Suchergebnisse

The existing practice of implementing antitrust law to bilateral monopolies in Russia shows signs of inconsistency. Traditional theoretical approaches differ in their estimations of the characteristics and attainability of equilibrium on such markets, but overall more or less converge on the idea of antitrust regulation of such markets to be unjustified. But approaching the problem in the context of transaction cost economics, taking into account the externalities appearing both upstream and downstream from the bilateral monopoly market in case of a suboptimal result, leads to viewing the antitrust authority as a discrete institutional alternative of internalizing such externalities by creating the incentives to develop a hybrid governance mechanism for transactions between the sides of contractual relationship characterized by sufficiently high switching costs. Taking into account the wide occurrence of bilateral monopolies in the Russian economy, the choice of a uniform approach to regulation is critical in terms of creating transparent legal environment and adjusting companies' incentives.

The article focuses on the effects of leniency programs when the antitrust authority is capable of making errors in classifying agreements between competitors. The research confirms that the application of the program can impede the growth of social welfare by destroying and preventing horizontal cooperation agreements. The obtained results can help explain the peculiar properties of the cases that have been investigated with the use of the leniency program in Russia.

The article examines the possible reasons for the dominance of fundamentalism( in the form of Pigouvianism or market fundamentalism) over functionalism (Coasianism) in the practice of decision-making in economic policy. Continuing the study of the relationship between Coasianism, Pigouvianism and market fundamentalism, presented in previous works, the article focuses on finding the basis for the dominance of fundamentalism at the level of individual decisions and actions — in particular, in the field of cognitive bias and behavioral effects. Decision-making using an automatic cognitive system, subject to cognitive bias, as opposed to a reflective system, can lead to the choice of a fundamentalist solution to a problem where it is not the most efficient, and also reduces the efficiency of functionalism, since it prevents the correct identification of the problem itself, of the structural alternatives for its solution, as well as identifying and comparing the effects associatedwith each of the alternatives. The microfoundations of insufficient supply and demand of the Coasian approach are explored. Based on the identified problems of supply and demand for Coasianism, as one of the possible ways to promote it, it is proposed to consider the primary socialization of the individual in the learning process, the formation of substantive critical thinking. It is emphasized that adjustments to the socialization process are a matter of long-term strategy

There is no unanimous opinion on the benefits of antitrust actions. They can result in direct and indirect costs for companies. The article evaluates the effect of the enforcement activities of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia on the market value of companies in the oil industry (reputational costs). An empirical conclusion was obtained on the basis of a sample of events of Russian oil companies from 2012 to 2018 that the actions of the antimonopoly service significantly affect the company's value not only when the fact of violation is established and decisions are made and orders are issued, but also when only its signs are established and warnings are issued and cases are initiated.

Under sanctions, at the state level (in particular via the Russian antimonopoly authority) the idea of the need to prioritize supply to the domestic market is being promoted as an imperative for Russian manufacturers. The reverse side of the prioritization of the domestic market is the refusal to link prices under domestic contracts to foreign price indicators and exchange rates. The requirement to prioritize the internal market is as simple and obvious in concept as it is difficult to administer. We assess the design of the norm and possible scenarios for its application in terms of effects both for Russian business entities and for public welfare in general. We propose options for fine-tuning in terms of the application of this norm. We show that the preferred methods for analyzing the satisfaction of domestic demand are economic and statistical methods, as opposed to survey methods, which are associated with high risks of strategic behavior on the part of consumers. Additionally, we outline the main risks associated with the administration of the priority of meeting domestic demand through antimonopoly regulation. Among these risks, the most important are the risk of involvement of the antimonopoly authority in the resolution of economic disputes (which contradicts not only the essence of antimonopoly policy, but also the existing regulatory documents), as well as the risk of side effects that cannot be systematically taken into account and adjusted for in conditions where the prioritization domestic demand is provided not by methods of economic regulation, but by antitrust measures.

The paper reveals the characteristics of competing approaches — Pigouvian and Coasian — to identify the grounds for state regulation. We outline the connections between Pigouvian and Coasian approaches with the values and prospects for their advancement in the field of political decision-making in the context of demand for economic knowledge and the possibilities of organizing compensating transactions. These connections are considered in the light of the externalities problem as one of the manifestations of market failure, as well as different internalization options. We also clarify the provisions from the theory of externalities in terms of their definition, classification and correlation with the conditions for optimal allocation of resources. The key types of structural alternatives for correcting market flaws are considered, and the main properties of the Pigouvian and Coasian approaches in economics, as they relate to the problem of market and government flaws, are determined. This helps explain why the Coasian approach cannot be considered synonymous with liberal fundamentalism. Finally, we indicate the relationship between normative conclusions and prospects of functionalism and two types of fundamentalism in the field of political decision-making. Using the example of intertemporal externalities, the difference in the approaches of Coasianism and Pigouvianism to their internalization is demonstrated.