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When nations fully embrace a free-market system, they not only experience an economic boom, but many positive social changes as well. This book delves into the challenges facing countries as they grapple with a world economy as it goes through ups and downs

The materialist-postmaterialist value dimension, understood as assigning priority to self-expression and quality of life as opposed to physical and economic security, has been one of the most important heuristic tools in the analysis of the changes of predominant values in cross-cultural and comparative studies in past decades. In recent elaboration of self-expression and emancipative values (in both cases, with postmaterialism as the most important component), postmaterialist values have been viewed as an essence of democratic political culture and a cultural precondition of effective democracy. This study was aimed at analysing the relation between postmaterialist values (understood as a political - thick culture variable), satisfaction with country's democracy (institutional - thin culture variable) and support for democracy. The data from the European Values Survey (EVS), conducted on the nationally representative samples in twenty East European countries on the total of twenty countries and 30,393 respondents, were used. It is shown that postmaterialism is an important aspect of democratic political culture in Eastern Europe; in general, the most supportive of democracy are postmaterialists. On the other hand, there is a mixed pattern between the postmaterialist values and satisfaction with democracy – in some countries, citizens satisfied with democracy are more prone to choose postmaterialist items compared to the dissatisfied ones, while in some other countries the reverse is true. Both are, however, important predictors of the support for democracy as well as the country's level of democracy development (measured by the EIU Democracy index). The relevance of postmaterialist values for the promotion of democratic political culture in Eastern Europe, possible alternative mechanisms of value change as well as the materialist-postmaterialist conception are discussed.

The materialist-postmaterialist value dimension, understood as assigning priority to self-expression and quality of life as opposed to physical and economic security, has been one of the most important heuristic tools in the analysis of the changes of predominant values in cross-cultural and comparative studies in past decades. In recent elaboration of self-expression and emancipative values (in both cases, with postmaterialism as the most important component), postmaterialist values have been viewed as an essence of democratic political culture and a cultural precondition of effective democracy. This study was aimed at analysing the relation between postmaterialist values (understood as a political/thick culture variable), satisfaction with country's democracy (institutional/thin culture variable) and support for democracy. The data from the European Values Survey (EVS), conducted on the nationally representative samples in twenty East European countries on the total of twenty countries and 30,393 respondents, were used. It is shown that postmaterialism is an important aspect of democratic political culture in Eastern Europe; in general, the most supportive of democracy are postmaterialists. On the other hand, there is a mixed pattern between the postmaterialist values and satisfaction with democracy - in some countries, citizens satisfied with democracy are more prone to choose postmaterialist items compared to the dissatisfied ones, while in some other countries the reverse is true. Both are, however, important predictors of the support for democracy as well as the country's level of democracy development (measured by the EIU Democracy index). The relevance of postmaterialist values for the promotion of democratic political culture in Eastern Europe, possible alternative mechanisms of value change as well as the materialist-postmaterialist conception are discussed. (author's abstract)

This paper is aimed at analysing the level of postmaterialist values in East European countries as well as the main individual and country level predictors of the postmaterialist value preference. The data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Survey (EVS), conducted on the nationally representative samples in the period from 1990 to 2008, were used. The main analysis was performed on the data from the fourth wave of EVS (2008/2010), on the total of twenty countries and 30,393 respondents. A number of individual (age, education, income level, size of town, economic hardship in formative years) as well as country level variables (inflation and unemployment rate, Human Development Index and GINI index values) were used. The results have shown that the level of postmaterialist values in Eastern Europe, measured by the standard four-item index, is relatively low and relatively stable in the period 1990–2008. Younger, urban and more educated respondents as well as the citizens from more developed and economically stable East European nations are more inclined towards postmaterialism. The significance of the current socio-economic conditions for the variation in postmaterialism as well as the insignificance of economic security during the formative period of political maturation calls into question the assumptions of Inglehart's original model. The possible alternative mechanisms of value change as well as of the (post)materialist conception are discussed.

This paper is aimed at analysing the level of postmaterialist values in Eastern European countries as well as the main individual and country level predictors of the postmaterialist value preference. The data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Survey (EVS), conducted on the nationally representative samples in the period from 1990 to 2008, were used. The main analysis was performed on the data from the fourth wave of EVS (2008/2010), on the total of twenty countries and 30,393 respondents. A number of individual (age, education, income level, size of town, economic hardship in formative years) as well as country level variables (inflation and unemployment rate, Human Development Index and GINI index values) were used. The results have shown that the level of postmaterialist values in Eastern Europe, measured by the standard four-item index, is relatively low and relatively stable in the period 1990–2008. Younger, urban and more educated respondents as well as the citizens from more developed and economically stable Eastern European nations are more inclined towards postmaterialism. The significance of the current socio-economic conditions for the variation in postmaterialism as well as the insignificance of economic security during the formative period of political maturation calls into question the assumptions of Inglehart's original model. The possible alternative mechanisms of value change as well as of the (post)materialist conception are discussed.

