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The divide separating the political left from right is often expressed in specific numbers. The proper size of unemployment benefits is a key example of such a disagreement, with the left generally favoring higher levels of benefits than the right. However, little is currently known about how voters make up their mind on such policy relevant numbers. Using two survey experiments, this article shows that while Danish voters' attitudes on unemployment benefits are correlated with their ideological position, they may also be strongly affected by the ways in which politically relevant numbers are presented and elicited. Specifically, when making up their minds on such numbers, voters are highly susceptible to anchoring effects and a unit effect. Furthermore, voters are affected more by precise numbers than by round numbers. Together, these results suggest that political actors may in some cases move public opinion closer to specific policy positions simply by presenting the relevant numbers in certain ways.

AbstractPolitically relevant numbers often have very limited effects on the policy attitudes of ordinary citizens, which make the widespread use of numbers by politicians somewhat puzzling. This paper argues that politicians' numerical rhetoric may function as a voter heuristic and that the use of numbers by politicians therefore has a positive impact on voters' perceptions of these politicians. A survey experiment confirms that even when numbers do little to move voters' policy positions, numbers do have the effect of making politicians appear more competent. As a consequence, numerical rhetoric can in some cases increase electoral support for a politician.

Numbers permeate modern political communication. While current scholarship on framing effects has focused on the persuasive effects of words and arguments, this article shows that framing of numbers can also substantially affect policy preferences. Such effects are caused by ratio bias, which is a general tendency to focus on numerators and pay insufficient attention to denominators in ratios. Using a population‐based survey experiment, I demonstrate how differently framed but logically equivalent representations of the exact same numerical value can have large effects on citizens' preferences regarding salient political issues such as education and taxes. Furthermore, the effects of numerical framing are found across most groups of the population, largely regardless of their political predisposition and their general ability to understand and use numerical information. These findings have significant implications for our understanding of framing effects and the role played by numbers in public opinion formation.

Abstract
Can democracies attract and elect politicians who are both high-ability and from diverse backgrounds? Using data covering the entire Danish population, including every candidate for local and national elections in 1990–2015, we explore the selection of political candidates. We show that Danish candidates and elected politicians have higher ability than the voters they represent, that selection on ability reflects individual skills rather than social background, that politicians are selected from economically diverse backgrounds, and that there is no substantial trade-off between ability and representation. Furthermore, we utilize a major structural reform, which significantly reduced the number of municipalities in Denmark, to show that increased political competition did not affect politicians' ability, economic background, or the trade-off between the two.

Citizens are generally opposed to politicians receiving a high pay. We investigate the degree to which this aversion is moderated by citizens' individual-level trust in politicians and whether institutional delegation can moderate the reactions to proposed changes in politicians' pay. Using a survey experiment, we confirm that trust in politicians is a key predictor of attitudes regarding their pay. Distrust toward politicians seems to matter much more than general attitudes on income inequality when citizens form opinions on politicians' pay. Furthermore, citizens' aversion to high pay for politicians is affected by institutional delegation, but such delegation only lessen the opposition to pay raises modestly, leaving most citizens firmly against pay raises for politicians. Finally, while citizens' trust in politicians matters greatly for their attitudes regarding politicians pay, proposed changes in politicians' pay do not conversely affect citizen's perceptions of the politicians.

AbstractNumbers are ubiquitous in modern political communication and discussions. The relationship between numbers and policy attitudes is therefore a key issue for public opinion research. This article explores the degree to which voters can translate their ideological predispositions into numerical policy preferences. Further, we theorize and investigate how numerical framing can affect this translation of ideology into numerical preferences. Using a survey experiment, we show that voters' ideological differences are reflected in their numerical preferences, but that they are also highly affected by numerical framing, specifically gain–loss framing and unit framing. These results have implications for our theoretical understanding of framing effects, and they suggest that politicians can markedly affect the attitudes of voters through strategic use of numerical framing.

