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Historically, burden sharing of mitigation in the climate regime was operationalized as a binary division of the world between the Annex I group of industrialized countries with emission reduction targets and the non-Annex I (developing) countries without them. The 2015 Paris Agreement arguably ended such division by introducing a bottom-up system of self-differentiated emission reduction commitments through countries' Nationally Determined Contributions. This paradigmatic regime shift creates the opportunity to research to what extent it has been accompanied by a similar change in member states' negotiation positions and policymaking. I explore whether key developing countries' discourses regarding burden sharing of mitigation have changed pre- and post-Paris and how this relates to their own mitigation contributions. Has the Paris Agreement led to a new way of thinking regarding burden sharing? Do countries in favour of abolishing the Annex I–non-Annex I divide also propose more ambitious climate policies? I rely on text analysis of written position papers submitted to the negotiations, focusing on members of two coalitions at opposite extremes of developing countries' positions: the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean, a group of progressive countries arguing for more comprehensive climate agreements; and the Like-Minded Developing Countries, a coalition that aims to uphold the regime's differentiation between developed and developing countries.

'Against all odds, the CDM has shown that market mechanisms for greenhouse gas reduction in developing countries can work. Nevertheless, as Paula Castro explains convincingly, the CDM is no "magic bullet". Advanced developing countries need to be "weaned off" the CDM in order to take up commitments, while the monetary incentive from emission credit sales is insufficient to put least developed countries on a low-emission pathway. However, experience from the CDM remains critical in designing new market mechanisms.' - Axel Michaelowa, University of Zurich, Switzerland. In this groundbreaking book, Paula Castro presents the first systematic categorization of positive and negative incentives generated by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for climate change mitigation in the Global South. To reduce the cost of meeting their greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries may rely on the CDM, a market instrument that allows them to count emission reductions from projects in developing countries as their own. Presented in four core empirical chapters, the book critically reviews whether and how the CDM creates incentives or disincentives for developing country action towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and draws lessons for the future international climate change regime. Recommendations and discussion on the reform of the CDM invoke debate on the future of this policy in developing countries, which is vital material for both policymakers and international institutions introducing similar instruments. Students and researchers working on topics related to environmental politics, climate policy, environmental economics and environmental science will also find this resource invaluable

Coalitions play a central role in the international negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. By getting together, countries join resources in defending their interests and positions. But building coalitions may come at a cost. Coalition positions are a result of compromise between their members, and thus the increase in bargaining power may come at a price if the preferences of their members are heterogeneous. Relying on automatic text analysis of written position papers submitted to the negotiations, I analyze the extent to which coalitions represent the preferences of their members and discuss whether this contributes to disproportionate policy responses at the international level. I focus on a recently formed coalition: the Like-Minded Developing Countries, a large and heterogeneous group that brings together emerging, oil-dependent and poor developing countries.

Accepted version posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich, ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-197017 ; Historically, burden sharing of mitigation in the climate regime was operationalized as a binary division of the world between the Annex I group of industrialized countries with emission reduction targets and the non-Annex I (developing) countries without them. The 2015 Paris Agreement arguably ended such division by introducing a bottom-up system of self-differentiated emission reduction commitments through countries' Nationally Determined Contributions. This paradigmatic regime shift creates the opportunity to research to what extent it has been accompanied by a similar change in member states' negotiation positions and policymaking. I explore whether key developing countries' discourses regarding burden sharing of mitigation have changed pre- and post-Paris and how this relates to their own mitigation contributions. Has the Paris Agreement led to a new way of thinking regarding burden sharing? Do countries in favour of abolishing the Annex I–non-Annex I divide also propose more ambitious climate policies? I rely on text analysis of written position papers submitted to the negotiations, focusing on members of two coalitions at opposite extremes of developing countries' positions: the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean, a group of progressive countries arguing for more comprehensive climate agreements; and the Like-Minded Developing Countries, a coalition that aims to uphold the regime's differentiation between developed and developing countries.

Abstract In this article I have the following goals: to enter the debate on what defines social psychology as a social science, arguing that it is the prominence conceded to a focus on agreed ‐ not natural ‐ limits to human action; to add to this debate a further
distinction ‐ that between social facts and cultural/institutional facts ‐ together with a theorization of the later highlighting the relevance of attending to the (de)legitimization of institutions; to extract consequences of this position for social psychology; finally, to
offer two cases illustrating and hopefully clarifying the set of theoretical arguments and concepts I used before: Sophocles' Antigone, and the EU debate on Natura 2000, both evidencing a tension between the legal and the legitimate. I conclude by suggesting that such a social psychology
can work together with the social sciences to ask questions productive for extending our knowledge of the ecological and the political.

In this article I argue that a desirable future direction for political psychology would be to pay more attention to social-psychological processes involved in the response to innovative laws, in particular those devised with sustainability and environmental protection aims. This involves taking into account the following premises: (1) innovation and change are not unitary phenomena; instead there are different types of innovation; (2) legal and policy innovation is a specific type and is highly central in an era when global challenges are increasingly dealt with by global treaties which are then translated into national laws with a call to transform local practices; (3) offering attention to the reception of such innovation involves developing specific conceptual tools; (4) devising a typology of legal innovation is one step in this direction; (5) furthering our comprehension of how people, groups, and institutions receive-i.e., accept, contest-legal innovation for sustainability is important for helping to push forward sustainability goals, which are legislated but far from attained. The present article outlines theoretical tools for addressing psychosocial processes involved in the reception of legal innovation, drawing mostly on the approach of social representations and the literature of environmental psychology, and offers three criteria for a typology of laws. Finally I present some examples of responses to subtypes of legal innovation from the sustainability domain, taken as an illustrative case, and discuss differences and commonalities in the processes of acceptance and resistance that each mobilizes. Adapted from the source document.

