Suchergebnisse

Japanese sea power: from Kaigun to Naiji -- Ethos and traditions: the navy of Imperial Japan -- History and memory: the Imperial Navy of the post-war era -- Experience and legacy: the education of a new navy -- Ethos and propaganda: ships, men, and the image of the naval profession -- Strategy and policy: the "sea power" of the Pacific -- Doctrine and capabilities: the quest for a balanced fleet -- Conclusions: the near past, the near future

Preliminary Material /Alessio Patalano -- Introduction: Maritime Strategy and National Security in Japan and Britain /Alessio Patalano -- The Fulcrum of Power: Britain, Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region, 1880-1945 /John Ferris -- Sea Power and Anglo-Japanese Military Relations, 1863-1923 /Haruo Tohmatsu -- Britain's Strategic View of Japanese Naval Power, 1923-1942 /Douglas Ford -- Balancing Threat Perceptions and Strategic Priorities: Japan's Post-war Defence Policy /Noboru Yamaguchi -- British Defence Policy and the Transformation of the Royal Navy in the Cold War and Beyond /Eric Grove -- Punching below its Weight: Japan's Post-Cold War Expeditionary Missions /Chiyuki Aoi -- The Political and Normative Constraints to Japan's National Security /Guibourg Delamotte -- 'Back to an Off shore Future': The Role of the Past in Britain's Contemporary Defence Policy /Steven Jermy -- From Alliance to Coalition, then Where? Japan and the US Navy Cooperative Strategy for the Twenty-first Century /Yoji Koda -- Conclusion: Maritime Strategy in Japan and the UK: The 'Island Nation' Model in Perspective /Alessio Patalano -- Index /Alessio Patalano.

This paper examines new Japanese primary source materials to reassess the significance of Japanese rearmament during the early stages of the Cold War in two ways. First, the paper shows how, in the area of submarine development, the post-war navy approached rearmament as an opportunity to address wartime failures with the support and professional mentorship of the US Navy. Second, whilst submarines were considered as outside the scope of Japanese defence posture, the navy had a crucial agency role in shaping how this branch of naval warfare was integrated into the country's strategy with significant consequences for the later stages of the Cold War.

The paper challenges the notion that Chinese maritime coercion in the East and South China Seas (ESCS) is best described as a grey zone strategy. The 'grey zone' notion raises two issues. Conceptually, it adds little to the existing literature on maritime coercion. Practically, it creates confusion over the understanding of maritime coercion by blurring the distinction between military and constabulary activities. The paper articulates this difference to elucidate the functional correlation between Beijing's strategic objectives and maritime claims. Within this context, the grey zone construct is particularly problematic since it uncritically assumes that the use of force is designed to remain below the threshold of war. By contrast, the paper argues that Chinese maritime claims to control 'rights and interests' are a function of a broader strategic intention to project military power within and beyond the confines of the ESCS, whilst preventing others to do the same. Thus, Chinese maritime coercion (military and constabulary) increases strategic competition and the risk of war, and is therefore better described as part of a 'hybrid' strategy.