Suchergebnisse

The author discusses the little-known details of the process by which British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet Party Secretary Joseph Stalin corresponded with each other during World War II. Churchill's correspondence to Stalin was widely discussed among and reviewed by members of the Cabinet before being finally sent to Moscow. The comments that Churchill's ministers and other members of the government made about the correspondence preserve the genuine attitude of the British elite toward their Soviet ally. K. Cargill

Based on the unearthed documents from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, the article examines an interaction of Russian diplomacy and Russian orthodox churches abroad in the process of their reform in the early 1860-s. This reorganization was undertaken in context of the "Great reforms" of Alexander II and aimed at rationalization of the previous system of subordination of those churches to civil and ecclesiastical authorities in St. Petersburg. The architects of the reform initiated by the Tzar himself sought to create a unified system of subordination and financing of those churches with identical criteria for their personnel, their rights and duties vis-à-vis heads of diplomatic missions. Accordingly, the Russian Foreign Ministry became responsible for their operation and financing while in ecclesiastical matters they were to answer to the Holy Synod. Foreign Ministry and personally Alexander Gorchakov, as demonstrated in the article, played a leading role in the reform preparation and implementation conducted on an inter-agency basis with the Holy Synod, Ministry of the Court and Finance Ministry taking part. The heads of diplomatic missions and of the affiliated churches were also consulted in the process. The authors trace all stages of these complex negotiations that resulted in achieving a balance of interests between all the actors involved. The newly created system proved to be quite efficient and lasted till the end of the Russian empire. The reorganization revealed a state of the churches abroad and their clergy that was a crème of Russian Orthodox Church. The reform experience is also instructive as a case study of Russian government apparatus in action.

Based on an analysis of documentary sources from Russian, American, and British archives, this article delves into the intricacies of coalition diplomacy among the Allies during World War II. It places special emphasis on the adherence to obligations and coalition behavior norms, encompassing respect for partners' interests, maintaining unity amidst divergences, coordinating actions towards shared objectives, and avoiding actions that risk coalition breakdown. The comparative analysis of Soviet and Anglo-American diplomacy reveals that the principal members of the anti-Hitler coalition generally adhered to these norms, contributing to the ultimate defeat of their common adversary. However, the study indicates that the Soviet Union exhibited greater fidelity in fulfilling its obligations and was more proactive in institutionalizing the coalition for enhanced stability and equal participation in strategic decision-making for war conduct and postwar arrangements. This quest for parity was often impeded by the Western powers' reluctance to accept the Soviet Union as an enduring, equal partner and legitimate member of the great powers' club, both during and after the war. This hesitance, the article argues, was rooted not just in geopolitical considerations but also in deep-seated cultural factors, particularly the traditional Western sense of superiority and perception of Russia as a 'lesser' civilization not fit for inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic community. The article brings to light lesser-known documents from US and UK archives to illustrate this mindset. It also acknowledges dissenting voices in Anglo-American political spheres who advocated for a more equitable relationship with the USSR. However, these perspectives did not significantly alter the overarching direction of Western policy.

The "Founding fathers" of American Studies at MGIMO are considered to be A.V. Efimov and L.I. Clove. Alexey Efimov - Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences since 1938, Head of the Department of Modern and Contemporary History and Dean of the Historical School at the Moscow State University - one of the first professors of the Faculty of International Relations MGIMO. Efimov distinguished himself by a broad vision and scope of scientific interests. Back in 1934 he published a monograph "On the history of capitalism in the United States," which initiated a series of research culminating in the fundamental work "The United States. The path of capitalist development (pre-imperialist era)". Alexey was not only a great scientist but also a great teacher, whose lectures was popular throughout Moscow. His lecture courses, given at the end of the 1940s at MGIMO, became the basis for the first post-war history textbooks USA - "Essays on the history of the United States." At least as colorful a figure was Professor Leo Izrailevich Zubok - a man of unusual destiny. As a teenager he emigrated to the United States with his parents, where he soon joined the American revolutionary movement in the 1920s and was forced to leave the country. He came to MGIMO being already an experienced scientists. His research interests were very wide: from the study of American foreign policy expansion to the history of the labor movement in the United States. Zubok's fundamental works still have not lost its scientific significance. He has successfully combined scientific work with teaching. Tutorials that are based on his lectures were very popular not only among students of MGIMO.

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Using less-known documents from American and British archives the article examines the impact of developments on Soviet-German front in late 1942 on military-political planning in U.S. and U.K. with a special emphasis on the second front problem. It is demonstrated how deeply the German defeat at Stalingrad affected Anglo-American military and intelligence estimates of situation at Soviet- German front and prospects of the war in general.

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