Suchergebnisse

Privatinvestitionen sind für die Anpassung an den Klimawandel wichtig: Einerseits sind die Anpassungskosten für den öffentlichen Sektor allein zu hoch. Andererseits haben Industrieländer zugesagt, bis 2020 jährlich 100 Mrd. USD zu mobilisieren, um Entwicklungsländer bei der Milderung von und der Anpassung an den Klimawandel zu unterstützen; dabei gilt die Privatwirtschaft als Finanzquelle. Doch wie realistisch ist es, vor allem für weniger entwickelte Länder, sich auf die Mobilisierung privater Anpassungsinvestitionen zu verlassen? Diese Frage soll das vorliegende Politikpapier für Kenia beantworten. Seine Grundlage sind Interviews und ein Analyserahmen, der förderliche Bedingungen und die Mobilisierung und Bereitstellung privater Investitionen erläutert (vgl. Abb. 1). In erster Instanz können Entwicklungs- und Industrieländer sowie der private Sektor ein Umfeld schaffen, das private Anpassungsinvestitionen fördert. Für die Regierung Kenias und ihre Entwicklungspartner hat Anpassung Priorität. Dennoch spielt private Anpassung in der Regierungspolitik kaum eine Rolle. Der kenianischen Privatwirtschaft ist das Konzept der Anpassung offenbar fremd. Wenn sie Anpassungsmaßnahmen ergreift, geht es um Ressourceneffizienz oder Bodendegradation. Mobilisierte Privatinvestitionen sind demnach schwer rückzuverfolgen. So können ländliche Gemeinschaften beispielsweise durch verbessertes Wassermanagement zur Anpassung beitragen, jedoch sind weder die Kosten noch die Höhe der Finanzierung durch Banken zu beziffern, da keiner der Akteure private Anpassungsinvestitionen dokumentiert oder meldet. Noch schwerer einzuschätzen ist, ob getätigte Privatinvestitionen tatsächlich zur Anpassung beitragen. Ungeachtet der Motive tragen viele Investitionen zur Armutsminderung oder nachhaltigen Ressourcennutzung zur Anpassung bei. Andererseits kann ein privater Akteur Anpassung auf Kosten anderer betreiben, indem er z. B. die eigene Wasserversorgung schützt. Gegenseitige Kontrollen für die Auswirkungen des Privatsektors auf Anpassung gibt es nicht. Schutzmaßnahmen wie Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfungen (UVP) sind nicht explizit auf Anpassung ausgerichtet. All dies macht es sehr schwer, private Anpassungsinvestitionen in Kenia zu bewerten, gerade vor dem Hintergrund des o. g. Ziels von 100 Mrd. USD. Der kenianische Privatsektor hat von den UN-Klimaverhandlungen kaum Notiz genommen. Internationale Quellen wie den "Grünen Klimafonds" kann er noch nicht anzapfen. Wäre das anders, hätten Unternehmer vielleicht mehr Interesse an Anpassung und den UN-Verhandlungen. Das wiederum könnte Anreize bieten, Anpassungsinvestitionen zu beziffern. Die kenianische Regierung könnte private Anpassungsinvestitionen stärker fördern. Durch Aufklärung und die Stärkung eines öffentlich-privaten Bewusstseins könnte die Regierung die Bedingungen für private Anpassung verbessern, verstärkt Privatinvestitionen mobilisieren und die Nachverfolgung privater Anpassungsinvestitionen erleichtern. Zudem könnten die Regierung und Entwicklungspartner bei Projektwahl und UVP Anpassungskriterien einbeziehen, um der mangelnden Anpassung auf privater Seite zu begegnen.

