Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Countries increasingly adopt measures to make their economy more sustainable. These measures range from pricing carbon and protecting forests to promoting renewable energy and banning forced labour. This article examines how countries can effectively enforce such sustainability requirements on imports. Based on two case studies—the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR)—and other developments in EU customs law and practice, this article shows that customs inspection of elements that cannot be physically detected in the imported product as such is neither unique nor new. Similar challenges arise when dealing with massive inflows of small e-commerce consignments or having to check the origin or value of products. Indeed, for customs enforcement more generally, the trend is one away from physical inspection of products on a transaction basis at the point of entry, toward verification and control of firms before and especially after release of the goods. To implement this 'product-to-firm' shift, four back-up features are, however, crucial, focusing on data, penalties/circumvention, cooperation, and resources.

ABSTRACT
In the face of multiple global challenges, major policy-making initiatives are under way at various international fora. In many of these talks and discussions, a central question is how to fairly and effectively engage external stakeholders. While lagging behind for decades, the World Trade Organization has woken up to the potential of more actively engaging stakeholders in international trade policy-making, both to make better policies and mitigate implementation challenges. This contribution describes the groundbreaking steps taken in a number of Member-led informal discussions and dialogues: the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions and the Informal Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade. The objective of this contribution is to describe and applaud recent developments and initiate a discussion on how the process can be made more inclusive and robust and, potentially, also be extended to formal World Trade Organization activities. In this context, the World Health Organization's ongoing negotiations on a new pandemic treaty are used to offer an interesting point of comparison.

ABSTRACT
What does the imminent demise of the WTO Appellate Body (AB) mean for the settlement of ongoing and future trade disputes? This editorial discusses two 'unlikely solutions', at least in the short term: the US lifts its veto on AB appointments; a WTO organ unlocks the impasse. Appeals pending on 10 December 2019 will most likely be carried-over pursuant to (contested) Rule 15 of the AB Working Procedures. For panel reports released after that date, four main scenarios emerge: (i) appeals 'into the void' blocking the panel report, (ii) no appeal ex post, or ex ante no appeal pacts, (iii) Article 25 appeal arbitration, (iv) 'floating' panel reports (interim or final), neither adopted, nor appealed/blocked. The transformation from GATT to WTO took half a century. Regular veto rights in the settlement of trade disputes may be back in a matter of months. It is one thing to lose the AB, quite another to return to pre-WTO dispute settlement where panel outcomes are not automatically binding and power relations play a considerably greater role. At the same time, it would be wrong to equate a (temporary?) return to GATT-style dispute settlement with the collapse of a rules-based WTO system.

At the twentieth anniversary of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the WTO's dispute settlement system is celebrated as one of the organization's biggest achievements. Although powerful members such as China, the European Union (EU), and the United States are regularly on the losing side of WTO trade disputes, overall support for the system remains high. If anything, it has increased over time, with early criticism by civil society waning. Compare this situation to investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), centered around the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). ISDS, which started in earnest around the same time that the WTO was created, is under fire not only in capital-importing countries ranging from Ecuador, Indonesia, and South Africa but also in capital-exporting nations such as Australia, Germany, and the United States. Indeed, in the ongoing EU-U.S. negotiations over a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), ISDS emerged as one of the biggest bones of contention.