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Part I. Ethics and law. 1. The black box problem -- 2. Ethics, applied ethics, and law -- Part II. Methods in legal theory. 3. Norms -- 4. Norm application -- 5. Norm development -- Part III. Methods in contemporary ethical theories. 6. Principlism -- 7. Casuistry -- 8. Consequentialism -- 9. The Morisprudence Model for applied ethics

The law serves a function that is not often taken seriously enough by ethicists, namely practicability. A consequence of practicability is that law requires elaborated and explicit methodologies that determine how to do things with norms. This consequence forms the core idea behind this book, which employs methods from legal theory to inform and examine debates on methodology in applied ethics, particularly bioethics. It is argued that almost all legal methods have counterparts in applied ethics, which indicates that much can be gained from comparative study of the two. The author first outlines methods as used in legal theory, focusing on deductive reasoning with statutes as well as analogical reasoning with precedent cases. He then examines three representative kinds of contemporary ethical theories, Beauchamp and Childress's principlism, Jonsen and Toulmin's casuistry, and two versions of consequentialism--Singer's preference utilitarianism and Hooker's rule-consequentialism--with regards to their methods. These examinations lead to the Morisprudence Model for methods in applied ethics.

Can post-truth thinking be rational? In order to answer that question I develop, in the first part of this article, a non-pejorative understanding of post-truth thinking, namely as the systematic underestimation of the epis- temic value of the expert discourse as compared to one's individual delib- eration in relation to politicized factual issues in an environment without secure epistemic rules. Everyone significantly underestimates how more re- liable academic discourse, say, is compared to individual epistemic means. In post-truth thinking this underestimation concerns questions the answers to which allow for predictions about political affiliation. In answering such questions—about the truth of the theory of evolution, say—almost everyone has to draw on the testimony of others one regards as being trustworthy. Oftentimes one finds these trustworthy people in his or her social media filter bubbles. Post-truth thinking happens when one has to inform oneself in social or alternative media for which we currently lack safe epistemic rules of thumb or heuristics. "Post-truth thinking" seems to imply indif- ference about truth or rationality. Against this assumption I argue, in the second part, that post-truth thinking can be regarded as being rational, at least in the sense of "bounded rationality". After all, everyone has to rely on the testimony of others in almost all fields of knowledge. In non-ideal cir- cumstances, which are characteristic for post-truth thinking, it is rational, in navigating social and alternative media, to follow epistemic rules well- established in other domains. These rules often speak for believing what emerges in one's filter bubble.

Can post-truth thinking be rational? In order to answer that question I develop, in the first part of this article, a non-pejorative understanding of post-truth thinking, namely as the systematic underestimation of the epistemic value of the expert discourse as compared to one's individual deliberation in relation to politicized factual issues in an environment without secure epistemic rules. Everyone significantly underestimates how more reliable academic discourse, say, is compared to individual epistemic means. In post-truth thinking this underestimation concerns questions the answers to which allow for predictions about political affiliation. In answering such questions—about the truth of the theory of evolution, say—almost everyone has to draw on the testimony of others one regards as being trustworthy. Oftentimes one finds these trustworthy people in his or her social media filter bubbles. Post-truth thinking happens when one has to inform oneself in social or alternative media for which we currently lack safe epistemic rules of thumb or heuristics. "Post-truth thinking" seems to imply indifference about truth or rationality. Against this assumption I argue, in the second part, that post-truth thinking can be regarded as being rational, at least in the sense of "bounded rationality". After all, everyone has to rely on the testimony of others in almost all fields of knowledge. In non-ideal circumstances, which are characteristic for post-truth thinking, it is rational, in navigating social and alternative media, to follow epistemic rules well-established in other domains. These rules often speak for believing what emerges in one's filter bubble.

