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Social capital is a relatively new concept compared to welfare, though debates on the advantages of different welfare regimes and the links between state provision and social participation are tentatively connecting the two areas. Esping-Andersen classifies welfare regimes into three types - market-focused liberal, status-focused corporatist, and equality-focused social democratic regimes. Each has been well studied with regards to the effects of commodification (market dependency), stratification (inequality and stigma), and familialisation (paternalistic family dependency). However, such focus largely upon economic rather than social concerns. This thesis examines the proposition that welfare can build society by promoting these social aspects otherwise known as social capital. The social capital concept has definition and measurement problems with causality and the capture of social activities rather than just norms. Acknowledging, this, social capital is preferably defined from the literature as norms of trust, networks of association membership, and practices of volunteering and socialising. A critical reading highlights the importance of separating bonding social capital, as captured in Bourdieu and Coleman s exclusive networks, from bridging social capital, more akin to Putnam s civil society and thus closer to social welfare. This thesis examines numerous empirical measures of bridging social capital, by looking at norms and networks through the World Values Survey, and practices through the Multinational Time Use Study across nine OECD countries. Results show that social democratic welfare regimes do promote social capital, with high levels of trust, membership and social activity. Corporatist welfare regimes show low but constant levels of social capital, whilst liberal welfare regimes have experienced declines in trust. Increasingly means-tested liberal regimes register high levels of commodification, with poor work-leisure balances, and are also more stratified with higher levels of inequality, ...

AbstractEmerging evidence suggests COVID lockdowns have not only increased the social problem of loneliness but widened the 'loneliness gap' between the most and least lonely people. Qualitative investigation can reveal why this gap might have increased, for whom, and whether the loneliness gap will remain long term. Using multi‐wave qualitative survey data conducted during Australia's 2020 lockdown period and beyond, we examine personal experiences of interaction transitioning out of lockdown. We find substantial and uneven impacts of COVID lasting well beyond lockdown. Participants reported heightened loneliness attributable to: physical isolation, health anxieties, ceased activities, reduced connection quality, and poor motivation. COVID also created new interactive difficulties for singles, those with physical and mental disabilities, their carers, and those with low social capital. There was also reported 'pruning' of social networks (i.e. reduced bridging, increased bonding social capital), and evidence that increased digital interaction did not substitute for lost physical contact. Younger people also experienced isolating COVID‐induced life disruptions (e.g. travel, university attendance etc). Findings suggest COVID has increased potential long‐term inequalities in loneliness, highlight the post COVID risks faced by vulnerable groups, and suggest caution in advocating digital solutions as a panacea for diminished physical interaction in the post‐pandemic world.

It is unclear how much gendered social exclusion and disconnection reflects a problem or a preference. Women may prefer market-disengagement despite the risk of exclusion from 'normal' social activities through financial incapacity, and men may prefer market-engagement despite the risk of disconnection from informal social networks. This article examines these issues amongst Australian men and women. It finds women, particularly single and low-income mothers, are more socially excluded, and men, particularly single middle-aged men, are the most socially disconnected, after preferences. Future policy should be cognisant of contact preferences, intra-household support dynamics, long work hours and prevailing gender norms.

International comparisons of emotional wellbeing rarely account for the situational and social context of the experience of emotions (such as happiness or pleasantness) associated with everyday activities. A small number of studies have revealed the emotional context of the daily time‐schedules of Americans. Knowing the emotions people associate with patterns of experience opens up the possibility of modelling how national emotional wellbeing might change, should policy persuade people to alter their routines. We compare time‐use patterns in two countries with relatively similar cultural and institutional contexts, Australia and the United States, to see how people in the United States might feel if they altered their routines to live more like Australians. We find that such a change could yield a reduction in unpleasant time in certain categories, such as paid work, but at the cost of losing more pleasant time in other activities, including socialising. We also find that men and women are likely to have different responses to policies that alter general behaviour. This paper highlights the need for future research to explore the emotional diversity, emotion work, and gender gaps in the emotional wellbeing of nations.

Sustainability is fashionable and becoming more important to the general policy discourse on protecting the environment. However, despite government adopting a National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development some twelve years ago, Australia's performance on crucial items such as emissions of carbon dioxide equivalents remains poor. Arguably then, for the environmental cause to be advanced substantially, not only must people's attitudes toward protecting the environment change, but also their voting intentions so as to send a signal to the major political parties. This paper presents internationally comparative research using data from the most recent waves of the World Values Survey. Changes in preferences associated with support for the environment are contrasted against changes in intentions to vote for Green political parties. Results indicate the strength and direction of the Green movement, and highlight gaps in the conversion of environmental values into votes.

The draft children's services regulation announced in April 2004 included a minimum standard staff child ratio of 1:5 for children aged under 2 years in centre-based and mobile children's services. The 2002 draft regulation proposed a better staff child ratio of 1:4. This research examined the likely impact of the 1:4 staff child ratio. The PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) report commissioned by the NSW Department of Community Services found that the balance of benefits and costs supported the 2002 draft regulation of 1:4 staff child ratio, even under worst case scenarios (PWC, 2003). National and international research on a minimum staff child ratio for care of children aged under 2 years supports a 1:4 ratio. It is consistent with NSW Government commitment to early childhood development, national and international recommended standards, outcomes for children and improving the availability of qualified and experienced early childhood staff.

This article calls for a new research agenda into 'emotional economies', or economies increasingly characterised by the creation, extraction and exploitation of emotional products and labour, enabled by and embedded in rapid advances in technological and digital-media systems. We base this concept and call on a literature review linking technological automation, the future of work and emotions. Our review finds that: (1) many existing studies – whether predicting dystopian end-of-work mass unemployment, or utopian complementarities between humans, machines and digital platforms – are technologically determinist in nature, and do not account for the roles of culture, society, government, business and education in the machine–human–emotion interface; (2) despite this, there is evidence that technology will replace many existing forms of human labour, leaving only technologically irreplaceable emotion-based soft-skill service work (and emotional labour) for humans to perform; (3) there is an outside chance (in some literature) that technology and AIs will replace even emotional labour, though we argue this is unlikely for many years; (4) the increasing centrality of emotional industries, emotional data and emotional labour to work, digital platforms and media-imagery will likely lead to emotions becoming vital commodities, central to the economies of the future. The article concludes with an urgent call for a new research agenda on emotional economies to elaborate on private/public intersections between work, economy and emotions that soberly engage with the future while challenging technologically determinist assumptions that underpin populist depictions of the end of work.