Search results

En avril 2002, après 27 années de guerre civile, l'Angola est officiellement « entré en paix » suite à la défaite militaire du principal mouvement rebelle, l'Unita, et à la mort de son leader historique Jonas Savimbi. En septembre 2008, des élections législatives, les premières depuis 1992 et les deuxièmes que le pays ait jamais connues, sont censées consacrer la « normalisation » du pays et sa transition démocratique. Alors que les tentatives précédentes de sortie de conflit s'étaient soldées par de retentissants échecs, la paix semble cette fois bien installée. Pourtant, la transition « à l'angolaise » n'est pas sans ambiguïtés, limites ni contradictions. Ce dossier en analyse les principaux ressorts, et montre comment le MPLA, au faîte de sa puissance politique et économique grâce à sa victoire militaire et à un boom économique sans précédent soutenu par les ressources pétrolières du pays, a fait main basse sur une transition qui a tout de la « reconversion autoritaire ».

En avril 2002, après 27 années de guerre civile, l'Angola est officiellement « entré en paix » suite à la défaite militaire du principal mouvement rebelle, l'Unita, et à la mort de son leader historique Jonas Savimbi. En septembre 2008, des élections législatives, les premières depuis 1992 et les deuxièmes que le pays ait jamais connues, sont censées consacrer la « normalisation » du pays et sa transition démocratique. Alors que les tentatives précédentes de sortie de conflit s'étaient soldées par de retentissants échecs, la paix semble cette fois bien installée. Pourtant, la transition « à l'angolaise » n'est pas sans ambiguïtés, limites ni contradictions. Ce dossier en analyse les principaux ressorts, et montre comment le MPLA, au faîte de sa puissance politique et économique grâce à sa victoire militaire et à un boom économique sans précédent soutenu par les ressources pétrolières du pays, a fait main basse sur une transition qui a tout de la « reconversion autoritaire ».

La recherche récente sur l'histoire du colonialisme montre comment le savoir colonial a servi à la fois de socle à l'édification de l'État colonial et de base identitaire à la revendication nationaliste. À partir de l'analyse d'un cas, celui de l'Angola, où le rôle du savoir dans la stratégie coloniale a été différent, cet article émet l'hypothèse qu'il y a un lien entre la faiblesse du « projet documentaire » de l'État colonial et celle de l'expression politique du nationalisme. Surtout, il met le doigt sur la manière dont l'atrophie de l'État colonial et les phénomènes de « décharge » – notamment au profit des missions chrétiennes – qu'elle implique ont favorisé la multiplicité et le cloisonnement des imaginaires politiques au nom desquels s'est faite la lutte nationaliste.

Dans l'Angola de l'après-guerre civile, l'Église tokoïste, une Église prophétique chrétienne née à l'époque coloniale, est devenue un acteur religieux, social et moral incontournable et, en même temps, un partenaire du gouvernement. Cet article suggère que le rôle politique de cette Église et sa proximité avec le gouvernement s'expliquent par le dispositif de « subjectivation citoyenne » que son histoire et sa trajectoire spirituelle ont forgé. Depuis la fin de la guerre civile, ce dispositif se distingue par une présence affirmée dans l'espace public, social et politique qui rompt avec la tradition de retrait de l'Église. La subjectivation citoyenne est analysée ici comme un processus par lequel se construit un sujet fidèle/citoyen, incarnation d'une société pacifiée, et s'opère son assujettissement au pouvoir politique.

Dominant narratives and theories developed at the turn of the 21st century in order to account for civil wars in Africa converged around the idea that this upsurge in violence was linked to state failure or decay. Violent conflict thus came to be seen as the expression of the weakness, disintegration and collapse of political institutions in the post-colonial world, and guerrilla movements, once viewed as the ideological armed wings of Cold War contenders, as roving bandits interested in plundering the spoils left by decaying states. Recent research has however shown that, against the reductionism that underlay such accounts, we need to move beyond the search for the motives that bring rebels and rebel movement to wage war against the established order and look into the (micro-)politics of civil war. Indeed, civil wars do not simply destroy political orders. They contribute to shaping and producing them. Civil wars, in other words, are part and parcel of processes of state formation. This working paper looks at state formation through violent conflict. It focuses on political orders put in place by rebel movements, on their strategy to legitimise their very existence as movements and their claim to power, and on the extent to which they strive and manage to institutionalise their military power and transform it into political domination. It discusses some of the recent literature on the topic and offers some avenues of new research on the complex interplay between civil wars and state formation. It concentrates on the manner in which statehood, understood as a historical and constantly changing process of institutionalization of power relations, is 'negotiated' during and after conflict. It is this 'negotiation' that will allow scholars to better understand what "legitimate institutions" are and how they are shaped by and through civil wars.

