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"Governing requires choices, and hence trade-offs between conflicting goals or criteria. This book asserts that legitimate governance requires explanations for such trade-offs and then demonstrates that such explanations can always be found, though not for every possible choice. In so doing, John W. Patty and Elizabeth Maggie Penn use the tools of social choice theory to provide a new and discriminating theory of legitimacy. In contrast with both earlier critics and defenders of social choice theory, Patty and Penn argue that the classic impossibility theorems of Arrow, Gibbard, and Satterthwaite are inescapably relevant to, and indeed justify, democratic institutions. Specifically, these institutions exist to do more than simply make policy - through their procedures and proceedings, these institutions make sense of the trade-offs required when controversial policy decisions must be made"--

Abstract
Much of policy-making involves prioritization—deciding not only what to do but also when—and uncertainty—not knowing exactly how the choices made will affect actual policy outcomes. I present a theory of dynamic prioritization within a hierarchical organization. The model illustrates how notions such as an agency's performance, mission, and critical tasks are linked with details such as institutional structure and the preferences of both front-line bureaucrats and their overseers. The theory highlights some reasons why even sincere, representative policy-making decisions might appear irrational, inconsistent, or "captured" to outside observers. This is in contrast to classical "spatial models" of policy that abstract from the more quotidian details of how policy is actually made as opposed to simply being "chosen." The theory also generates traditional comparative static-style predictions about the features of the policy-making tasks, the preferences of bureaucrats and political overseers, and agency structure that affect the substance and quality of policy-making. Finally, the theory offers a general explanation for why real-world agencies employ widely varying processes to organize and implement policy-making: optimal policy-making is—in a precise sense—"sufficiently complicated" to render a succinct and robust summary of optimal management impossible.

AbstractI describe and analyze a model of strategic communication and deliberation in decentralized decision‐making settings. I show that, in a cheap‐talk environment, inclusion and exclusion of agents can affect the credibility of messaging between agents and, accordingly, the quality of policy decisions and overall social welfare. Somewhat surprisingly, the inclusion of agents can aid information aggregation and social welfare even when the added agents do not themselves communicate truthfully. Analogously, the results suggest an informational, social welfare–based rationale for excluding agents not only from observing policy‐relevant deliberation but also from observing the product of the communication precisely because the excluded agents possess decision‐making authority.

Obstruction is a time‐honored tradition in legislative politics. In many cases, obstruction can be foreseen to be ultimately unsuccessful, and in some of these cases, purely costly even to the obstructor. In this article, I construct a model of obstruction in which the individual obstruction of a fait accompli policy proposal is potentially informative precisely and ironically because it is inefficient. The theory, based on the legislators' reelection motivations, offers comparative static predictions about the frequency and length of obstruction as a function of the individual characteristics of the legislator and his or her electoral setting, including the legislator's value for reelection, the appeal of the legislator's challenger, the legislator's individual‐specific seniority, competence, and/or valence, and the visibility of the legislator's obstruction efforts to the voter. Finally, the theory illustrates the potential for transparency of legislators' individual actions to be strictly welfare reducing, even in the absence of pandering.

In this paper, I examine a simple procedure in the United States House of Representatives, approving the Journal, and its implications for legislative business. In this paper, I examine the hypothesis that such votes are more than simply pro forma motions or dilatory tactics by the minority party. Considering the 102nd--107th Congresses, I show that votes on the Journal's approval are just as frequently requested by the majority party as by members of the minority party. Furthermore, I find that votes recorded on days on which a vote was also recorded on the House Journal were more likely to be close and more likely to be party-line votes than those recorded on other days. Adapted from the source document.

This article presents a model of collective choice when group decisions must be justified by arguments from first principles. Individuals may have preferences over both the actions chosen and the arguments used to justify them. Defining a notion of stability in the arguments made and actions supported within a group, I characterize the set of actions that can be justified as well as the arguments that will be used to justify these actions. Of particular interest in the article is the fact that each individual's preferences over different arguments are endogenously determined by the collection of actions justified by the arguments.

This article presents a model of collective choice when group decisions must be justified by arguments from first principles. Individuals may have preferences over both the actions chosen and the arguments used to justify them. Defining a notion of stability in the arguments made and actions supported within a group, I characterize the set of actions that can be justified as well as the arguments that will be used to justify these actions. Of particular interest in the article is the fact that each individual's preferences over different arguments are endogenously determined by the collection of actions justified by the arguments. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2008.]

In this article, I present an equilibrium model of party government within a two‐party legislature. The theory is predicated upon members of the majority party having potentially conflicting individual and collective interests. In response to this potential conflict, the members of the majority party endogenously choose a degree of control to grant to their leadership. The equilibrium level of party strength is decreasing in the size of the majority party and increasing in the strength of opposition among members of the minority party. The theory implies that the average performance of W‐Nominate estimates of majority party members' ideal points will be a decreasing function of the size of the majority party while the performance of these estimates for members of the minority party will not be affected by the size of the majority party. Using data from the U.S. House and Senate between 1866 and 2004, the theory's predictions are largely consistent with roll‐call voting in both chambers.