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However, it also is written with an eye to readers with practical interests in international management or governments. This pioneering work will be discussed and analyzed for decades to come.

Organizational behavior has developed into a particularly non-contextual ap­plied social science. It is clear to any observer that organizational behaviors tend to differ across societies, yet discussions of these differences typically document variations in organizational practices and cultures, which are descriptive without being explanatory. These accounts do not address why organizational practices and behavior differ in different societal contexts and so cannot be used to, among other things, predict change. Here ideas drawn from comparative institutions theories are applied in an effort to better understand organizational behavior in the organizations of relatively more traditional societies, and the circumstances under which organizations are likely to adopt comparatively more modern practices.

Is it particularly difficult to reward employees' performance in public orga­nizations? Here it will forcefully be suggested that this assumption is false, that managers in or out of government have powerful informal rewards at their command. Certainly, there are important differences in the formal per­sonnel and pay policies between government and smaller businesses. Clearly, most employees in businesses are not subject to the variety of goals and con­stituents that often occur in public organizations; yet it will be suggested here that dwelling on the limitations of normal procedures and external links is the leading contributor to the neglect of rewarding good performance in government. In public organizations, the expectation that performance in itself cannot be rewarded leads to few rewards for good performance, a classic self-fulfilling hypothesis. The chapter begins with an analysis of the limitations of formal policies for effectively rewarding performance. This is followed by an argument for the use of informal systems to reward performance, with special attention to the strengths and limitations of this approach. Finally, the chapter concludes with specific steps that individual managers and policymakers alike can take to implement effective informal procedures to reward good performance.

We address the effects of secrecy in organizational policy enforcement. First, the legal literature that explains why court proceedings are open is summarized: openness more effectively holds decision makers and claimants accountable for truthfulness and unbiased decisions, demonstrates that the rich or powerful have not bought off the weak, supports adaptation to changing norms, and enhances the legitimacy of state authority. Next, we propose that when organizational policy enforcement is kept secret from other employees, organizations lose these benefits. One reflection of these loses will be lower employee trust in their organizations the longer their tenure there. Using questionnaire data from a large U.S. governmental agency, we found that lower employee trust with tenure is incrementally linearly lower over the course of employment, not the result of an early breach of the psychological contract. This occurs for employees at all hierarchical levels but is steepest for nonsupervisory employees, suggesting that employees lack information about policy enforcement may be driving this phenomenon.

We address the effects of secrecy in organizational policy enforcement. First, the legal literature that explains why court proceedings are open is summarized: openness more effectively holds decision makers and claimants accountable for truthfulness and unbiased decisions, demonstrates that the rich or powerful have not bought off the weak, supports adaptation to changing norms, and enhances the legitimacy of state authority. Next, we propose that when organizational policy enforcement is kept secret from other employees, organizations lose these benefits. One reflection of these loses will be lower employee trust in their organizations the longer their tenure there. Using questionnaire data from a large U.S. governmental agency, we found that lower employee trust with tenure is incrementally linearly lower over the course of employment, not the result of an early breach of the psychological contract. This occurs for employees at all hierarchical levels but is steepest for nonsupervisory employees, suggesting that employees lack information about policy enforcement may be driving this phenomenon.

We address the effects of secrecy in organizational policy enforcement. First, the legal literature that explains why court proceedings are open is summarized: openness more effectively holds decision makers and claimants accountable for truthfulness and unbiased decisions, demonstrates that the rich or powerful have not bought off the weak, supports adaptation to changing norms, and enhances the legitimacy of state authority. Next, we propose that when organizational policy enforcement is kept secret from other employees, organizations lose these benefits. One reflection of these loses will be lower employee trust in their organizations the longer their tenure there. Using questionnaire data from a large U.S. governmental agency, we found that lower employee trust with tenure is incrementally linearly lower over the course of employment, not the result of an early breach of the psychological contract. This occurs for employees at all hierarchical levels but is steepest for non-supervisory employees, suggesting that employees lack information about policy enforcement may be driving this phenomenon.

With the political and media spotlight falling on climate change, sustainability, the ethics of business leaders (and those in the financial services preceding the recession) as well as the other global problems in the under-developed world of poverty, HIV, etc., the business world is beginning to see the necessity of being more socially and ecologically responsible. This is not just about being 'green', but about exploring the full range of socially responsible behaviours. As Theodore Zeldin suggested in his book An Intimate History of Humanity: 'The Green Movement could not become a major political force so long as it concerned itself primarily with natural resources rather than with the full range of human desires. Its setbacks are yet another example of idealism being unable to get off the ground because it has not looked broadly enough at human aspirations in their entirety'. This book, edited by Craig Smith and his colleagues, provides the research base to this growing and increasingly important field. They focus on three key issues of corporate responsibility: embedding corporate responsibility, marketing and corporate responsibility and corporate responsibility and developing countries. Their contributors are comprised of some of the leading international scholars in the field from eight different countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, UK and the United States. This volume is based on state of the art research, which illustrates the importance of corporate responsibility, not only in terms of the ethical and environmental challenges but also because of their business imperative.