Private investments in climate-change adaptation are important. First, because the costs of adaptation are too high to be met by the public sector alone. And second, developed countries pledged to mobilise USD 100 billion annually by 2020 to support developing countries' climate change mitigation and adaptation; the private sector is described as a source of finance. Yet how realistic is it to rely on the mobilisation of private investments in adaptation, in particular for less developed countries? This Policy Brief aims to answer this question in relation to Kenya. It is based on interviews and an analytical framework that spells out enabling environments; mobilisation and delivery of private investments (see Figure 1). As a first step, developing and developed countries, and the private sector can create enabling environments to mobilise private investments in adaptation. Adaptation is a priority to both the Kenyan government and its development partners. However, private adaptation has not been mainstreamed in key government policies. The Kenyan private sector appears unfamiliar with the concept of adaptation. Where it acts on adaptation, its purpose is generally resource efficiency or to address land degradation. This makes it hard to track mobilised private investments. For example, rural communities might contribute to adaptation though improved water management. However, related expenditure remains unknown, as is the extent to which it is financed by banks. Neither actor tracks or reports investments in adaptation. It is even harder to assess if private investments, once mobilised, actually deliver on adaptation. Regardless of the underlying motivations, many investments that reduce poverty or stimulate sustainable resource use contribute to adaptation. However, a private actor can also adapt at the expense of communities, for example by securing or fencing off its own water intake. There are no explicit checks and balances on private-sector impacts on adapta¬tion. Safeguards such as environmental impact assessments (EIAs) do not explicitly address adaptation. All of the above make it extremely difficult to assess private investments in adaptation in Kenya, in particular in the context of the above-mentioned USD 100 billion target. Kenya's private sector has taken little interest in the UN climate negotiations. It is currently not able to tap into international funds such as the Green Climate Fund. If it could, private actors might take more interest in adaptation and the UN negotiations. This in turn might also provide incentives for quantifying investments in adaptation. The Kenyan government could encourage more private-sector investments in adaptation. By stimulating a shared public-private awareness and understanding of adaptation, the government could improve enabling environments for private adaptation; mobilise more private investments; and improve the tracking of private investments in adaptation. Moreover, the government and development partners could include adaptation criteria in project selection and EIAs in order to reduce private maladaptation and increase private adaptation.

This briefing paper proposes a Global Framework for Climate Action (GFCA), a comprehensive and collaborative programme to build advantageous linkages between the multilateral climate regime and non-state and subnational climate initiatives. Global climate governance features a great diversity of institutions, state and non-state stakeholders, and their plethora of actions aimed at mitigation and adaptation. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol remain the most important elements of the multilateral climate regime. However, these state-centred regimes and their ongoing negotiations have been criticised for being cumbersome and insufficiently effective. The multilateral regime leaves governance deficits regarding implementation (of adaptation and emission-reduction policies), regulation (new international agreements, norms and standards) and legitimacy (effective output, as well as engagement by underrepresented stakeholders). These deficits could partially be addressed through a growing number of non-state and sub-national initiatives. For instance, cities have adopted emission-reduction targets and cooperate on adaptation, and industries are setting their own targets to reduce emissions. These kinds of initiatives have the potential to make concrete and solution-oriented contributions towards realising a climate-resilient and low-carbon future and also improve the effectiveness of the UNFCCC process. The groundswell of initiatives has, however, not reached its full potential as – until now – it has been uncoordinated and not well documented. The proposed GFCA aims to catalyse non-state and subnational initiatives, grant recognition to initiatives that make substantial contributions, and inspire governments to raise mitigation and adaptation ambitions by scaling-up innovative solutions and successful methods. To achieve this, a layered design is proposed that allows for the recording of a wide array of initiatives while ensuring measurability of progress in terms of output (visible activities and products), outcome (behavioural change) and impact (changes in environmental indicators). Periodic overall assessments of participating initiatives will strategically inform where initiatives could complement the multilateral process and where links could be built. We envisage a GFCA as a collaborative programme, oper¬ated and administered by a network of experts, think tanks as well as public and private organisations. Such a network yields the strengths of existing efforts and pools resources from multiple organisations while retaining legitimacy through a partnership with an international body, such as the UNFCCC secretariat or the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The proposed GFCA could become an important element in the future global climate governance architecture. It would strengthen coordination capacity within the UNFCCC to steer non-state and subnational actions towards greater ambition and the implementation of international targets and agreements on the ground. It would also give recognition to initiatives that substantially contribute to low-carbon and climate-resilient develop¬ment, and it would motivate reputation-conscious non-state stakeholders to develop such initiatives.