Sustainable development is a key feature of national, European Union and global development strategies. The main research goal is to provide evidence on how impactful public policies on environmental sustainability in Portugal are at the regional level, in various policy areas. In this context, this paper analyses the main impacts of the Portuguese Operational Programme for Sustainability and Efficient Use of Resources (PO SEUR 2014–20). The research uses a territorial impact assessment (TIA) methodology (TARGET_TIA) to assess these impacts in five analytic dimensions (economy with low emissions, adaptation to climate change, risk prevention and management, environmental protection and resource efficiency) in the five mainland Portuguese NUTS 2. It concludes that, in overall terms, PO SEUR produced low to moderate positive impacts in all NUTS II and analysed dimensions, but it was particularly positive in measures fostering adaptation to climate change, and less impactful in measures supporting an economy with low emissions and resource efficiency in Portugal. Despite data limitations, the research provided adequate evidence that key public policies supporting environmental sustainability in Portugal are largely ineffective and inefficient in view of their policy goals and allocated funding. To turn this scenario around, the process of project selection needs to undergo significant improvements to better adjust the regional needs on environmental sustainability-related issues to the available funding. Moreover, on a policy strategic level, there needs to be support for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate-neutral economy in Portugal via concrete actions exploring environmental capital and a green economy in urban areas.

This paper will deal with the (in) conformity of the award granted before the guarantees of the rights of the offender and the debtor before the Federal Constitution, thus demonstrating all the necessary requirements to sign the award agreement and who is entitled to propose this agreement. Demonstrating that, although the institute does not have a specific law, which is introduced in sparse legislation, it is being widely used to reduce economic criminalization, as in the case of Operation Lava Jato, where the defendant delivers the others investigated for obtaining of some benefit, such as the reduction of sentence or the substitution of deprivation of liberty by restriction of rights. It will also address the constitutional guarantees envisaged for the offender and the complainant showing their pros and cons. ; O presente trabalho abordará a (in) conformidade da delação premiada perante as garantias dos direitos do delator e do delatado frente à Constituição Federal, assim demonstrando todos os requisitos necessários para firmar o acordo de delação premiada e de quem compete à legitimidade para propor este acordo. Demonstrando que, ainda que o instituto não tenha uma lei específica, sendo ela introduzida em legislações esparsas, está sendo muito utilizada para diminuir a criminalização econômica, como no caso da Operação Lava Jato, onde o réu-colaborador delata os outros investigados para a obtenção de algum benefício, como exemplo a redução de pena ou a substituição da pena privativa de liberdade por restritiva de direitos. Abordará ainda as garantias constitucionais previstas ao delator e o delatado mostrando seus prós e contras.

Differential treatment is a key norm in multilateral environmental agreements. Its main objective is to increase compliance and reduce the free-rider problem by apportioning the costs and benefits of implementation more equitably across the parties in an agreement. The question of how to differentiate those burdens is inextricably linked to national interests, and while in some instances differential treatment is well designed and facilitates cooperation, in other cases a rigid divide—or cleavage—leads to a stalemate and constant conflict. This article studies the consequences of differential treatment as institutionalized under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Previous research has shown that the separation of UNFCCC parties into two opposing groups has deepened the polarization in the negotiations. We identify two causal mechanisms that may have driven this polarization, namely socialization through material incentives and the formation of group identity. We draw on an original dataset that records (dis)agreements between country pairs, coded from negotiation summaries between 1995 and 2013. Using a relational events model, we show that the division of UNFCCC parties into Annex I (with obligations) and non-Annex I (without obligations) is related primarily to material incentives and less to group identity formation.

Im Dezember 2015 wurde in Paris ein neues Klimaabkommen verabschiedet. Im Wesentlichen gelang es, die länger als 20 Jahre währende strikte Trennung zwischen entwickelten (Annex I) und Entwicklungsländern (non-Annex I) aufzubrechen. Gleichzeitig fand in Paris ein Paradigmenwechsel statt: von den im Stil des Kyoto-Protokolls von oben verordneten verbindlichen, absoluten Emissionsreduktionszielen hin zu einem eher von unten nach oben ausgerichteten System unterschiedlicher freiwilliger Zusagen. Eine entscheidende Komponente des Abkommens, zu der jedoch viele Fragen offen bleiben, ist die Klimafinanzierung. Im Global Governance Spotlight 3|2016 erörtern Dr. Paula Castro und Dr. Carola Betzold die Fortschritte des Pariser Gipfels im Hinblick auf die Klimafinanzierung - wenn es denn solche gegeben hat. Dabei befassen sie sich mit drei zentralen Themen: mit dem Gesamtvolumen der Klimafinanzierung, ihren Quellen und ihrer Verteilung. Darüber hinaus geben Sie Empfehlungen, wie die Verpflichtungen zur Klimafinanzierung glaubwürdig erfüllt werden können.