DRAWING ON A LONGITUDINAL comparative analysis of three Hungarian-Western European partnerships, it is argued that insight into the different assumptions foreigners o~en bring to their cooperative arrangements can be gained by framing such contacts as clashes in systems of legitimacy. Focusing on which partners' actions are viewed as desirable or appropriate in their respective social settings helps to illuminate the role of social support in maintaining behavior, as well as the ways assumptions are sustained and changed. These ideas are illustrated by differences between the Hungarian managers and their Western European partners in their approaches to managing authorities, and by an analysis of how Hungarian managers and government officials have maintained their familiar modes of operating despite the change from communism to capitalism.

Interview data from China are used to test an argument that executives develop personal connections in societies with underdeveloped legal support for private businesses. In China, such connections are called guanxi. An underdeveloped legal framework makes private-company executives more dependent on guanxi than executives in state-owned or collective-hybrid companies. Compared to the other executives, private-company executives considered business connections more important, depended more on connections for protection, had more government connections, gave more unreciprocated gifts, and trusted their connections more.

The work of Max Weber (1947) on "traditional authority" forms the basis for a theoretical analysis of resource allocation decisions in radical-product innovative organizations. Decisions to support particular projects must be made on arational criteria, because radical product innovation destroys existing competencies and is not subject to economic calculation. The limitations of both bureaucratic and charismatic models of the political processes governing this kind of innovation in large organizations are described. This is followed by a discussion of the traditional practices of selling offices, favoritism toward fellow kinsmen, and nonmerit evaluation criteria in the allocation of resources to innovative projects. The politics of innovative units is better characterized by reference to medieval structures of palace favorites, liege lordship, and fiefdoms, rather than to more familiar bureaucratic concepts. The argument concludes with a discussion of both the theoretical implications and the advantages and disadvantages of traditional approaches to the allocation of resources for radical product innovation. © 1990.

Citizen advisory boards are important to non-profit and governmental organizations, yet these boards face fundamental problems of ambiguous responsibilities and limited board member commitment. In the present paper a model of these propositions is developed and tested. Board performance is operationalized as productivity and board impact, and is expected to be dependent on the development of operational objectives and a subcommittee structure, which in turn is facilitated by the financial support of management, and impeded by a large board membership. The model is tested using path analysis on a national sample of federally-mandated Community Advisory Boards to public television stations. We find that the establishment of operational objectives and subcommittees is significantly associated with productivity but only weakly with the impact of the advisory board. Board size is unassociated with board performance. The findings support the assertion that successful boards must clarify their roles and develop efficient operating structures, but suggest that the advisory board-management relationship is complex. © 1985, Sage Publications. All rights reserved.

Both Pearce and Molm have conducted research in interpersonal trust. Here we apply their work to international business by deriving hypotheses from their work, some compatible, some conflicting. We test them with data from managers in China, the United States, Hong Kong and Thailand using measures from the World Bank, World Competitiveness Report, and Transparency International and managerial interviews. We find support for Pearce's arguments on the effects of governmental facilitation on managers' trust in their business partners, and for extensions of Molm's work on reciprocal exchange to international field settings. For the conflicting hypotheses, results support Pearce's arguments that the structural assurances of facilitative governments lead to higher levels of trust in business associates. © 2005 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. All rights reserved.

Many employees in the world are evaluated and rewarded at work based on who they are ("particularism") rather than based on impersonal judgments of their performance ("universalism"). Yet the field of organizational behavior has been virtually silent on how employees react to workplaces dominated by particularism. In an effort to understand the role of particularistic organizational practices, several ideas from comparative institutions theories are applied to questions of organizational behavior, and the model is tested in samples of large manufacturing and service organizations in the United States and Hungary. It was found that employees in a modernist political system (United States) did echo social scientists' claims by reporting that their employers' personnel practices were comparatively more universalistic than those in organizations operating in a neotraditional polity (Hungary). This perception of differences in personnel practices mediated the relationship between political system and employees' trust in one another, their perceptions of coworker shirking, and their organizational commitment.

The realised niche of the helmeted honeyeater, in terms of the floristic and structural attributes of the
vegetation, was determined using logistic discrimination. The vegetation was divided into two communities,
Eucalyptus camphora swampland and E. viminalis-dominated riparian forest, based on
differences observed in other studies on foraging behaviour within these two communities. The variables
describing the realised niche of the helmeted honeyeater in the E. camphora community were a high
bark index, a large number of E. camphora stems and the presence of surface water. The results for
the E. viminalis community were less conclusive, but suggest that a deep eucalypt canopy may be
important. These variables relate to the feeding and breeding biology of the helmeted honeyeater.
Habitat models of this form will allow appropriate habitat management strategies for Yellingbo State
Nature Reserve to be developed, as well as allow the suitability of potential helmeted honeyeater
release or relocation sites to be assessed.

Executives from capitalist countries are rushing to form joint ventures with enterprises in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, what do these executives really know about the management practices and working relationships in these enterprises? While numerous newsletters and professional news weeklies can provide detailed analyses of the political and legal environment for business, they provide only partial, but vivid, anecdotes about what happens inside these enterprises. Into this analytic vacuum have come untested assumptions, such as 'Employees do not work hard because they have no financial incentive'.