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While politicians are often seen as being motivated by narrow self-interest, this article offers an alternative view. The relationship between two pro-social dimensions - Commitment to the Public Interest (CPI) and User Orientation (UO) - and behavioural outcomes among local councillors is analyzed. The raison d'etre for the local councils is to define the public interest. In line with this, CPI, which is directed towards doing good for the public interest, is associated with working hours and political influence; this is much less so for UO, which is directed towards doing good for individual citizens. Behavioural outcomes are thus greater if there is a fit between the personal motivation and the organizational environment. This has implications for democracy, as a fit could lead to a race to the top. The data are based on a survey of local councillors in Denmark in 2009. Adapted from the source document.

While politicians are often seen as being motivated by narrow self‐interest, this article offers an alternative view. The relationship between two pro‐social dimensions – Commitment to the Public Interest (CPI) and User Orientation (UO) – and behavioural outcomes among local councillors is analyzed. The raison d'être for the local councils is to define the public interest. In line with this,CPI, which is directed towards doing good for the public interest, is associated with working hours and political influence; this is much less so forUO, which is directed towards doing good for individual citizens. Behavioural outcomes are thus greater if there is a fit between the personal motivation and the organizational environment. This has implications for democracy, as a fit could lead to a race to the top. The data are based on a survey of local councillors in Denmark in 2009.

In this article, insights from diverging institutional perspectives on the concept of ideas are integrated into a sequential analysis of mechanisms of transfer & transformation. The analysis of the introduction of eco-taxation into two policy sectors in the Scandinavian countries shows that, as the idea of eco-taxation transfers, a well-known instrument can be framed as rational & legitimate, & policy-makers 'hook' on to the idea in order to solve problems with institutionalized areas of responsibility. In this way, what at one point may be regarded as a virus-like attack of a regulatory idea is influenced by the more stable configuration of administrative bias & organized interests when transformed into actual regulation. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract.  There is a missing link between studies that investigate how regulation is becoming more similar, on the one hand, and studies that focus on how national policy styles and administrative traditions create patterns of stable diversity on the other. This article attempts to bridge these views in an analysis of how ideas transform as they transfer. The article shows that the idea of creating independent regulatory authorities (IRAs) has become institutionalized as a 'script' regarding how the regulation of liberalized electricity markets ought to be organized. This script has transferred to the European Union 15 Member States (EU‐15) in processes moving from mimetic and normative to more coercive isomorphism, but the transformation is influenced by the way the need for credibility is mediated by contextual factors. Thus IRAs have more formal independence in countries formerly dominated by state ownership, where policy makers are perceived as corrupt and where decentralization is low. In this way, the analysis reveals how impulses of institutional change from the international arena are mediated by more stable and robust institutional factors at the domestic level.

The impact of European integration differs over time and between states. This article demonstrates how the increasing europeanisation of CO2 regulation in the Scandinavian countries has lead to increasing convergence in the regulatory systems for very important target groups. The same system is being implemented in EU-member states (Denmark and Sweden) and an EEA member state (Norway), but at this stage the implementation is dissimilar in the sense that the established CO2 tax delimits where quotas are introduced in Norway. In contrast, however, the quota systems in Sweden and Denmark delimit to a higher extent where the CO2 taxation continues to exist. However, at this stage, it cannot be concluded that the variation is due to different degrees of Europeanisation.

CO2 taxes on industry increased in the Scandinavian countries over the course of the 1990s, whereas taxation on agricultural emissions of nitrogen stagnated or decreased. Variations between the two policy fields can in part be explained by contrasting ideational viabilities. Two diverging expert communities exist in the agricultural sector: the first is dominated by agricultural scientists, whose analytical vantage point is field production; the other is dominated by economists; whose analytical vantage point comprises overall socio-economic benefits. In the debate between these diverging models of cognition, the taxation of nitrogen is increasingly perceived as inefficient & unfair. Administrative bias & the position in the ministerial hierarchy affect the advice passed on to policy makers. The political viability of nitrogen taxes consequently decreases as politicians hesitate to employ a policy measure that can be cast into doubt on scientific grounds by the political opposition & agricultural organisations. Instead, alternative instruments developed by agricultural scientist are employed. Thus, the interaction between ideas & interests can contribute to our understanding of why the idea of externality taxation gains more political trenchancy in relation to the taxation of industrial CO2 emissions than in the taxation of nitrogen emissions from agriculture. 64 References. Adapted from the source document.

The impact of European integration differs over time & between states. This article demonstrates how the increasing europeanisation of CO2 regulation in the Scandinavian countries has lead to increasing convergence in the regulatory systems for very important target groups. The same system is being implemented in EU-member states (Denmark & Sweden) & an EEA member state (Norway), but at this stage the implementation is dissimilar in the sense that the established CO2 tax delimits where quotas are introduced in Norway. In contrast, however, the quota systems in Sweden & Denmark delimit to a higher extent where the CO2 taxation continues to exist. However, at this stage, it cannot be concluded that the variation is due to different degrees of Europeanisation. Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

It is becoming difficult to maintain consensus in a period of economic austerity, and this possibly challenges the ability of democratic institutions to take decisions on tough economic questions. In order to find out how political consensus influences fiscal outcomes, this article sets out to analyse the association between political consensus and public expenditure growth. The results show that political consensus is positively associated with both budgeted and actual expenditure growth, but also negatively associated with budget overruns. This indicates that political consensus comes at a cost, while at the same time politicians may be better at sticking to budgets if political consensus exists. The analysis is based on a pooled regression analysis of the local governments in Denmark in the years 2008 and 2009 using a data set combining survey data with administrative data on the local governments. Adapted from the source document.

The realist evaluation (RE) approach is a promising contribution to the literature on theory-driven evaluation.Thus far, RE has mainly been applied to the evaluation of human service programmes, but the aim of this article is to investigate if it can be extended to large-scale public sector reforms, in casu: the reform of the electricity market in Denmark. Five areas of regulation under the reform were selected and hypotheses on the context, mechanism and outcome (CMO) for each intervention were formulated. The evaluation of three of these interventions is summarized: opening markets to foreign trade, price regulation of monopolies and consumer protection. The article concludes that the CMO framework is applicable not just to interventions at the programme level, but also to large-scale public sector reform characterized by high technical complexity and strong policy coalitions. However, it only serves as a general framework, which has to be substantiated.This is done, first, by generating theories — i.e. programme theories — on each specific intervention. Second, theories are produced at the meso level to identify the institutional patterns that function as conditions for the effects to be obtained.

Citizens are generally opposed to politicians receiving a high pay. We investigate the degree to which this aversion is moderated by citizens' individual-level trust in politicians and whether institutional delegation can moderate the reactions to proposed changes in politicians' pay. Using a survey experiment, we confirm that trust in politicians is a key predictor of attitudes regarding their pay. Distrust toward politicians seems to matter much more than general attitudes on income inequality when citizens form opinions on politicians' pay. Furthermore, citizens' aversion to high pay for politicians is affected by institutional delegation, but such delegation only lessen the opposition to pay raises modestly, leaving most citizens firmly against pay raises for politicians. Finally, while citizens' trust in politicians matters greatly for their attitudes regarding politicians pay, proposed changes in politicians' pay do not conversely affect citizen's perceptions of the politicians.