Recent studies of attitudes toward economic inequality suggest that most people around the world prefer very low levels of inequality, despite well-known trends toward greater inequality within many countries. Even within countries, people across the political spectrum are said to be in remarkable agreement about the ideal level of economic inequality. Using survey data from 40 countries and a novel survey experiment in the United States, we show that this apparent agreement is illusory. When relying on a widely used cross-national survey measure of Ideal Pay Ratios, preferred levels of inequality are heavily influenced by two well-documented sources of perceptual distortion: the anchoring effect and ratio bias. These effects are substantial and many times larger than the influence of fundamental political predispositions. As a result, these cross-national survey measures tapping preferences regarding economic inequality produce misleading conclusions about desired levels of inequality.

In today's high-choice media environments, newscasts increasingly compete for viewers against multiple entertainment options. This development has led to concerns over the demise of inadvertent news audiences, which is especially problematic for public service broadcasters who have an obligation to provide news to all segments of the population. However, this study demonstrates how entertainment shows can be used to create a favourable opportunity structure that generates substantial inadvertent news audiences. Using Danish TV meter data from 2008 to 2016, we show that scheduling the music talent show The X Factor before and after the newscast on the main public service channel increased news audiences dramatically. These 'grab' and 'wrap' effects of entertainment were particularly strong among young people and people with low news interest, and the effects became even stronger over time. Consequently, entertainment shows, indirectly, play a positive democratic role, by increasing the viewership of newscasts.

At the end of their political career, some politicians pass through 'a revolving door', while others face 'a closed door', in the sense that they have difficulty finding a job after their incumbency. Based on in‐depth interviews with 15 Danish ex‐ministers, this study shows how a minister's specialized skills, knowledge and networks related to the decision‐making processes of government are considered by the ministers themselves to be important contextual factors that can lead to a revolving‐door scenario for an ex‐minister. Conversely, political profiling and a negative celebrity effect are key mechanisms that are considered to lead to a closed‐door career outcome for ex‐ministers. This closed door career outcome may discourage people from seeking a political career in the first place, and it may result in politicians continuing in politics after having lost the motivation that originally inspired their political career. Thus, the closed door phenomenon constitutes a potential democratic problem, knowledge of which is therefore an important addition to our knowledge on the democratic problems linked to the exit side of political careers.

While politicians' remuneration is a key issue in the relationship between citizens and politicians, there is still limited knowledge about the politicians' own views on this issue. This article investigates how politicians' attitudes regarding pay are affected by their motivation, political ideology and party position as well as institutional position. Using data from a survey among municipal politicians in Denmark (n = 838), our analyses suggest that politicians with different levels of extrinsic motivation sort into parties with different political ideologies. Left‐wing politicians express a strong distaste for high pay, probably for strategic as well as ideological reasons. In addition, institutional position matters. Chairmen prefer higher rewards for chairmen, but the backbenchers also prefer higher rewards for the chairmen—if they come from the same party. The results help us understand why politicians do not necessarily act in line with the fundamental assumption that individuals prefer more pay to less.

Abstract
Citizens value competence in politicians. However, while offering high pay is a key strategy when recruiting competent candidates in the job market, most citizens are highly averse to paying politicians higher salaries. We argue that this aversion arises from one fundamental concern among citizens: self-interested politicians. Using data from a large-scale preregistered survey experiment, we show that citizens are affected by the argument that higher salaries may attract self-interested politicians, whereas they are not affected by the argument that higher salaries will attract competent politicians. Surprisingly, the more positively citizens view politicians, the more they are affected by the argument about self-interested politicians. These results suggest that citizens may view modest salaries as a guard against self-interested politicians.

The rewards of politicians are a key part of the implicit contract between politicians and citizens, and the effect of these rewards on democratic legitimacy and political recruitment is a central concern in public debate and democratic theory. Using a survey experiment, we show how citizens respond to hypothetical changes in politicians' pay. The results indicate that citizens express lower levels of trust in the politicians when these politicians award themselves higher pecuniary rewards. However, our results also show that a devious strategy in which the rewards for politicians are less transparent ensures lower opposition from citizens than open and transparent strategies. Based on this, we outline a reinvigoration of the research agenda on "rewards at the top."