Suchergebnisse

Authoritarianism -- Hope disappointed -- Revolution -- Crackdown -- Militarization -- Living war -- Flight -- Reflections

Although political science increasingly investigates emotions as variables, it often ignores emotions' larger significance due to their inherence in research with human subjects. Integrating emotions into conversations on methods and ethics, I build on the term "ethnographic sensibility" to conceptualize an "emotional sensibility" that seeks to glean the emotional experiences of people who participate in research. Methodologically, emotional sensibility sharpens attention to how participants' emotions are data, influence other data, and affect future data collection. Ethically, it supplements Institutional Review Boards' rationalist emphasis on information and cognitive capacity with appreciation for how emotions infuse consent, risk, and benefit. It thereby encourages thinking not only about emotional harm but also about emotions apart from harm and about emotional harms apart from trauma and vulnerability. I operationalize emotional sensibility by tracking four dimensions of research that affect participants' emotions: the content of research, the context in which research occurs, researchers' positionality, and researchers' conduct.

Studies of refugee belonging, as a key facet of integration, primarily focus on post-flight processes. Adopting an approach to integration that is temporally and spatially broader, this article argues that refugees' varied experiences of belonging or estrangement in origin countries fundamentally condition their subsequent experiences of belonging or estrangement in settlement countries. To explore this argument, the article develops a framework that distinguishes between the psychosocial and locational aspects of home, identifying five distinct categories of experience: home in the homeland, exile in the homeland, exile outside the homeland, home outside the homeland, or overlaps of exile and home across borders. The article illustrates these categories in the Syrian case, using original interviews with displaced Syrians and a range of texts by Syrian writers. In doing so, it demonstrates how knowing whether or how refugees found belonging inside their homelands before displacement enriches understandings of who refugees are, what they seek, and what home or exile means to them. While these pre-flight experiences cannot precisely predict integration outcomes, they shape the frame of reference that refugees carry into homemaking in refuge and, thus, the experiences of belonging that they develop there.

AbstractIn discussions about the connection between migration and the Arab uprisings, perhaps no expression has been more commonplace than "refugee crisis." Commentators have typically invoked this term to refer to Europe's struggle with large numbers of refugees and migrants reaching European borders since 2015. They sometimes also invoke it with reference to countries in the Middle East and North Africa, where the overwhelming majority of the region's forced migrants continue to reside in their countries of the first refuge. But what does "refugee crisis" mean for refugees themselves? I explore this question based on open‐ended interviews that I have conducted with more than 450 displaced Syrians across five continents since 2012. I discuss a major crisis that emerges repeatedly in those conversations, as it does across various mediums of Syrian self‐expression: the crisis of dignity. Weaving Syrians' reflections on dignity together with my own analysis, this essay discourages analysts and policy‐makers from making assumptions about displaced people's concerns and priorities. Rather, I argue, they should listen when displaced people describe and analyze their own experiences, and then work to ensure that those experiences inform policy interventions and service provision.

AbstractMuch ink has been spilled on the pros and cons of U.S. president Barack Obama's decision not to strike the regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad after that regime launched a deadly chemical weapons attack in 2013. Often missing from those debates, however, are the perspectives of Syrians themselves. While not all Syrians oppose Assad, and not all opponents endorsed intervention, many Syrian oppositionists resolutely called for Obama to uphold his "red line" militarily. As part of the roundtable "The Ethics of Limited Strikes," this essay analyzes diverse expressions of such opinion and finds that they highlight three dimensions of the ethical case for limited strikes against Assad. First, they remind us that the ethical context of the red line question was many Syrians' sense of abandonment by the international community. Second, they emphasize the ethical stakes of the limited strikes; namely an opportunity to hold the Syrian regime accountable, weaken it from within, and thus change the equation of the war. Third, they make sense of the ethical consequences of the nonintervention outcome, and especially its effect in deepening civilians' despair, accelerating extremism, and convincing Assad and his allies that they could kill with impunity. These views controvert both legalistic arguments precluding military intervention and assumptions that U.S. intervention is always imperialist and warmongering. In this case, consideration of the case for military intervention from the viewpoint of those on whose behalf the intervention would have taken place challenges us to think deeply about circumstances in which limited strikes might be not only ethically justified but also imperative.