Can post-truth thinking be rational? In order to answer that question I develop, in the first part of this article, a non-pejorative understanding of post-truth thinking, namely as the systematic underestimation of the epistemic value of the expert discourse as compared to ones individual deliberation in relation to politicized factual issues in an environment without secure epistemic rules. Everyone significantly underestimates how more reliable academic discourse, say, is compared to individual epistemic means. In post-truth thinking this underestimation concerns questions the answers to which allow for predictions about political affiliation. In answering such questions about the truth of the theory of evolution, sayalmost everyone has to draw on the testimony of others one regards as being trustworthy. Oftentimes one finds these trustworthy people in his or her social media filter bubbles. Post-truth thinking happens when one has to inform oneself in social or alternative media for which we currently lack safe epistemic rules of thumb or heuristics. "Post-truth thinking" seems to imply indifference about truth or rationality. Against this assumption I argue, in the second part, that post-truth thinking can be regarded as being rational, at least in the sense of "bounded rationality". After all, everyone has to rely on the testimony of others in almost all fields of knowledge. In non-ideal circumstances, which are characteristic for post-truth thinking, it is rational, in navigating social and alternative media, to follow epistemic rules well-established in other domains. These rules often speak for believing what emerges in ones filter bubble. ; (VLID)3314238

Baccarini's excellent treatment of the political and societal implications of various uses of enhancement technologies is grounded in the Rawlsian tradition. This short discussion focusses on one kind of enhancement—moral enhancement—and examines three different versions of liberal views with regards to moral enhancement, perfectionist liberalism, political liberalism, and liberal equality. It is argued that perfectionist versions of liberalism would consider society-wide moral enhancements a legitimate policy option as long as they are so modest that they do not impede autonomy or pluralism. Political liberalism, in contrast, cannot support society-wide enhancements because it is grounded on respect for persons—persons, that is, which might not share a single comprehensive doctrine. Political liberalism cannot generally oppose individual moral enhancements, whereas perfectionist liberalism could support state-driven enhancements while suppressing severe forms of individual enhancements. The third view, Dworkin's liberal equality, is also opposed to state-driven moral enhancements. While it is perfectly fine to try to convince people to change their ethical views, ethical choices must not be restricted politically. The discussion of three versions of liberalism shows that there is no easy answer to the political virtues or vices moral enhancement technologies.

Die deutsche Zeitungslandschaft ist sich einig: Von der taz über die Süddeutsche und die FAZ bis hin zur Welt sind die Nachrufe auf Ronald Dworkin als Lobeshymnen ausgefallen. Und das, obwohl er ein äußerst streitbarer Intellektueller war. Ein Wissenschaftler, der sich in politische Kontroversen einmischte und zeitweise für die Demokratische Partei in den USA politisch aktiv war. Besonders in seinen mehr als einhundert Beiträgen für die New York Review of Books hat er kein heißes politisches Eisen unkommentiert gelassen und wurde so zu einem der wichtigsten und streitbarsten öffentlichen Intellektuellen der englischsprachigen Welt.

Die gegenwärtige Debatte um die "Krise" der Demokratie hat nach 2016 eingesetzt und steht in engem Zusammenhang mit dem politischen Populismus. Diese Einleitung zum Schwerpunkt "Demokratie in der Krise rechts- und sozialphilosophische Aspekte" weist darauf hin, dass in vielen wichtigen Beiträgen zu dieser Debatte sowohl unklar bleibt, was genau eigentlich Populismus ist, als auch, welches Demokratieverständnis vorausgesetzt wird. Dies ist besonders misslich, wenn der Begriff des Populismus in Abgrenzung von der Demokratie verstanden werden soll. Meist wird ein Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Populismus und demokratischer Repräsentation betont. Die Beiträge in diesem Schwerpunkt zeigen allerdings, dass diese Sichtweise zu eng ist. Es müssen verschiedene Legitimationsebenen auseinandergehalten werden. Auch ist das Verhältnis zwischen Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit komplexer, als viele Autor*innen annehmen. Ferner erweisen sich einige der hauptsächlich vertretenen Vorschläge, wie man der populistischen Herausforderung begegnen kann, als äußerst voraussetzungsreich. ; The current debate about the "crisis" of democracy has begun after 2016 and is closely related to political populism. This introduction to the special issue "Democracy in Crisis Philosophical Perspectives" points out that in many important contributions to this debate it remains unclear both what exactly populism is and what understanding of democracy is assumed. This is particularly unfortunate when the concept of populism is to be understood in contrast to democracy. Usually a tension between populism and democratic representation is emphasized. However, the contributions in this special issue show that this view is too narrow. Different levels of legitimacy must be distinguished. Also, the relationship between democracy and the rule of law is more complex than many authors assume. In addition, some of the main proposals on how to meet the populist challenge seem to make highly controversial assumptions. ; (VLID)4632287

