brain is fully matured only in the mid-twenties, general criminal law is possibly inappropriate, and a specific youth or young-adult criminal law reflecting the transitional processes and the diminished culpability of young-adult offenders should rather be applied. In many European jurisdictions, the scope of youth justice has been extended upwards to 18–20 year-old adults, in the Netherlands even up to 22 years of age, a political decision affecting criminality and based on new neuroscientific evidence.
BASE
Taking together all the evidence on the aetiology, development and differential processes of delinquent behaviour from childhood to adulthood, we dispose of important new evidence from the neurosciences, which, compared to traditional criminological, developmental, psychological and sociological evidence, increases our capacity to explain the age-crime curve. In particular, the right-hand side of the curve, indicating desistance from crime in young adulthood between the ages of 18 and 25, can be based on new insights from neuroscientific research on brain maturation and the development of self-control mechanisms. As a result, new questions about judicial reactions and interventions must be raised. If an individual's brain is fully matured only in the mid-twenties, general criminal law is possibly inappropriate, and a specific youth or young-adult criminal law reflecting the transitional processes and the diminished culpability of young-adult offenders should rather be applied. In many European jurisdictions, the scope of youth justice has been extended upwards to 18–20 year-old adults, in the Netherlands even up to 22 years of age, a political decision affecting criminality and based on new neuroscientific evidence.
BASE
Taking together all the evidence on the aetiology, development and differential processes of delinquent behaviour from childhood to adulthood, we dispose of important new evidence from the neurosciences, which, compared to traditional criminological, developmental, psychological and sociological evidence, increases our capacity to explain the age-crime curve. In particular, the right-hand side of the curve, indicating desistance from crime in young adulthood between the ages of 18 and 25, can be based on new insights from neuroscientific research on brain maturation and the development of self-control mechanisms. As a result, new questions about judicial reactions and interventions must be raised. If an individual's brain is fully matured only in the mid-twenties, general criminal law is possibly inappropriate, and a specific youth or young-adult criminal law reflecting the transitional processes and the diminished culpability of young-adult offenders should rather be applied. In many European jurisdictions, the scope of youth justice has been extended upwards to 18–20 year-old adults, in the Netherlands even up to 22 years of age, a political decision affecting criminality and based on new neuroscientific evidence.
BASE