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AbstractDebates about accountability in cyberspace are dominated by state‐centric and security‐driven approaches that disregard the complexity of the institutional ecosystem in cyberspace and the diverse ways through which different stakeholder groups may pursue accountability. Such an approach has contributed to a flawed interpretation of accountability in cyberspace as applicable solely to malicious actors who need to be punished for their actions. Despite greater policy and research attention to this line of reasoning, holding states accountable for their behaviour has yielded limited results due to the legal, political and technical complexities. At the same time, the non‐malicious activities in cyberspace that might have unintended negative effects remain exempted from scrutiny. Cyber capacity‐building activities, which aim at supporting governments and societies in strengthening their cyber resilience, illustrate this point well. This article introduces the concept of positive accountability to describe accountability for actions that are not malicious in their intent. It argues that the anticipatory potential of mechanisms like deliberation, joint problem‐solving, interactive learning and competition plays an important role in strengthening accountability by eliminating or minimising any unintended or undesired spillovers. It concludes with a proposal that broadly defined capacity building might also be considered a form of anticipatory and deliberative accountability mechanism.

As various aspects of cyber-related policies become a priority for national and international stability, an increasing number of actors attempt to shape this policy area. With the EU expanding its international role in foreign and security policy globally – and gradually becoming a target of malicious cyber operations – it becomes critical to consider whether the European Union can play a more active role in shaping global cyber-related policies to effectively protect its citizens in the digital domain. As this article argues, the answer to this question depends on the concurrence of two major elements: the rapid evolution of the international digital environment and associated modes of global governance; and the institutional and policy processes within the European Union that help to deal with the complexity. This article aims to better understand factors influencing the EU's position within the existing cyber-related regimes and mechanisms deployed by the EU and its member states to shape the policy debates in those venues. It concludes that the EU's role as a global cyber-player is better understood through the prism of the global cyber regime complex and the strategies that the EU pursues within this complex, rather than by merely examining the effectiveness of its actions within individual regimes (e.g. cybercrime, stability, human rights).

AbstractThe positive impact of the Internet on human development depends on security and safety of the digital environment. With the share of developing countries in the global Internet population increasing rapidly, addressing the threats posed by malicious cyber activities is a clear priority. The purpose of this article is to explore the linkages between international debates on cyber‐related issues (i.e. Internet governance, cybercrime, cybersecurity, or international norms) and cyber capacity building. Specifically, the article analyses capacity building projects by the Council of Europe and International Telecommunication Union to answer if and how they can be used as a tool in foreign policy. This question stems from the assumption that capacity building as a process focused on human resources development, organisational arrangements and legal and institutional frameworks is ultimately aimed at deep societal and political transformation.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the U.S. role as a regional actor along three dimensions: intra-regional, inter-regional and trans-regional. The paper investigates to what extent these three dimensions are present within the U.S. strategic thinking and discusses briefly different dimensions of the U.S. role as a security provider. The paper demonstrates that despite the extensive interdependence between the United States and its North American neighbours, the political and analytical significance of their relationship is overshadowed by its international commitments in other parts of the world, including in the Middle East or Asia. The paper concludes that the roles that the United States plays as a regional security provider are in constant evolution which results in a varied geometry of U.S. engagement within North America and globally.

"In recent years various governments, international organisations and private actors have devoted substantial resources to developing their foresight capacities. This development is primarily a response to the increasing uncertainty of the global geopolitical environment which significantly complicates the process of policy making. This chapter provides a brief overview of some general trends identified in the existing literature and discusses their implications for European security. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be attributed to the EU Institute for Security Studies." (author's abstract)

New technologies for border control and surveillance are increasingly being applied in the field of justice and home affairs. The European Union (EU) has been particularly successful in promoting its approaches internationally despite the potentially negative impact of these technologies on civil liberties and fundamental freedoms. This article investigates why, despite a clear divergence between the EU's declarations and practice in balancing fundamental freedoms and security, the EU has faced little external criticism regarding its extraterritorial instruments. In the case of EU-US relations, the EU managed to optimize the outcome of the Passenger Name Record (PNR) negotiations by using the security-oriented US legislation as a pretext for advancing its own security-dominated agenda. At the same time, the EU managed to avoid criticism from the United States and international civil society regarding its flagship projects like the 'border package' or the creation of large-scale IT systems for collecting and processing personal information. In its relations with candidate countries, the EU has managed to escape criticism due to several factors: weak data protection institutions in those countries, different priorities set by the accession process, and rather weak civil society organizations (CSOs) dependent on EU funding. In the absence of external actors challenging the EU approach, recourse to the international judicial bodies is the last resort for taking action in this regard. This article argues that inconsistency and contradiction between the EU's various policy approaches has contributed to the unintentional development of an external governance model that maximizes the EU's position internationally.

New technologies for border control and surveillance are increasingly being applied in the field of justice and home affairs. The European Union (EU) has been particularly successful in promoting its approaches internationally despite the potentially negative impact of these technologies on civil liberties and fundamental freedoms. This article investigates why, despite a clear divergence between the EU's declarations and practice in balancing fundamental freedoms and security, the EU has faced little external criticism regarding its extraterritorial instruments. In the case of EU-US relations, the EU managed to optimize the outcome of the Passenger Name Record (PNR) negotiations by using the security-oriented US legislation as a pretext for advancing its own security-dominated agenda. At the same time, the EU managed to avoid criticism from the United States and international civil society regarding its flagship projects like the "border package" or the creation of large-scale IT systems for collecting and processing personal information. In its relations with candidate countries, the Fl I has managed to escape criticism due to several factors: weak data protection institutions in those countries, different priorities set by the accession process, and rather weak civil society organizations (CSOs) dependent on EU funding. In the absence of external actors challenging the EU approach, recourse to the international judicial bodies is the last resort for taking action in this regard. This article argues that inconsistency and contradiction between the EU's various policy approaches has contributed to the unintentional development of an external governance model that maximizes the EU's position internationally. Adapted from the source document.