In current debates about climate change, the environment is often seen as a potential cause of violent conflicts. According to this view, environmental degradation will significantly increase the stress put on various societies, particularly in so-called weak and fragile states, and thereby cause political destabilisation and violence while jeopardising national and international security. Drawing on research conducted within the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South programme, this article shows that establishing such direct causal links is simplistic and reductionist. While recognising that climate change, and especially resource scarcity, can lead to violent conflict, we argue that, when trying to understand the relationships between changes in the environment and violent conflict, it is crucial to put social and human dimensions at the centre of the analysis. Climate change may render human interaction and social regulation more difficult, but it will hardly ever directly affect the probability of violence. Climate policy will not bring about peace any more than peace policy will improve the climate. In other words, the missing link in current debates about environmental conflicts is the key role played by political, social, and cultural institutions in mediating between the two terms of the equation.

This article, which forms the introduction to a collection of studies, focuses on processes of state construction and deconstruction in contemporary Africa. Its objective is to better understand how local, national and transnational actors forge and remake the state through processes of negotiation, contestation and bricolage. Following a critique of the predominant state failure literature and its normative and analytical shortcomings, the authors identify four key arguments of the scholarly literature on the state in Africa, which concern the historicity of the state in Africa, the embeddedness of bureaucratic organizations in society, the symbolic and material dimensions of statehood and the importance of legitimacy. A heuristic framework entitled 'negotiating statehood' is proposed, referring to the dynamic and partly undetermined processes of state formation and failure by a multitude of social actors who compete over the institutionalization of power relations. The article then operationalizes this framework in three sections that partly conceptualize, partly illustrate who negotiates statehood in contemporary Africa (actors, resources and repertoires); where these negotiation processes occur (negotiation arenas and tables); and what these processes are all about (objects of negotiation). Empirical examples drawn from a variety of political contexts across the African continent illustrate these propositions.

Depuis une vingtaine d'années, on assiste en Afrique à un essor sans précédent de mouvements religieux de tous ordres: Églises pentecôtistes, mouvements issus du renouveau catholique charismatique, mouvements confrériques et islamistes, Églises de guérison ou encore cultes dits « néotraditionnels ». La crise socio-économique et politique que traverse le continent constitue la toile de fond de cette expansion. Mais elle ne suffit pas à en expliquer les ressorts profonds.

Depuis une vingtaine d'années, on assiste en Afrique à un essor sans précédent de mouvements religieux de tous ordres: Églises pentecôtistes, mouvements issus du renouveau catholique charismatique, mouvements confrériques et islamistes, Églises de guérison ou encore cultes dits « néotraditionnels ». La crise socio-économique et politique que traverse le continent constitue la toile de fond de cette expansion. Mais elle ne suffit pas à en expliquer les ressorts profonds.

In the course of the past four decades, participation has been mainstreamed in development research and practice. However, despite very widespread use of the term, there is no consensus on its definition, and it has generated intense and controversial debate. Taking stock of some fifty publications developed within the framework of the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South on the topic, this paper opens up new avenues of research while offering a critical appraisal of social and political participation in sustainable development research and practice. The mainstreaming of participation has corresponded to an increasingly technical approach to the question. What the body of literature discussed here suggests is that more attention should be given to power relationships and governance processes in analysing the participatory dynamics of development. Participation is primarily a political problem relating to power relations and (im)balances in a given society. It is, therefore, not a 'simple' norm whose implementation would be a prerequisite for "good governance" and sustainable development. It is an arena, a physical or symbolic space where key social issues such as, for example, access to resources, gender inequalities, access to land, or land rights are debated and negotiated.

Civil wars do not only destroy existing political orders. They contribute to shaping new ones, and thereby play a crucial role in dynamics of state formation. This working paper is based on a 2-year research project funded by the Swiss Network of International Studies and conducted by a consortium of five research institutions in Switzerland and Africa. It reflects on the social construction of order and legitimacy during and after violent conflict by focusing on political orders put in place by armed groups, their strategies to legitimize their (violent) action as well as their claim to power, and on the extent to which they strive and manage to institutionalize their military power and transform it into political domination. Drawing on case studies in Angola, Côte d'Ivoire and South Sudan, it shows how strategies of legitimization are central to understanding the politics of armed groups and their relation to the state, how international aid agencies impact on the legitimacy of armed groups and state actors, and how continuities between war and peace, especially in key sectors such as security forces, need to be taken into account in any effort at establishing long-term peace and stability.

Religion and Politics in a Global Society: Comparative Perspectives from the Portuguese Speaking World, edited by Paul Christopher Manuel, Alynna Lyon, and Clyde Wilcox, explores the legacy of the Portuguese colonial experience, with careful consideration of the lasting impression that this experience has had on the cultural, religious, and political dynamics in the former colonies