Suchergebnisse

Le raisonnement en équipe est-il plus efficace que le raisonnement individuel ? Il devrait l'être, puisqu'il mène par définition des individus à adopter des stratégies collectivement optimales. De fait, on a pu lire que le raisonnement en équipe est plus rationnellement efficace et qu'il peut être plus viable du point de vue évolutionnaire que le raisonnement individuel. Cet article donne des raisons qui limitent ces deux affirmations, qui reposent sur une sous-estimation de l'efficacité du raisonnement individuel et sur une surestimation du pouvoir de coordination du raisonnement en équipe. Après ces rectificatifs, l'efficacité du raisonnement en équipe se révèle équivoque. D'un point de vue rationnel, l'efficacité supérieure du raisonnement par équipe dépend de conditions spécifiques concernant la nature du contexte d'interaction et la probabilité générale que des individus raisonnent en équipe. D'un point du vue évolutionnaire, l'apparition comme la stabilisation du raisonnement en équipe deviennent difficilement explicables.

Most definitions of cooperation provide sufficient but not necessary conditions. This paper describes a form of minimal cooperation, corresponding to mass actions implying many agents, such as demonstrations. It characterizes its intentional, epistemic, strategic, and teleological aspects, mostly obtained from weakening classical concepts. The rationality of minimal cooperation turns out to be part of its definition, whereas it is usually considered as an optional though desirable feature. Game-theoretic concepts thus play an important role in its definition. The paper concludes by answering concrete questions about what should and should not be called cooperation.

Abstract
In his 'Cooperation as joint action', Tuomela presents a we-mode account of cooperation, which he argues has several advantages over an individual account. This commentary examines to what extent this is true. In particular, I assess three related characteristics of we-mode joint action: its possible rationality, its greater efficiency, and its alleged irreducibility to purely individual properties, which are recurring points of the article.

Abstract
This paper introduces freely improvised joint actions, a class of joint actions characterized by (i) highly unspecific goals and (ii) the unavailability of shared plans. For example, walking together just for the sake of walking together with no specific destination or path in mind provides an ordinary example of FIJAs, along with examples in the arts, e.g., collective free improvisation in music, improv theater, or contact improvisation in dance. We argue that classic philosophical accounts of joint action such as Bratman's rule them out because the latter require a capacity for planning that is idle in the case of FIJAs. This argument is structurally similar to arguments for minimalist accounts of joint action (e.g., based on joint actions performed by children before they develop a full-fledged theory of mind), and this invites a parallel minimalist account, which we provide in terms of a specific kind of shared intentions that do not require plan states. We further argue that the resulting minimalist account is different in kind from the sort of minimalism suggested by developmental considerations and conclude in favor of a pluralistic minimalism, according to which there are several ways for an account of joint action to be minimal.