Core social movement research argues that large-scale challenges to authority build upon preexisting organization and civil society resources. How do dissenters mobilize masses in repressive settings where, given curtailment of civil society, autonomous associations scarcely exist and norms discourage trust more than encourage it? Testimonials from the Syrian uprising illustrate how protest can become widespread under such conditions, yet occurs through processes different from what dominant theory expects. Activists get demonstrations off the ground by planning around awareness of their organizational deficits. Once in motion, contention propels both organization and increasing organizational sophistication. To be effective, mobilization sometimes evades or obscures established social relationships, even as it produces new forms of sociability. Bridging literatures on mass and clandestine mobilization, this research reconsiders the assumed sequential logic of movement development from organization to protest, rather than vice versa. It also shifts attention from movement antecedents toward the resourcefulness and strategy that enable mobilizing both from scratch and at grave risk.

Refugees' preflight class interacts with host state policies to shape refugees' postdisplacement class trajectories. This interaction affects whether refugees of different backgrounds experience mobility over time and how refugees of various backgrounds disperse over space. "Selective
engagement" hosts that leave refugees to self-settle accentuate stratification insofar as refugees with capital can attain entrepreneurial success, poor refugees lack protection from further impoverishment, and middle-class professionals have both the means and motivation to try to migrate
elsewhere. "Interventionist engagement" hosts lessen the gap between rich and poor both by attracting middle-class refugees and by imposing integration programs that further compress all refugees toward the middle. Demonstrating these arguments, analysis of Syrian refugees in Turkey and Germany
illustrates a diaspora's class-remaking in ways not attributable to displacement alone.

Six and a half years after the start of the Arab uprisings, the initial euphoria of popular mobilization and optimism in revolutionary change is an increasingly distant memory. While a few countries in the region are moving in the direction of greater openness, most are gripped by a resurgent authoritarianism that is ever more repressive. Some states are collapsing amid mass violence and humanitarian catastrophe. In others, threat of brutal punishment continues to enforce red lines against permissible speech and action, even as those red lines continue to shift.

Cascade models explain the roles of the intrepid few who initiate protest and the masses who join when the expected utility of dissent flips from negative to positive. Yet questions remain about what motivates participation between those points on the causal chain, or under any conditions of high risk. To explain these anomalies, this article employs theories of moral identity to explore the interdependence of a facet of decision making that rationalist models typically regard as fixed: individuals' awareness of and need to express values central to their sense of self. Three mechanisms describe ways that individuals' responses to early risers trigger moral identity-based motivations for protest. First, by conjuring normative ideals, first movers can activate bystanders' urge to follow their example in order to earn their own self-respect. Secondly, by demonstrating the joy of agency, early risers can inspire bystanders' desire to experience the same gratification. Thirdly, by absorbing punishments, early risers can activate onlookers' sense of moral obligation to contribute to collective efforts. These mechanisms redouble bystanders' sense of the inherent value of protest, apart from its instrumental utility, and intensify their acceptance of risks, independent of the actual risks anticipated. Original interviews with displaced Syrians about their participation in demonstrations illustrate these processes.

Scholarship on Syria has traditionally been limited by researchers' difficulty in accessing the reflections of ordinary citizens due to their reluctance to speak about politics. The 2011 revolt opened exciting opportunities by producing an outpouring of new forms of self-expression, as well as encouraging millions to tell their stories for the first time. I explore what we can learn from greater attention to such data, based on thick descriptive analysis of original interviews with 200 Syrian refugees. I find that individuals' narratives coalesce into a collective narrative emphasizing shifts in political fear. Before the uprising, fear was a pillar of the state's coercive authority. Popular demonstrations generated a new experience of fear as a personal barrier to be surmounted. As rebellion militarized into war, fear became a semi-normalized way of life. Finally, protracted violence has produced nebulous fears of an uncertain future. Study of these testimonials aids understanding of Syria and other cases of destabilized authoritarianism by elucidating lived experiences obscured during a repressive past, providing a fresh window into the construction and evolution of national identity, and demonstrating how the act of narration is an exercise in meaning making within a revolution and itself a revolutionary practice.