As a result of the United Nations (UN) climate negotiations in Warsaw in 2013, all countries were invited to submit a climate action plan – or "Intended Nationally Determined Contribution" (INDC) – as part of the preparations for the 2015 UN climate summit in Paris (COP21). The innovation of this instrument lies in the fact that it is universal (each country formulates one) and that they are formulated "bottom-up" (countries set their own priorities and ambitions). In theory, this stimulates countries' self-differentiation of responsibilities and capabilities to address climate change. This paper analyses 159 INDCs on whether they advanced self-differentiation in the context of the notion of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). The analysis focuses on aspects beyond mitigation targets, including INDC sections on fairness / equity as well as INDC content on adaptation and climate finance. Findings are provided for three country groupings: 15 "Annex I" parties, representing 42 countries (the EU, as one Party, represents 28 countries); 79 least-developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS), given the Paris Agreement's subtle differentiation towards these country groups; 65 "Middle countries" that fit neither category: a heterogeneous mixture of pre-dominantly middle-income countries. This paper offers two main conclusions: First, bottom-up setting of priorities and ambitions in INDCs advanced the issue of CBDR-RC beyond mitigation to include, at least, adaptation and finance. Although Annex I countries hardly mention adaptation in their INDCs, Middle countries, and LDCs and SIDS prioritise adaptation. The latter group, in particular, included adaptation plans and strategies. Climate finance was also hardly mentioned by Annex I countries. For Middle countries, however, and for LDCs and SIDS in particular, climate finance is often a condition for undertaking mitigation and adaptation. Second, self-differentiation through INDCs advanced the evolution of differentiation beyond the bifurcation of Annex I and non-Annex I countries. For example, the three country groupings introduced above have cascading priorities and ambitions in adaptation and finance. Such differentiation already appears in the Paris Agreement through "subtle differentiation": flexible differentiation that is applicable to specific subsets of countries (e.g. the LDCs and SIDS) on certain issues (e.g. adaptation and finance) and procedures (e.g. timelines and reporting). The bottom-up formulation of INDCs brought many interesting insights about the climate politics and policies of years to come. However, as much as the instrument is universal, the limited guidance on the formulation of INDCs allowed for non-universal INDC content. For example, it is problematic that only the potential recipients included climate finance in their INDCs. Also, the adaptation challenge (e.g in terms of cost estimates and the global goal on adaptation that was decided upon in the Paris Agreement) remains unclear because developed countries did not include adaptation in their INDCs. We have used our in-depth analysis of the INDCs to create an interactive visualization of countries' policy priorities and ambitions. You can access the INDC Content Explorer via the Klimalog project page.

Few studies focus on how children's environment affects their ability to cope with contemporary advertising. This study uses multilevel analysis techniques to explore how parents', classmates', and teachers' characteristics influence primary school children's dispositional advertising literacy, while acknowledging these children's own individual features. To this end, three surveys were conducted, resulting in four data sets linking information obtained from 9- to 12-year-old children ( n = 392), their peer group (children aggregated per class; n = 22), their parents ( n = 191), and their teachers ( n = 22). The results show that children's cognitive and attitudinal advertising literacy is to a large extent (12%-13%) determined by class-level processes (especially peers). Children's moral advertising literacy is primarily an individual matter (1%), albeit greatly influenced by their teachers. In general, parents' impact is mainly expressed through socioeconomic factors.

At the UN climate negotiations, developed countries pledged to mobilise US$ 100 billion of climate finance per year from 2020 onwards to support developing countries in dealing with climate change. Since this money is supposed to come from private sources too – some of which is to be spent on climate change adaptation – this briefing paper explores the potential of the international tourism industry to contribute to adaptation finance, with a focus on Small Island Development States (SIDS). The SIDS is a group of low-lying coastal countries that are particularly susceptible to natural disasters and climate change impacts. Tourism is the main economic sector for most of them. Given the sector's vulnerability to climate change (e.g. rising sea levels or extreme weather events), high levels of investment in adaptation will be needed to maintain the high number of visitors. A diverse landscape of modalities for funding adaptation through the tourism sector is available, with corresponding limitations and challenges in their implementation. The tourism sector represents a diverse array of businesses. The adaptive capacities of these businesses, their operational scales and customer demands are key determining factors behind the potential to contribute to, or finance, adaptation. Different options are available on various scales. For example, on a local scale, hotels and resorts can contribute to adaptation by investing in sea walls, or in water- and energy-efficiency measures. Governments can endorse this through, for instance, building codes and policies for sustainable water and energy use. On a sub-national or national scale, adaptation funds (i.e. financed by public and private sources) or adaptation taxes could be suitable instruments for involving a range of private actors operating in tourism and generating financial resources. Insurance schemes could help to share in and deal with risks. Tourism enterprises can contribute to and invest in adaptation in SIDS. Regardless of whether such investments would count as part of the US$ 100 billion, we recommend governments in SIDS to endorse this. However, in developing such mechanisms to mobilise pri¬vate financial contributions, it must be considered that tourists and multinational tourism corporations have the highest adaptive capacities. They can simply change destinations if climate impacts are too extreme or if the costs of adaptation make a destination relatively more expensive. The price sensitivities of the industry thus need to be factored in, and taxes or levies should theoretically be applied as uniformly as possible across tourist destinations in different countries in order to prevent travellers from substituting more expensive destinations (where adaptation taxes are adopted) for cheaper ones.