According to the cultural model of political culture and political change, citizens accept only those political and economic structures compatible with their relatively stable cultural orientations and political values, which are product of a common early socialization. An important implication of this view is that, after several decades of authoritarian rule and a lack of democratic political culture, the support for democracy in ex-communist societies is rather instrumental than intrinsic, based not on values, but perceived system performances in political and economic terms. The rational choice (or institutional) model, on the other hand, posits that these evaluations of system performances are far more than just lip service to democracy; they shape the political attitudes and behaviours and contribute to the (lack of) allegiance to democratic institutions and norms. This paper aims at clarifying the importance of certain "institutional" and "cultural" variables for the general support to democracy in Serbia and their dynamic interplay. The data used in the paper were collected in the post-election survey, conducted after the May 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections on a representative sample of Serbian citizens (N=1,568). The relative importance of several predictors was analyzed: the socio-demographic variables (respondent's age, educational level, monthly household income), the personality/dispositional variables (authoritarianism), the institutional variables (satisfaction with Serbian democracy and economy, evaluation of government performance before the election, the perceived level of respect for individual freedom and the quality of voters' view representation in elections) and the cultural variables (political tolerance, nationalism, liberalism, socialist egalitarianism). The most important predictors of support for democracy were satisfaction with Serbian democracy (β=.21, p lt 001) and evaluation of government performance (β=.21, p lt 001); the citizens who were more satisfied with democracy and more inclined to positively evaluate the government performance were more supportive of democracy. The less authoritarian citizens (β=-.11, p lt .01) and those who described their political views as liberal (β=.11, p lt .01) were also more positively oriented towards democracy, proving the relevance of the more general and relatively stable political orientations. The quality of support for democracy in Serbia in intrinsic/instrumental terms was discussed in the concluding part.

According to the cultural model of political culture and political change, citizens accept only those political and economic structures compatible with their relatively stable cultural orientations and political values, which are product of a common early socialization. An important implication of this view is that, after several decades of authoritarian rule and a lack of democratic political culture, the support for democracy in ex-communist societies is rather instrumental than intrinsic, based not on values, but perceived system performances in political and economic terms. The rational choice (or institutional) model, on the other hand, posits that these evaluations of system performances are far more than just lip service to democracy; they shape the political attitudes and behaviours and contribute to the (lack of) allegiance to democratic institutions and norms. This paper aims at clarifying the importance of certain "institutional" and "cultural" variables for the general support to democracy in Serbia and their dynamic interplay. The data used in the paper were collected in the post-election survey, conducted after the May 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections on a representative sample of Serbian citizens (N=1,568). The relative importance of several predictors was analyzed: the socio-demographic variables (respondent's age, educational level, monthly household income), the personality/dispositional variables (authoritarianism), the institutional variables (satisfaction with Serbian democracy and economy, evaluation of government performance before the election, the perceived level of respect for individual freedom and the quality of voters' view representation in elections) and the cultural variables (political tolerance, nationalism, liberalism, socialist egalitarianism). The most important predictors of support for democracy were satisfaction with Serbian democracy (β=.21, p<.001) and evaluation of government performance (β=.21, p<.001); the citizens who were more satisfied with democracy and more inclined to positively evaluate the government performance were more supportive of democracy. The less authoritarian citizens (β=-.11, p<.01) and those who described their political views as liberal (β=.11, p<.01) were also more positively oriented towards democracy, proving the relevance of the more general and relatively stable political orientations. The quality of support for democracy in Serbia in intrinsic/instrumental terms was discussed in the concluding part.

U radu se analizira značaj činilaca izborne apstinencije mladih koji se nalaze u fokusu vodećih eksplanatornih modela izborne participacije - sociodemografskog, modela partijske identifikacije i kognitivnog modela. Ispitivana je relevantnost većeg broja sociodemografskih varijabli, partijske identifikacije, političkog cinizma, političkog interesovanja i političkog znanja kao prediktora izborne apstinencije mladih. Istraživanje je sprovedeno na uzorku od 788 maturanata iz 25 beogradskih srednjih škola. Rezultati analize ukazuju na to da su najvažniji prediktori izborne apstinencije mladih partijska identifikacija, političko interesovanje, formalni aktivizam (članstvo u organizacijama) i obrazovni nivo majke. Šanse da se partijski neidentifikovana mlada osoba naše u grupi apstinenata su 3.6 puta veće nego u slučaju partijski identifikovanih; šanse za izbornu apstinenciju rastu s opadanjem nivoa političkog interesovanja i formalnog aktivizma, ali i s porastom obrazovnog nivoa majke. Dobijeni rezultati diskutovani su u kontekstu postuliranih modela izborne participacije, kao i rezultata ranijih istraživanja. ; The paper presents an analysis of the importance of some of the determinants of youth electoral absenteeism, which are in the focus of the predominant explanatory models of electoral participation - socio-demographic, party identification and cognitive model. The relevance of numerous socio-demographic characteristics, party identification, political cynicism, political interest, and political knowledge as predictors of youth electoral absenteeism were analyzed. This research was conducted on a sample of 788 fourth grade secondary school students attending 25 secondary schools in Belgrade. The results indicated that party identification, political interest, organizational membership and mother's level of education were significant predictors of electoral absenteeism. For young persons without party identification the odds of non-voting were 3.6 times higher than the non-voting odds of their counterparts but with party identification. The odds of electoral absenteeism increased with the decreasing level of political interest or organizational membership as well as with the increasing level of mother's level of education. The obtained results were discussed in the context of the proposed explanatory model of electoral participation as well as some previous research findings.