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Cover -- Half Title -- Dedication -- Series Page -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Series Preface -- Introduction: What Lies in Wait... -- Narrative Beacons -- A Tale Around a Governmental Theme -- Consequential Word Plays -- A Post-Disciplinary Tractate -- PART I: RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY AND THE TWILIGHT OF CRITICAL JUDGEMENT -- 1 A Grammar of Modern Critique: Judgement, Criteria and Progress -- Background Auspices -- The Grammar of Critique as Authoritative Judgement -- Three Ground Rules -- Initial Reflections -- 2 Radical Criminology's Judgemental Genres of Critique -- Neo-Kantian Genres of Critique -- Critical Theory's New Left Genres -- Guarding Human Rights -- The New Criminology -- Women, Exclusion and Criminology -- A Critique of Ideology: the Case of Mugging -- Neo-Marxist Genres -- Guarding the Orthodoxy -- Critical Criminology's Praxis-Orientated Critique -- Compendium... -- 3 Amidst the Ruins of Judgement -- Signs of a Fall... -- Radical Criminology and the Ruins of Judgement -- The Changing Conditions of Knowledge Production -- The Crumbling Foundations of Authoritative Judgement -- Judging: Whose Progress? -- Stocktaking... -- PART II: GOVERNMENTAL CRITIQUE'S LOGOS OF CRIMEN -- 4 The Art of Post-Disciplinary Critique: A Governmental Grammar -- A Critique of Governmental Critique -- Orientating Gestures -- In Search of a Clearing... -- The AItered Auspices of Governmental Critique -- A Genealogy of Governmental Critique -- Enunciating a Grammar of Governmental Critique -- Troubling the Truth(s) of Governmental Limits -- Troubled Subjects: That Which Rises From Under... -- Exits and the Promise of Justice -- 5 Of Logos: From Whence to Speak -- Recomposing a Post-Disciplinary Criminology -- Tentative Footings: Proceeding Under Erasure -- The (im)possibility of Radical Criminology.

Restorative justice is the policy of eschewing traditional punishments in favour of group counselling involving both victims and perpetrators. Until now there has been no critical analysis of governmental rationales that legitimize restorative practices over traditional approaches but Governing Practices of Restorative Justice fills this gap and addresses the mentalities of governance most prominent in restorative justice. The author provides comprehensible commentary on the central images of this discursive arena in a style accessible to participants and observers alike of restorative justice

AbstractPower, while fundamental to sociality, might be exercised with haphazard ferocity or more judiciously in legally constrained ways. Such constraint requires us first to understand how ruling paradigms work, and the effects of their powers, before entertaining suitable forms of legal limitation. Transposing Kuhn's famous concept, this paper examines a ruling paradigm of biopolitical sovereignty at the Cape of Good Hope through two examples: the 1891 census' racialized categorizations of the "population"; and a racialized segregation responding to the 1901 bubonic plague. Prefiguring apartheid, both examples indicate how colonial laws authorized discretionary biopowers and yet exempted themselves from monitoring how officials demarcated and governed racialized population groups. The paper touches on the growing maladroitness of positivist ideas about a sovereign "rule of law" in regulating arbitrary biopolitical forces. It concludes by briefly indicating the promise of legal pluralism and Indigenous legalities to check capricious biopowers while pursuing legitimate life-affirming forces.

AbstractEarly restorative justice archives challenged state criminalisation through three basic pledges – diversion, social transformation, and decolonisation – thereby inaugurating a movement against repressive state criminalisation and announcing a new paradigm of justice. Returning to that movement's beginning, this article shows how its global successes were secured through intimate ties with state justice that diluted its early pledges. Highlighting oft‐overlooked insights from legal pluralism, it calls for new articulations between semi‐autonomous justice fields to revitalise, and not simply recover, restorative foundations. Forging links with diverse social fields, and engaging a politics of accusation, restorative justice could recraft lenses that bring harm‐producing social assemblies into focus.

This article returns to a colonial discourse on crime, criminals, and punishment that the court of justice enunciated and followed during an 8-year British occupation of the Cape of Good Hope in the latter part of 1795. Tapping unusually frank juridical discussions on criminality and punishment in the context of sovereignty politics, it examines three key matters. Commencing with a description of the Cape colony's inquisitorial criminal procedures, the analysis—following Foucault (2000)—conceives of these as powers (political techniques) through which the British claimed an exclusive capacity to enunciate legal "truths" about specific criminal events. Second, it analyzes a unique correspondence between the British military commander and the court of justice members together with two illustrative criminal cases of the day. These provide a sense of the judge's knowledge of crime and criminal punishment in a social context that imagined itself through social differentiation and hierarchy. Third, it reads these colonial power-knowledge formations as generating three congruent political logics that in hybrid combinations have nurtured segmented, racially orientated, and group-based criminal justice arenas. This discussion alludes to the pivotal role colonial discourses of criminal law have played in generating a politics that shaped the criminal justice arenas of subsequent social forms. New, and differently combined, political logics of sovereignty, discipline, and biopolitics have left a decided legacy to which post-colonial arenas continue to respond.