Despite that contemporary advertising is decreasingly about persuading children through persuasive messages and increasingly about influencing them through implicit tactics, little attention has been given to how children may cope with advertising by understanding and evaluating the new advertising tactics. Drawing on 12 focus groups entailing 60 children of ages 9–11 years, this article investigates children's advertising literacy by exploring their knowledge and judgements (and accordingly reasoning strategies) of the new advertising formats. In particular, insight is provided into children's critical reflection on the tactics of brand integration, interactivity and personalization in the advertising formats brand placement, advergames and retargeted pre-roll video ads on social media. It is shown that while children not spontaneously do so, they appear to have the ability to understand these tactics and form judgements about their (moral) appropriateness, thereby considering a wide range of societal actors.

Anthropogenic climate change is a formidable global challenge. Yet countries' contributions to global greenhouse gas emissions and the climate change impacts they face are poles apart. These differences, as well as countries' different capacities and development levels, have been internationally acknowledged by including the notion of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) and Respective Capabilities under the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The logic of CBDR was paramount in enabling negotiators to agree on an international legal framework for climate policy in the 1990s. Quite paradoxically, however, it has since proved to be a major obstacle in negotiating a universal new climate agreement, now envisioned for 2015 under the UNFCCC's "Durban Platform". The UNFCCC's original dichotomous differentiation between "Annex I" parties (basically comprising "industrialised countries") and "Non-Annex I" parties (i.e. developing countries) reflects neither scientific knowledge nor current political realities. The system of international climate policy has thus become dysfunctional. In fact, mitigation efforts by industrialised countries alone would be insufficient to avoid dangerous climate change, even if they were far more ambitious than they currently are. The diversification of state groups and country coalitions among developing countries, and the rise of emerging economies such as China and India – now among the world's major greenhouse gas emitters – warrant a critical reconsideration of the conceptualisation and implementation of CBDR. Yet, no progress has been made so far to adequately adjust for the UNFCCC's principled anachronism. It is against this background that this DIE Discussion Paper presents a state-of-the-art review of the notion of CBDR in international negotiations. It thus aims to identify mechanisms that could contribute to reinvigorating CBDR as a meaningful guiding principle for a 2015 climate agreement under the UNFCCC. To this end, it first considers the normative framing of CBDR and reviews the way CBDR has been conceptualised and interpreted in the academic literature. Second, it scrutinises the way CBDR manifests itself under the UNFCCC and how it explains the Annex I / Non-Annex I dichotomy before it summarises the respective political standpoints of some of the UNFCCC's most important and influential parties (or groups of states). Third, it provides an analysis of the way CBDR or CBDR-like approaches have been put into practice in a variety of international regimes and policy arenas, including the World Trade Organization, the Montreal Protocol and the burgeoning debate on universal Sustainable Development Goals. The discussion paper thus brings forward different approaches for the attribution of emissions, criteria and means that allow for a differentiation of responsibilities for the reduction and limitation of emissions, as well as for mechanisms that facilitate broad participation in the conceptualisation and implementation of CBDR. It concludes that a flexible implementation of CBDR is needed to take into account the multiplication of country coalitions among developing countries and the rise of emerging economies. Finally, we argue for a flexible regime that would include differentiation of state groups beyond the Annex I / Non-Annex I dichotomy, with graduation and exclusion mechanisms that are based on a set of transparent, measurable and verifiable indicators of development, emissions and capacities.

AbstractThe considerations of how Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to global climate action under the Paris Agreement are ambitious and fair, or equitable, is expected to guide countries' decisions with regards to the ambition and priorities of those contributions. This article investigates the equity aspect of the NDCs of four cases (Canada, the EU, Kenya, and South Africa) utilizing a combination of document analysis and expert interviews. It interrogates both the NDC documents themselves and, uniquely, the role of international and domestic equity considerations within the domestic policy processes that led to the formulation of the NDCs. For this, 30 participants and close observers of these processes were interviewed. We find countervailing effects of equity on ambition, with an enabling, or ambition-enhancing, effect resulting from international equity, in that these four Parties show willingness to do more if others do, too. In contrast, tempering effect appears to result from domestic equity concerns, for example with regards to real, perceived, or anticipated adverse distributional impacts of climate action across regions, sectors, and/or societal strata. Political cultures differ across the four case studies, as do the key actors that influence domestic policies and the preparations of NDCs. This paper also demonstrates that research on equity in NDCs can benefit from expanding its scope from the contents of NDC submissions to also examine the underlying decision-making processes, to generate insights that can contribute to future NDCs being both equitable and ambitious.