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AbstractThe prominence of evangelical Christians in the electoral base of the Republican Party is a noted feature of recent American elections. This prominence is linked to a key stereotype that saturates public discourse: "born-again/evangelical Republicanism." The stereotype fuses religious and partisan social group membership to create a composite social label. Using a social categorization approach, which challenges the assumptions and methods of existing research, the present analysis asks whether voters embrace this stereotype in their definitions of self. The article employs confirmatory factor analysis of religious and partisan identity constructs from a national internet survey, the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, and finds evidence of the presence of this religious-partisan stereotype in individual self-views, and of the backlash that it has produced, particularly among citizens that are exposed to public discourse on American elections.

According to the optimistic reading of the trust deficit in contemporary democracies, an increasingly non-religious and presumably more rational citizenry is naturally inclined to distrust public institutions. This modern shift is viewed as a positive check that can supposedly improve representative government. We propose a more nuanced understanding of the influence of supernatural beliefs on institutional trust. Specifically, we move beyond the popular analytical dichotomy between the religious and the non-religious by separating the non-religious into a non-believer segment and a segment hitherto overlooked by studies of political trust: unconventional or heterodox believers (e.g., in astrology, lucky charms, divination and faith healing, but not in conventional religion). Using comparative data from the International Social Survey Programme, we find that heterodox believers, similarly to non-believers, tend to distrust institutions, albeit for very different reasons. The previously ignored role of heterodox beliefs points to grave implications regarding the current trust deficit.

Is there a connection between government intervention in religious competition and partisan clientelism in democratic systems? Drawing on the economics of religion, we argue that alongside commonly examined population-level religious processes (religious diversity), state-level religious processes (government regulation of competition in the religious market) affect institutional performance in electoral democracies. Linking comparative indicators of religion-state relations with measures of partisan clientelism, statistical analysis suggests that uncompetitive religious markets, such as those where a dominant religion is sponsored by the state, create incentives, infrastructures and opportunities that favour clientelism. The study emphasises the importance of light-touch regulation of religion not merely as a normative principle narrowly related to religious freedom, but also as a potential remedy that can enhance the quality of political institutions.