Nuclear Weapons in Wargames: Testing Traditions and Taboos
In: MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2017-3
15 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2017-3
SSRN
Working paper
In: MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2014-28
SSRN
Working paper
In: Cornell International Affairs review: CIAR journal, Band 4, Heft 1
Immediately following the first and only uses of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, President Truman described nuclear stewardship as "an awful responsibility that has fallen to us." The decision to use the bombs did clearly demonstrate the operational effectiveness of a new and awesome weapon, as the atomic bomb was generally accepted to have been critical in bringing about the Japanese surrender. Moreover, new weapon technologies have consistently been used in subsequent warfare throughout human history. Policy-makers in the post-1945 period, therefore, would have had to work energetically against that precedent if they sought to meet Truman's "responsibility" and establish a tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons. This paper will defend the proposition that this is exactly what key American policy-makers sought and accomplished.
In the narrative that follows, the key dates to be examined are between 1945 and 1950—a transformative period in American foreign affairs when Paul Nitze and other key US policy-makers were setting the stage for the Cold War. The key to this study is not in episodically assessing why the United States repeatedly stepped back from the brink of the nuclear abyss, but rather in seeking to discern the development of a tradition of policy considerations concluding in the practice of nonuse. This policy evolution is tracked through three key debates of the early Cold War: establishing the uniqueness of nuclear weapons, creating the hydrogen bomb, and the writing of NSC-68.
Scholars have proposed two key explanations for the widely unexpected legacy of atomic weapons: the tradition of non-use and the nuclear taboo. The taboo explanation stems from a constructivist appreciation of the role of ideas and social action in state behavior, while the tradition of non-use comes from an assessment of the material and reputational factors considered by rational and strategically-oriented policy-makers. Both of these explanations need to be taken into account when assessing the non-use of nuclear weapons. Overall, I argue in this paper that US nuclear policy, with the early support of policy-makers like Paul Nitze, developed in a way that allowed for the emergence of a tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons. Evolving practices in the early years of the Cold War contributed substantially to a strategic commitment that helped prevent the use of nuclear weapons and prepare the ground for later struggles against proliferation.
In: International security, Band 43, Heft 2, S. 151-192
ISSN: 1531-4804
Abstract
Why since 1945 have nuclear weapons not been used? Political scientists have cited five basic reasons: deterrence, practicality, precedent, reputation, and ethics. Scholars attempting to weight these factors face a dearth of empirical data. Declassified records of political-military wargames played by U.S. policymakers, however, open up new avenues for theory testing. An investigation of the willingness of U.S. "strategic elites"—experts with experience in diplomatic or military strategy—to use nuclear weapons in a sample of twenty-six political-military wargames reveals that elite players were reluctant to cross the nuclear threshold against both nuclear-armed and nonnuclear-armed adversaries. The only uses of nuclear weapons in the sample occurred in two wargames with nuclear adversaries. Players' arguments for restraint in the wargames invoked reputational aversion: decisionmakers feared the opprobrium they would face if they used nuclear weapons. Wargame records also strongly support the power of deterrence and basic practicality—whether conventional weapons could accomplish the same goals—as reasons for widespread hesitation to use nuclear weapons. Precedent and ethical aversions to using nuclear weapons were less common. Finally, players also demonstrated some conformity to what they thought the president expected of them.
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 66, Heft 1, S. 1-13
ISSN: 1468-2478
Nuclear technology is often "dual-use," having both peaceful and military applications. This is widely regarded as a lamentable fact, as states can pursue nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful intentions. However, this article proposes an upside to the nuclear dual-use dilemma: the deniable nature of dual-use technology makes it more amenable to coercive counterproliferation. Caught proliferators are more likely to come into compliance if they can elude audience costs by denying that they were ever out of compliance. Thus, the dual-use dilemma is both the bane of the nonproliferation regime and a boon to its coercive enforcement. Poor knowledge of past nuclear programs can hamper future verification. Counterintuitively, however, the effectiveness of nonproliferation regime institutions created to promote transparency—the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—may be enhanced by not directly challenging the denial of past nuclear activities. This research uses interviews and archival evidence from the IAEA, US government, and South African apartheid government. At a time when ongoing nuclear disputes revolve around questions of transparency and admissions of guilt, this article contributes to scholarly and policy debates about secrecy, face-saving, counterproliferation strategy, and the role of international institutions in coercive bargaining.
World Affairs Online
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 66, Heft 1
ISSN: 1468-2478
AbstractNuclear technology is often "dual-use," having both peaceful and military applications. This is widely regarded as a lamentable fact, as states can pursue nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful intentions. However, this article proposes an upside to the nuclear dual-use dilemma: the deniable nature of dual-use technology makes it more amenable to coercive counterproliferation. Caught proliferators are more likely to come into compliance if they can elude audience costs by denying that they were ever out of compliance. Thus, the dual-use dilemma is both the bane of the nonproliferation regime and a boon to its coercive enforcement. Poor knowledge of past nuclear programs can hamper future verification. Counterintuitively, however, the effectiveness of nonproliferation regime institutions created to promote transparency—the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—may be enhanced by not directly challenging the denial of past nuclear activities. This research uses interviews and archival evidence from the IAEA, US government, and South African apartheid government. At a time when ongoing nuclear disputes revolve around questions of transparency and admissions of guilt, this article contributes to scholarly and policy debates about secrecy, face-saving, counterproliferation strategy, and the role of international institutions in coercive bargaining.