Expansive criminal justice arenas have for centuries been marked by tenaciously unequal representations of the race, class, ethnicity and gender of the subjects they capture and punish. Although the phenomenon has been analysed in several ways, this article focuses on the influence of criminal justice in an eclipsed dimension of colonial settings, namely, the political logic deployed to enunciate legal persons that simultaneously defined criminal law's jurisdiction and objects of regulation. This politics is nicely illustrated by law directed at crimes at the Cape of Good Hope during extraordinarily unsettled times circa 1795, where unequal categories of legal personhood were assigned to those involved with crime. These categories were subsequently targeted for different intensities of legal force. Versions of this basic logic have resounded over the centuries; using the Cape's rich archive as an illustrative example, one glimpses how differentiated conceptions of the legal person help to sustain inequalities that fuel the disproportions of many criminal justice institutions nowadays.

AbstractThis paper shows how law enables right‐based versions of the sovereign to take root by studying how British sovereignty was fashioned over the Cape of Good Hope since its occupation in 1795. Challenging notions that sovereignty is predicated on an ability to except itself from law, the analysis shows how the emerging Cape sovereign was authored into being through its active insertion into crime‐focused legal practices.

Judgment is a complex matter, with particular nuances in the context of juridical decision-making. The following commentary explores legal judgment at a particular juncture via a Cape colonial case in 1798 and through Foucault's often overlooked essay, "Truth and Juridical Forms." Noting the legacy of the test and the inquiry as knowledge formations that have significantly influenced judgment in European and colonial law, this discussion highlights how legal judgment might usefully be viewed as a shifting product of local and wider power-knowledge formations. Viewing a Cape record at some historical distance enables one to see colonial legal judgment as a process of its time and place. It also enables a more general, if admittedly exploratory, comment on judgment as an authorized, violent process that cuts and countersigns itself through complex transcriptions. As well, a performative contradiction attaches indecision to the heart of legal decisions, thereby disabling apodictic judgments and intimating a potential escape from totalitarian judgmental systems.

This article analyses two late 19th-century technologies that sought to identify criminals with scientific accuracy: Alphonse Bertillon's techniques for measuring bodies and Francis Galton's composite portraits of criminal types. It analyzes the regulatory environment in England in which their ideas achieved considerable prominence, emphasizing crucial differences in the visions of `science' embraced by the two men. By highlighting their different claims to science, this article outlines their respective legacies in criminal identification arenas, and isolates unique dangers associated with each. Those dangers variously alert us to the importance of questioning a persistent, if often implicit, sentiment within much criminal justice thinking; namely, by identifying individual criminals, or criminal types, justice systems effectively address the problem of crime. Against this approach, and resonant with a critical criminology in search of less exclusionary ways to govern, the following analysis considers criminal identification not as a discovery but a creation. In so doing, it seeks to re-politicize current practices of criminalization, challenge claims to the purported scientific impartiality of criminal identification and embrace the possibility of justice beyond a dominant reflex to create criminals.

Discusses injustice as a primordial presence that serves as a backdrop against which the elusive promise of justice is figured, drawing on the philosophy of Jean-Francois Lyotard (1988). Injustice is considered in terms of three different phrasings: (1) a popular phrasing, in which injustice is experienced as an immediate limit; (2) a calculated phrasing found in many philosophical theories of justice, in which injustice is conceived as a threat to be overcome by promises, calculations, & practices of justice; & (3) a phrasing of injustice as immemorial, or the eternal quest to offer restitution for injustices. A way of linking these phrasings through a discourse language is presented. It is suggested that this linking discourse language offers the possibility of creating new moves in each phrasing &, so, of employing analyses of injustice to shed light on the limits of any particular historical ontology. In the process, the analysis of injustice becomes the critique of existing limits. It is concluded that, in the act of transcending limits, philosophical analysis offers the promise of regeneration & of overcoming prior injustices. 51 References. D. Ryfe

People's courts, which emerged in response to widespread social injustice in townships around South Africa in the early to mid-1980s, are examined, showing that, instead of functioning as mere complements to the state's courts, people's courts sought to change extant power relations by challenging state hegemony over the legal field. A brief history of the rise & decline of people's courts is given, & lessons that may be of value to future attempts to restructure conflict resolution forums in a postapartheid South Africa are discussed. It is concluded that an overrepresentation of youths, increasingly punitive punishments, & loss of popular support contributed to the late-1986 decline of people's courts. 41 References. W. Howard