What should we do if climate change or global injustice require radical policy changes not supported by the majority of citizens? And what if science shows that the lacking support is largely due to shortcomings in citizens individual psychology such as cognitive biases that lead to temporal and geographical parochialism? Could then a plausible case for enhancing the morality of the electorateeven against their will be made? But can a democratic government manipulate the will of the people without losing democratic legitimacy? This paper explores the problems that governmental manipulation of voters pose for democratic legitimacy and the tensions between non-manipulated input and morally acceptable output. These venerable issues of political theory resurface in light of recent suggestions to tackle todays global mega-problems by Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu. They suggest that to avert the looming catastrophe, governments should alter psychological traits of the citizenry through biomedical means, from pharmaceuticals to genetics. However, we argue that a government cannot rule with democratic legitimacy if elected by a will of the people it manipulated before. Normatively, conferring power from the governed onto governors is a one-directional relation that is incompatible with manipulation. But while it is tempting to rebut suggestions to morally enhance the people as antithetical to essential ideas of democracy, swift rebuttals tend to overlook the deeper challenge: Majoritarian decision-making may lead to inacceptable outcomes. The dilemma between input and output runs through major works in political theory. Rather than wishfully ignoring the dangers of democracy, democratic theory has to provide answers.

What should we do if climate change or global injustice require radical policy changes not supported by the majority of citizens? And what if science shows that the lacking support is largely due to shortcomings in citizens individual psychology such as cognitive biases that lead to temporal and geographical parochialism? Could then a plausible case for enhancing the morality of the electorateeven against their will be made? But can a democratic government manipulate the will of the people without losing democratic legitimacy? This paper explores the problems that governmental manipulation of voters pose for democratic legitimacy and the tensions between non-manipulated input and morally acceptable output. These venerable issues of political theory resurface in light of recent suggestions to tackle todays global mega-problems by Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu. They suggest that to avert the looming catastrophe, governments should alter psychological traits of the citizenry through biomedical means, from pharmaceuticals to genetics. However, we argue that a government cannot rule with democratic legitimacy if elected by a will of the people it manipulated before. Normatively, conferring power from the governed onto governors is a one-directional relation that is incompatible with manipulation. But while it is tempting to rebut suggestions to morally enhance the people as antithetical to essential ideas of democracy, swift rebuttals tend to overlook the deeper challenge: Majoritarian decision-making may lead to inacceptable outcomes. The dilemma between input and output runs through major works in political theory. Rather than wishfully ignoring the dangers of democracy, democratic theory has to provide answers.

In this contribution, it is argued for the potential of empirical moral philosophy in the context of the regulation of self-driving cars. This chapter focuses on the use and abuse of capturing the moral preferences of the general public and including these in the regulatory process. The Moral Machine Experiment is used as an example of collecting evidence on public moral preferences to help program self-driving vehicles. After a comprehensive presentation of the aim and methodology of the study, criticisms are discussed and partly refuted.  It is concluded that the findings of the Moral Machine experiment are an impressive collection of data that has indeed contributed to the ethical and legal debate of how to regulate moral dilemmas caused by self-driving cars. Future empirical research in the field can continue along these lines. While the methodological limits of the Moral Machine experiment have to be acknowledged, it is nevertheless important to consider public moral preferences in the ethics of self-driving cars.