In: International security, Band 43, Heft 2, S. 151-192
ISSN: 0162-2889
World Affairs Online
In: The nonproliferation review: program for nonproliferation studies, Band 22, Heft 3-4, S. 441-455
ISSN: 1746-1766
In: International security, Band 47, Heft 3, S. 9-51
ISSN: 1531-4804
Abstract
Conventional wisdom sees nuclear brinkmanship and Thomas Schelling's pathbreaking "threat that leaves something to chance" as a solution to the problem of agency in coercion. If leaders cannot credibly threaten to start a nuclear war, perhaps they can at least introduce uncertainty by signaling that the decision is out of their hands. It is not so easy to remove humans from crisis decision-making, however. Often in cases of nuclear brinkmanship, a human being retains a choice about whether to escalate. When two sides engage in rational decision-making, the chance of strategic nuclear exchange should be zero. Scholars have explained how risks associated with accidents, false warnings, and pre-delegation creep into nuclear crises. An investigation of how chance can still produce leverage while leaders retain a choice over whether and when to escalate adds to this scholarship. There remains an element of choice in chance. For a complete understanding of nuclear brinkmanship, psychology and emotion must be added to the analysis to explain how leaders make decisions under pressure. Human emotions can introduce chance into bargaining in ways that contradict the expectations of the rational cost-benefit assumptions that undergird deterrence theory. Three mechanisms of nuclear brinkmanship—accidents, self-control, and control of others—illustrate how a loss of control over the use of nuclear weapons is not a necessary element of the threat that leaves something to chance. Choice does not have to be eliminated for a risk of catastrophic destruction to remain.
In: International security
ISSN: 1531-4804
World Affairs Online
In: International security, Band 46, Heft 2, S. 7-50
ISSN: 1531-4804
Abstract
States frequently acquire proof of other states' norm violations, from nuclear proliferation to harboring terrorists to interfering in elections. Existing theories do not fully explain how states that catch others red-handed wield a form of coercive power over the wrongdoers. Discoverers may conceal proof of wrongdoing, share such proof with other actors privately, or reveal their proof to the world. States with more leverage over wrongdoers have two incentives to conceal proof of wrongdoing. They can blackmail wrongdoers by threatening to go public with proof of their guilt, and they can simultaneously allow wrongdoers to save face. States that possess proof of wrongdoing but have less leverage are more likely to share that proof with others. If a discoverer distrusts the intentions of states with more leverage, it will reveal evidence publicly, catalyzing others to act. Publicizing proof weaponizes the prospect that other states will pay reputation and hypocrisy costs if they do not follow through on punishing norm violations. Four case studies of nuclear proliferation (Taiwan, Libya, South Africa, and North Korea) probe this novel theory.
SSRN
Working paper
In: International security
ISSN: 0162-2889
World Affairs Online
In: European journal of international relations, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 83-109
ISSN: 1460-3713
Political scientists are increasingly integrating wargames into their research. Either by fielding original games or by leveraging archival wargame materials, researchers can study rare events or topics where evidence is difficult to observe. However, scholars have little guidance on how to apply this novel methodological approach to political science research. This article evaluates how political scientists can use wargames as a method of scholarly inquiry and sets out to establish a research agenda for wargaming in International Relations. We first differentiate wargames from other methodological approaches and highlight their ecological validity. We then chart out how researchers can build and run their own games or draw from archival wargames for theory development and testing. In doing so, we explain how researchers can navigate issues of recruitment, bias, validity, and generalizability when using wargames for research, and identify ways to evaluate the potential benefits and pitfalls of wargames as a tool of inquiry. We argue that wargames offer unique opportunities for political scientists to study decision-making processes both in and beyond the International Relations subfield.
World Affairs Online
In: European journal of international relations, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 83-109
ISSN: 1460-3713
Political scientists are increasingly integrating wargames into their research. Either by fielding original games or by leveraging archival wargame materials, researchers can study rare events or topics where evidence is difficult to observe. However, scholars have little guidance on how to apply this novel methodological approach to political science research. This article evaluates how political scientists can use wargames as a method of scholarly inquiry and sets out to establish a research agenda for wargaming in International Relations. We first differentiate wargames from other methodological approaches and highlight their ecological validity. We then chart out how researchers can build and run their own games or draw from archival wargames for theory development and testing. In doing so, we explain how researchers can navigate issues of recruitment, bias, validity, and generalizability when using wargames for research, and identify ways to evaluate the potential benefits and pitfalls of wargames as a tool of inquiry. We argue that wargames offer unique opportunities for political scientists to study decision-making processes both in and beyond the International Relations subfield.