Churchill, Chamberlain and appeasement
Chamberlain : guilty man? -- Why historians differ on appeasement -- Two contrasting personalities -- Who was who in Whitehall -- The intelligence services -- Churchill and Whitehall in the 1930s -- Measuring power -- Sea power -- Air power -- Land power -- Defence industries -- The wider economy -- Public opinion and national morale -- Collective security -- Intelligence and perceptions of power -- Dealing with the great depression -- The war debts controversy -- Manchuria and the end of the ten year rule -- Disarmament and defence requirements, 1932-34 -- Reshaping grand strategy, 1934 -- Anglo-Japanese relations -- The German threat increases -- The Ethiopian crisis -- Drawing up the rearmament programme -- The Rhineland crisis and after -- Rearmament and the role of the army -- Financing rearmament -- Relations with the United States and Japan -- Seeking a general settlement in Europe -- The Inskip defence review -- Eden's resignation -- First reactions to the threat to Czechoslovakia -- From May 'crisis' to September crisis -- Berchtesgaden and Godesberg -- Munich -- The aftermath of Munich -- Towards a continental commitment -- Chamberlain still hoping for the best -- The end of Czechoslovakia -- The guarantee to Poland -- Negotiations with the Soviets -- Secret contacts with Germans -- The decision for war -- The 'phoney war' -- Norway and the fall of Chamberlain's government -- Finest hour -- The limits of British power -- What would Churchill have done? -- Would it have been better to fight in 1938? -- Concluding reflections.